United States v. Pitts

Citation: 346 F. App'x 839Docket: No. 08-2631

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; September 24, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

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Melvin Pitts was convicted of armed robbery related to the Tropicana Lounge in Philadelphia, based on eyewitness testimony identifying him as one of the robbers. Prior to trial, Pitts, who was deemed indigent and represented by court-appointed counsel, filed an ex parte motion seeking funds for an expert on eyewitness identification, which the District Court denied. Following his conviction on three counts—conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery interference with interstate commerce, and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence—Pitts was sentenced to 210 months in prison. On appeal, Pitts challenged the denial of his motion, arguing it violated his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and equal protection. The appellate court reviews such denials for abuse of discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1), which allows counsel for indigent defendants to request expert services through an ex parte application. The court ultimately affirmed the District Court's decision.

A court may authorize counsel to obtain expert services if it determines, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that such services are necessary and the defendant is financially unable to obtain them, per 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). Before assessing necessity, the court should first confirm the existence of a plausible defense. In this case, the District Court found Pitts’s defense of mistaken identity plausible. To authorize expert witness funds, the court must find the services necessary for adequate representation, commonly assessed by whether a reasonable attorney would hire such services for a client who could afford them. The burden of proof for necessity lies with the defendant, who must specifically demonstrate why the services are required. For expert testimony on eyewitness identification, the defendant must show why cross-examination of eyewitnesses would be insufficient. The District Court denied Pitts’s motion for expert testimony, finding that he did not adequately explain the necessity of the expert’s testimony or why cross-examination would be inadequate. Although Pitts listed potential topics for the expert's testimony, he failed to link them to the specific eyewitness identifications relevant to his case. The court noted that Pitts did not demonstrate how the expert would specifically address the government’s eyewitnesses. On appeal, Pitts argued that the expert testimony would directly challenge the identifications; however, this inference alone did not satisfy his burden to establish a specific necessity for the requested expert testimony.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pitts’s ex parte motion for expert witness services. Pitts's appeal relied on three prior cases (United States v. Brownlee, United States v. Stevens, and United States v. Downing) that address the admissibility of expert eyewitness testimony rather than the provision of CJA funding for such experts. The court clarified that admissibility requires a detailed proffer demonstrating the relevance of the expert's testimony to the eyewitness identifications in question, including specific factors that could impair identification accuracy. Pitts failed to provide this necessary explanation in his motion, thus not meeting the burden for admissibility or CJA funding eligibility.

The court affirmed the denial of the motion and expressed concern over inappropriate language used by Pitts in his brief, which it deemed lacking in professional civility. Pitts claimed that his counsel had explained the relevance of the expert testimony during an in-chambers conference, but without a transcript or record of this discussion, it could not be considered on appeal. Additionally, Pitts argued that the denial of funding violated the Equal Protection Clause by comparing his situation to defendants with financial means or those represented by the Federal Public Defender. However, he provided no legal authority to support this claim, and the court found it unpersuasive.