Castaneda v. Astrue
Docket: No. 07-16589
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 2, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
The ALJ's adverse credibility determination regarding Castaneda was supported by substantial evidence, as he provided specific and convincing reasons for his findings. Although Castaneda claimed difficulty standing and walking, he did not use a cane or back brace during the hearing, and no doctor had prescribed a cane. The ALJ was not obligated to call a medical expert to assess whether Castaneda's impairment met or equaled Listing 1.04(A) or (C) because he adequately satisfied the requirement by obtaining signatures from state medical consultants on the necessary forms, as outlined in SSR 96-6p. The ALJ determined that Castaneda’s impairment did not equate to any listing due to a lack of inability to ambulate effectively and absence of a positive straight-leg raising test. The ALJ’s reliance on assessments from Dr. Cunningham and non-examining state agency physicians was justified, despite Castaneda’s claim that Dr. Cunningham did not review his October 2003 MRI; Dr. Cunningham's analysis was based on an independent examination and was consistent with the overall record. Dr. Hughes’s review of Castaneda’s medical history, including his MRI, supported the conclusion that Castaneda retained a residual functional capacity (RFC) for medium work. The ALJ's decision not to further develop the record was appropriate since the existing medical evidence was clear and sufficient, aside from a report by Nurse Ridge, whose opinions were given little weight because she was not considered an "acceptable medical source," and her RFC determination was brief and conclusory. The ALJ's evaluation of conflicting medical opinions, favoring the more comprehensive reports of Drs. Cunningham, Vivian, and Hughes over Nurse Ridge's, was consistent with legal standards. The ruling affirmed the ALJ’s findings, confirming that Castaneda was not disabled according to the SSA’s five-step process. This disposition is unpublished and not considered precedent except as specified by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.