The Cargo of the Brig Aurora, Burn Side v. The United States

Citations: 11 U.S. 382; 3 L. Ed. 378; 7 Cranch 382; 1813 U.S. LEXIS 431

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 26, 1813; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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An appeal was made regarding the condemnation of the cargo of the brig Aurora, which was imported from Great Britain, in violation of the non-intercourse act of March 1, 1809. This act prohibited the importation of goods from Great Britain and its dependencies, effective from May 20, 1809, and mandated the forfeiture of any articles imported in contravention of this law. The President was empowered to restore trade with either France or Great Britain if they revoked their edicts against U.S. neutral commerce. An earlier proclamation by the President had declared that Great Britain had revoked its edicts, but this was later retracted due to the British government's disavowal. The act expired on May 1, 1810, but Congress subsequently enacted a new law that would reinstate certain sections of the non-intercourse act if either nation failed to revoke their edicts by a specified date. On November 2, 1810, the President declared that France had revoked its edicts, allowing for renewed trade with France while maintaining restrictions against Great Britain.

The act of March 2, 1811, exempts vessels and merchandise owned by U.S. citizens that departed from British ports before February 2, 1811, from seizure or forfeiture due to violations of previous trade acts. The act allows for a presidential proclamation to declare any changes by Great Britain regarding its trade edicts. Until such a proclamation is made, specific provisions of the act from March 1, 1809, will remain in effect against Great Britain and its territories. 

The Aurora, which departed Liverpool before the proclamation was known there, arrived in New Orleans between February 2 and 20, 1811. The appellant argues that there was no intention to violate the law, as the vessel cleared before the proclamation was acknowledged and could not have known if Great Britain would revoke its orders. 

The law's provisions were not set to take effect until May 20, 1811, and the appellant contends that the legislature intended to provide citizens with adequate warning to avoid penalties. The construction of the law must allow for a grace period to prevent unjust punishment for actions taken in ignorance of the law's revival. Penal laws should not be conditional upon the subjective interpretation of individuals, nor should the President possess authority to determine when a law is revived; this power must remain with Congress. Thus, the appellant argues for a construction that respects legislative intent and prevents unjust application of the law.

The act of March 2, 1811, stipulates that until Great Britain revokes its edicts and the President proclaims this, the provisions of the act of March 1, 1809, remain effective. The first section of the March 2 act protects American vessels and goods departing from Great Britain before February 2, 1811. The goods in question are claimed as bona fide American property by Robert Burnside, who is identified as an American citizen. The court infers that the property is American and thus not subject to forfeiture. 

However, John Law argues that the proclamation regarding the edicts was known in Liverpool before the Aurora’s departure, suggesting the master was aware of it. Law asserts that the act of March 1, 1809, expired on May 20, 1809, and that the legislature intended to revive it as it existed on that date, rendering certain provisions ineffective at the time of the revival. 

The court addresses two main questions: whether the property is American and whether the act was revived by the President's proclamation. The evidence presented is deemed insufficient to establish the property as American, as the claimant did not provide adequate supporting evidence or testimony. The court concludes that the absence of this evidence allows for the presumption that the property is not American.

Regarding the revival of the act, the court maintains that the legislature holds the discretion to revive laws without restrictions and that upon revival, the act should have the same force as when it expired. Consequently, the court determines that the act's operation commenced on February 2, 1811. The court also addresses procedural points, asserting that it is unnecessary for a libel to negate the claimant's defense in its statement.