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TCIF REO CIT, LLC v. Gray
Citation: 346 F. App'x 763Docket: No. 09-2966
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; September 25, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
T. Barry Gray appealed the District Court's denial of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the remand of his civil action to the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. The District Court initially dismissed Gray's motion, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to articulate any claims or clarify his intent regarding the removal of a state court action. On appeal, the court vacated the District Court's order and remanded the case, instructing it to assess Gray's financial eligibility and allow him to provide the legal basis for federal jurisdiction. Upon remand, Gray argued that jurisdiction existed under multiple statutes, including 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332, and 1443, asserting that the case involved an ejectment suit where his Fourteenth Amendment rights were at stake. The District Court ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and opted for abstention under Younger v. Harris, leading to the remand of the case to state court. The appellate court examined the denial of Gray's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, determining that the District Court abused its discretion by denying the motion on grounds of lack of relief. Gray’s financial disclosures indicated a monthly income of approximately $741, insufficient to meet basic needs. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the District Court's denial of the in forma pauperis motion and remanded for an order granting it. Regarding the remand to state court, the appellate court noted that such orders are generally not appealable unless based on 28 U.S.C. 1443. Since Gray invoked this statute, the appellate court retained jurisdiction to review the remand and reiterated that removal under civil rights statutes is a limited exception to standard removal rules requiring evident federal jurisdiction. Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) requires a two-prong test: a defendant must show that (1) their rights guaranteed by federal law concerning equal civil rights are being deprived, and (2) they cannot enforce those rights in state courts. Gray's claim hinges solely on a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, a general assertion that fails to meet the removal criteria. Thus, the court determines that § 1443 is inapplicable, denying further review of the District Court's removal order. Summary action is warranted due to the absence of substantial questions in the appeal. Consequently, the court will affirm the District Court's denial of removal, reverse the denial of Gray's in forma pauperis motion, and remand for the granting of that motion. Additionally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine limits a District Court's jurisdiction to review state court decisions.