Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; October 6, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
John Anthony Gonzalez, Jr. appeals a District Court order that denied his motion to suppress physical evidence obtained from a search warrant. He argues that the affidavit supporting the warrant was deficient due to: (1) insufficient information on the reliability of a drug detection dog’s sniff, and (2) statements that allegedly violated the standards set in Franks v. Delaware. The incident began on July 4, 2006, when Officer Richard Martinez received information from an informant about cocaine stored in locker J0819 at a Public Storage facility in Philadelphia, including details about the packaging and the individuals involved. Officer Martinez relayed this information to Officer Brian Myers, who later confirmed the existence of the locker and its rental by an individual named Daniel Rivera from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Subsequently, a drug detection dog indicated the presence of narcotics at the locker, leading to the preparation of a search warrant by Officer Myers. The affidavit, submitted to support the warrant, included detailed information from the informant but did not mention the name 'David Rivera' or the photo identification attempt. The court ultimately affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, finding the affidavit sufficient.
An affidavit was submitted to a Philadelphia County bail commissioner, resulting in a search warrant being granted. Later that evening, officers executed the warrant and discovered 47.83 kilograms of cocaine in a locker, leading to Gonzalez being charged federally with possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Gonzalez moved to suppress the evidence and requested a Franks hearing, claiming the affidavit contained misleading information. During the hearing, Officer Myers admitted to mistakenly switching the names 'David' and 'Daniel' in the affidavit and acknowledged failing to include an identification issue raised by a new Public Storage employee. He also did not provide any details about the canine's training or the handler's experience, despite having used dog sniffs over 50 times. The District Court denied Gonzalez’s motion, rejecting the Franks challenge and ruling that police need not substantiate the canine's reliability in the affidavit. Gonzalez later pled guilty while reserving the right to appeal the motion's denial.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and appellate jurisdiction was established under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The appellate review involves clear error for factual findings and plenary review for legal applications, emphasizing that courts should not second-guess a magistrate's probable cause determination. The standard of review is deferential, affirming the denial of the suppression motion based on any record-supported grounds, and considers whether there was a substantial basis for probable cause.
Gonzalez's claims focus on two issues: the alleged inadequacy of the affidavit concerning the dog sniff's reliability and the assertion that the affidavit contained erroneous information and omissions. The analysis will address the requisite details regarding the dog's training in the affidavit, the Franks inquiry regarding omitted information, and whether the modified affidavit supports a substantial basis for probable cause.
The District Court's finding of probable cause is upheld despite Gonzalez's claims, eliminating the need to evaluate the good faith exception under United States v. Leon. The court affirms the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. Gonzalez argues that a positive dog sniff should not contribute to probable cause without specific reliability facts in the warrant. However, the court declines to adopt such a requirement, noting that there was corroborative evidence, including an initial tip about drugs in the locker and the positive indication from the K9 unit dog, Tre, whose reliability was acknowledged. The court emphasizes that the purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent officers from making inferences in the heat of the investigation, reserving that role for a neutral magistrate. It is deemed reasonable for the bail commissioner to infer Tre's training and reliability. The case distinguishes itself from United States v. Massac, which did not address warrant probable cause, focusing instead on whether a dog alert justified an arrest without a warrant. Additionally, the requirements established in prior rulings regarding canine reliability pertain to different contexts, such as the forfeiture of drug-tainted money, rather than search warrant affidavits. Overall, the court concludes that the dog sniff, alongside other corroborating evidence, is sufficient for establishing probable cause.
In United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir.1994), the court upheld a conviction based on the seizure of currency following a trained dog’s alert, despite the lack of a warrant and specific details about the dog’s training. While other circuits have required more evidence of a dog’s reliability, the court found no necessity to adopt such a requirement at that time. A dog's reliability can be established with a simple statement of training and certification to detect drugs, and a canine sniff can provide probable cause for a search warrant if the dog’s reliability is sufficiently detailed in the affidavit. Although a more thorough account of training would aid a magistrate’s decision-making, its absence does not invalidate the affidavit. Concerns about a dog’s reliability must be disclosed by the affiant under Franks v. Delaware, which allows a defendant to request a hearing if they can show that a false statement was included in the warrant affidavit with intent or reckless disregard for the truth, affecting probable cause. Gonzalez claims two inaccuracies in the affidavit: misnaming a source and failing to mention an attempt to obtain photo identification. The distinction is made between assertions, which may be recklessly false if the affiant had serious doubts about their truth, and omissions, which can impede a magistrate's ability to make informed decisions. An omission occurs if the affiant withholds information that a reasonable person would recognize as pertinent to the magistrate's judgment.
The affidavit supporting the search warrant contained an incorrect name, referring to "Daniel Rivera" instead of "David Rivera," which was the name provided in the original tip. Officer Myers acknowledged this mistake during the Franks hearing, and the District Court determined that the error was not significant enough to invalidate the warrant, as it was deemed an innocent mistake. The court found that Officer Myers likely did not have reason to doubt the accuracy of the information he received, which suggests no reckless disregard for the truth.
Additionally, Officer Myers failed to include in his affidavit that the only employee who viewed the photo could not identify the individual, and this omission was noted as significant since it could affect the probable cause assessment. However, the employee’s lack of familiarity with the storage facility was also considered, indicating that the omission might not have been intended to mislead the bail commissioner.
The remedy for these issues would involve correcting the affidavit to replace "Daniel" with "David" and acknowledging the identification failure while also noting the employee's new status. Ultimately, the review of the affidavit must determine if there was a substantial basis for the bail commissioner’s probable cause finding, guided by the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis established in Illinois v. Gates. The issuing magistrate should consider all circumstances, including the reliability of hearsay information, to assess whether there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime exists at the location in question.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of corroborating an informant’s tip through independent police investigation, which can establish a substantial basis for probable cause. In Draper v. United States, an informant accurately predicted the arrival of a suspect with heroin, leading to a finding of probable cause based on corroborated details. In the present case, an informant reported that a storage unit in Philadelphia contained drugs and identified two individuals, one named David Rivera, who would retrieve the contraband. Police confirmed that a storage unit, locker J0819, was rented under the name Daniel Rivera, matching the informant's information about the location and the state of origin. Although the employee at the storage facility could not identify David Rivera, a police canine positively indicated the presence of drugs in locker J0819. These corroborated facts, including the dog’s alert, provided a substantial basis for concluding probable cause, despite potential Franks issues related to the affidavit. The District Court's decision was affirmed, noting that any reliability concerns regarding the dog’s track record could lead to a separate analysis under Franks. Additionally, the affidavit contained a naming error, confusing David and Daniel Rivera, which contributed to a misunderstanding in the District Court's order.
