Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 13, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
Plaintiffs John and Carol Clevenger appeal the denial of their motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of defendant CNH America, LLC, concerning a strict products liability claim related to a Case 85XT skid steer loader. Mr. Clevenger was injured while exiting the loader, which the Clevengers alleged was defectively designed due to its safety interlock system. The jury concluded that the loader was not defectively designed, leading to the Clevengers' appeal after their new trial motion was denied.
The Clevengers argue that the District Court erred in its jury instructions and evidentiary rulings. The standard for reviewing a motion for a new trial is based on whether there was an abuse of discretion, unless the denial involves a legal question, which is reviewed de novo. Key points of contention include the jury instructions misdefining 'intended use' under Pennsylvania law, conflating it with causation, improperly introducing the concept of assumption of risk, and unduly emphasizing Mr. Clevenger’s actions over the alleged product defect.
Under Pennsylvania strict products liability law, a plaintiff must prove that a product was defective and that the defect proximately caused the injury. A product is considered defectively designed if it lacks necessary safety elements for its intended use or contains features that make it unsafe for that use. The Clevengers claimed the jury instructions incorrectly tied 'intended use' to the warnings provided by CNH, but the court found that Pennsylvania law presumes that warnings are followed, thus requiring the Clevengers to show that the loader would still be unsafe even if the warnings were adhered to.
The District Court correctly instructed the jury on the concept of 'intended use' and 'defective design,' leading to the conclusion that a new trial was unnecessary despite potential misstatements in other aspects of the jury charge. The presumption that juries follow judicial instructions supports this decision, especially since the jury found the Case 85XT skid steer loader was not defective as designed. The court's review of the trial evidence confirmed that the jury instructions were neither misleading nor inadequate.
The Clevengers raised multiple claims of evidentiary errors by the District Court. The court allowed evidence of Mr. Clevenger’s conduct at the time of the accident, as Pennsylvania strict products liability law permits defendants to introduce evidence of misuse to challenge causation. The court appropriately restricted questioning of CNH’s corporate representative regarding consumer usage of the skid steer loader, as foreseeability is irrelevant in Pennsylvania strict liability design defect law.
The District Court also permitted a video of CNH's expert operating the skid steer loader, determining its probative value outweighed potential prejudice. The Clevengers contested the exclusion of CNH's reports of similar accidents, arguing for their admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). However, the court upheld the exclusion of these hearsay reports due to concerns about their trustworthiness, indicating no abuse of discretion regarding the evidentiary rulings.
The Clevengers argue that the District Court improperly allowed CNH to present testimony on industry standards and practices, claiming such evidence is inadmissible in strict liability design defect cases under Pennsylvania law, as established in Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div. Duff-Norton Co. However, the Clevengers themselves introduced similar evidence in their case-in-chief. The District Court acted within its discretion by permitting CNH to offer rebuttal evidence, as supported by Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Dep’t, which allows for such a response when one party introduces inadmissible evidence. Ultimately, the District Court's jury instructions and evidentiary decisions are upheld. The Court affirms the denial of the Clevengers’ motion for a new trial, confirming its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332 and the appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
