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Gilroy v. Astrue

Citation: 351 F. App'x 714Docket: No. 08-4908

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; November 8, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

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Billie Jo Gilroy appeals a summary judgment favoring the Commissioner in her Social Security disability case. The court, led by Circuit Judge Stapleton, will affirm the judgment. The record includes a report from Gilroy’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Wang, which assigns her a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 45, indicating serious symptoms or significant impairment in social or occupational functioning. Gilroy argues that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred by not explaining the rejection of this score and reconciling it with his own findings. However, the ALJ determined Gilroy did not meet the Social Security Act’s definition of disability from June 15, 2003, to April 11, 2007, identifying her impairments as bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. The ALJ assessed her limitations as moderate in social functioning and concentration. Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Gilroy could perform simple, routine tasks without exertional limitations, while her social anxiety restricted her interactions. The opinion articulated substantial evidence supporting these conclusions and addressed the lack of specific limitations in Dr. Wang’s report. The court found no requirement for the ALJ to further comment on the GAF score, as it did not conflict with the ALJ’s findings regarding Gilroy’s limitations.

Gilroy and her husband provided testimony to the ALJ regarding her impairments and their impact on her work capabilities, but the ALJ found their accounts "only partially credible." This conclusion was based on her daily activities, objective medical evidence, and treating medical opinions. Gilroy argued that the ALJ failed to explain the rejection of her husband’s testimony, but it was determined that the ALJ's partial crediting of his testimony was based on similar reasoning as applied to Gilroy’s. 

Gilroy requested that the District Court remand her case to the Commissioner to consider three additional pieces of evidence: evaluations by Dr. Lindsay Groves (August 30, 2007) and Dr. Chantal Deines (June 6, 2008), and a notice of award for disability benefits (August 1, 2008). The District Court declined the remand, which was not considered an abuse of discretion. For a remand based on new evidence under 42 U.S.C. 405(g), the evidence must be new, material, and relevant to the period for which benefits were denied, with good cause for not including it earlier. 

Gilroy did not demonstrate good cause for not securing Dr. Groves’ evaluation in time for the ALJ, nor did she show it could change the ALJ’s decision. Dr. Groves’ report was deemed not significantly different from Dr. Wang’s findings. Dr. Deines’ evaluation, sought for a later benefits application, was irrelevant to the period in question (June 15, 2003, to April 11, 2007). Thus, the District Court appropriately concluded that the additional evidence was not material.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed based on several key findings regarding Gilroy's alleged disability. After her claimed onset of disability, she engaged in various activities, including working as a nurse's aide and labor packager, shopping, cleaning, cooking, and caring for herself without assistance. Gilroy married, lived with her spouse, socialized with friends and family, and demonstrated the ability to understand instructions, make decisions, and assist her young son with homework. Her mental health treatment was minimal, with her first psychiatric evaluation occurring in February 2006, nearly three years after her claimed disability began. Throughout this period, she did not require hospitalization for mental health issues, and her symptoms reportedly improved with treatment. Records indicated noncompliance with her treatment plan. Between February and November 2006, her psychiatrist noted adequate insight, judgment, and impulse control, along with normal speech and cognition. A state agency psychologist concluded that her impairments did not meet any listed criteria and that she was capable of working.