Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 14, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
Mark Maddaloni appealed the denial of his Social Security disability benefits, which was affirmed by the District Court for the District of New Jersey. The appeal was based on the Commissioner of Social Security's findings, which were subject to substantial evidence review under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Maddaloni, a former union electrician, ceased work in December 2003 due to physical limitations from arthritis and shoulder atrophy, and later applied for benefits citing both physical and mental impairments, including depression and anxiety. The administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a five-step analysis according to 20 C.F.R. 404.1520 but denied the claim. Maddaloni argued that the ALJ erred at steps two and three, particularly regarding the severity of his mental impairment. Although the ALJ’s findings were not entirely clear, the court concluded that the ALJ followed the required regulatory framework, which allows for the evaluation of severe impairments at step two and the assessment of whether these meet listed impairment criteria at step three. The court noted that the ALJ's analysis at step five lacked clarity, leading to a remand for further proceedings. The regulations require a "special technique" for evaluating mental impairments, ensuring a thorough assessment of any medically determinable mental condition and its functional limitations.
Regulation 404.1520a requires the assessment of functional limitations across four areas, rated on a five- or four-point scale. If the first three areas are rated as “none” or “mild” and the fourth area as “none,” the impairment is generally deemed not severe unless evidence suggests otherwise. In the case of a severe mental impairment, the medical findings must be evaluated against the criteria of the appropriate mental disorder listing. The ALJ confirmed a medically determinable mental impairment, specifically a dysthymic disorder, but recognized that mere diagnosis does not indicate the degree of functional limitation. The ALJ found substantial evidence that Maddaloni’s limitations were either "mild" or "none," leading to the conclusion that his mental impairment was not severe.
Maddaloni challenges the ALJ's decision at step five of the sequential analysis, which requires consideration of the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC), age, education, and work experience to assess the ability to perform other work in the national economy. The government bears the burden to show that significant numbers of jobs exist for the claimant, potentially using the medical vocational guidelines, or "grids." However, the grids only apply to exertional impairments; if a claimant has a nonexertional impairment, the ALJ must assess its impact on RFC with additional evidence. Maddaloni argues the ALJ improperly applied the grids despite recognizing a nonexertional impairment, concluding that the additional limitations had little effect on the available occupational base for unskilled sedentary work, which led to a finding of “not disabled.”
The ALJ's mention of "additional limitations" is problematic due to a lack of specificity regarding the nature and number of those limitations. This ambiguity prevents the determination of whether these limitations are nonexertional, which would affect the applicability of the grids as established in Sykes. Consequently, the judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings. On remand, the ALJ is instructed to clearly identify the "additional limitations," classify them as exertional or nonexertional, and explain their impact on grid application. The requirement for clarity is supported by Allen v. Barnhart, emphasizing that the effect of nonexertional limitations on work ability must be explicit. The ALJ is also directed to conduct any necessary further proceedings in accordance with the Social Security Act and the Sykes ruling. Additionally, Maddaloni's claim regarding an error at step four is waived since it was not presented to the District Court, following Harris v. City of Phila. Even if not waived, Maddaloni's argument lacks merit as there is no evidence that the ALJ failed to establish a basis for finding that he could perform a full range of sedentary work. While Maddaloni assumes the "additional limitations" are nonexertional mental limitations, there remains the possibility that they pertain to pain, which can be exertional or nonexertional, or could relate to administrative rulemaking that indicates these limitations do not significantly affect the occupational base for sedentary work.
