Keene v. Zelman

Citation: 337 F. App'x 553Docket: No. 08-4004

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; July 29, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

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Defendants Ohio Board of Education and Superintendent Susan Zelman appeal a district court’s order granting plaintiffs Paul Keene and Dr. Mary Fehskens attorneys' fees of $81,093.62 under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The appeal arises from a class action lawsuit alleging that the Westerville City School District imposed excessively stringent requirements on requests for administrative hearings regarding special education. The appellate court affirms the fee award, stating that no special circumstances warranted denying the fees and that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

The IDEA mandates that states identify and evaluate all children with disabilities needing special education and provide them with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). School districts must create an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for each eligible child, detailing current performance, goals, proposed services, and evaluation criteria, with annual reviews required. The IDEA includes a structured administrative review process for parents dissatisfied with an IEP, starting with a due process complaint to the school district, followed by a hearing with an independent hearing officer, and potential appeals to state-level officers or courts.

The plaintiffs became dissatisfied with their son S.K.'s IEP in February 2006, stemming from initial conflicts with Westerville that began in August 2002, when they sought special education services for his speech and language delays. Westerville had previously rejected medical recommendations for S.K.’s IEP, deeming him ineligible for special education services upon his kindergarten enrollment.

Plaintiffs chose to provide private speech and language services for S.K. at their own expense after a denial of special education services by Westerville. In January 2005, they presented evaluations from a private speech therapist and S.K.’s physician, who recommended Marburn Academy for S.K. Following a meeting, Westerville again denied special education services, prompting plaintiffs to unilaterally enroll S.K. at Marburn for the 2005-2006 academic year and request public funding for tuition, which was refused. In late 2005, Westerville proposed an Individualized Education Program (IEP) that offered comparable services but was deemed untimely as it was presented after the school year began. Plaintiffs filed a due process complaint to contest the IEP and sought reimbursement for tuition and evaluation expenses. The due process hearing initially progressed but was interrupted when Westerville challenged the complaint's sufficiency, leading to its dismissal by the appointed hearing officer (IHO) for lack of specificity. Westerville subsequently canceled the hearing and informed plaintiffs they could file a new complaint without disclosing their right to amend before cancellation. An appeal to a State Level Review Officer (SLRO) was dismissed as premature due to the lack of a final decision. In May 2006, plaintiffs filed a ten-count class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, alleging unlawful dismissal of their due process complaint and systemic issues leading to similar dismissals statewide.

Plaintiffs claimed defendants directed the IHO in their case to limit actions for the first thirty days to scheduling a hearing and to charge no more than one hour of time. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with compensatory damages for S.K.’s tuition and special education services. In April 2007, eleven months post-filing, the parties reached a settlement where the State Defendants recognized the Plaintiffs as prevailing parties regarding systemic sufficiency challenges. The agreement preserved rights concerning attorney’s fees and mandated changes to due process procedures, including retraining IHOs on the proper review standard under 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii). After the settlement, plaintiffs requested attorney’s fees under 20 U.S.C. 1415(i), which the district court granted, excluding fees from the administrative process. Defendants appealed the $81,093.62 award, asserting that "special circumstances" justified denying the fees. Under Section 1415(i) of the IDEA, reasonable attorney’s fees may be awarded to prevailing parties, defined as those who succeed on significant litigation issues. Awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion, particularly if a court neglects legal standards or factual considerations. In IDEA cases, attorney fees should be granted unless special circumstances argue against it. While the Supreme Court has not definitively defined "special circumstances," the approach has become case-specific, placing the burden on the non-prevailing party to demonstrate such circumstances clearly, with courts generally reluctant to find them.

A district court's denial of attorney's fees cannot be justified by the complexity or difficulty of a case. The fee-shifting provision aims to enable plaintiffs with limited resources to pursue valid claims, incentivizing attorneys to represent such cases. Defendants presented three arguments for special circumstances to deny fees: (1) their inability to address the administrative decisions leading to the lawsuit, (2) timely actions to rectify these decisions, and (3) attributing sole culpability to the Westerville school district for the litigation costs. The defendants claimed that 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(1)(A) restricted their ability to challenge the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ due process complaint, but this section pertains to final decisions from due process hearings, which the plaintiffs did not receive in this case. Previous rulings established that false attorney billing and lack of identified special circumstances do not warrant fee denials. The burden rests on defendants to prove special circumstances, which must be compelling. The district court thoroughly examined and dismissed the defendants' claims. The assertion of good faith actions does not constitute a special circumstance for denying fees. The defendants had the opportunity to address the dismissal during the SLRO appeal but chose to uphold it without addressing the plaintiffs' arguments. The court also rejected the notion that only the Westerville defendants were culpable, noting that both the Westerville and state defendants were implicated in the procedural deficiencies related to the lawsuit.

Plaintiffs' lawsuit was grounded in the defendants' obligation to implement procedures ensuring that children with disabilities and their parents receive procedural safeguards related to a free appropriate public education, as mandated by Ohio Rev.Code. 3323.05 and 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(11)(A)(i). The right to a due process hearing, as outlined in 20 U.S.C. 1415(b), serves as the primary means for parents to protect these safeguards. Defendants are implicated in the claims due to their responsibility for establishing the necessary due process procedures. Consequently, the district court's order is affirmed, and the case is remanded for a determination of the appropriate award for plaintiffs' appellate attorneys' fees under 20 U.S.C. 1415. Additionally, 20 U.S.C. 1415(c)(2)(E)(i) allows a party to amend a due process complaint notice with the other party's written consent or upon the hearing officer's permission, which must be granted no later than five days before the hearing. Plaintiffs also reached a separate settlement agreement with the Westerville defendants.