Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; July 8, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
Gerald Teagle appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, focusing on whether he is entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations due to claims of actual innocence. The court affirms the denial, finding Teagle does not establish a valid claim of actual innocence, thus rendering the tolling question moot.
Teagle and co-defendant John Hunter were convicted of first-degree murder for the 1983 killing of Marvin York, which they claimed was in self-defense, asserting that York had threatened them with a gun. However, witness Konrad Jett testified that he saw Teagle and Hunter approach York's car and fire multiple shots at close range, and no weapons were found on York or at the crime scene. Teagle and Hunter's defense was based on their claims that they feared for their lives due to past threats from York. Teagle was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1984, and his subsequent appeals and postconviction relief petitions were unsuccessful. His third postconviction petition was dismissed as untimely in 2005, and after being denied further review by the state supreme court, he filed the habeas corpus petition in 2007 that is now under appeal.
On March 23, 2004, Jett approached Teagle's sister at a funeral, expressing a desire to clear his conscience regarding his testimony at Teagle's trial. Following this, Teagle's attorney, Cheryl Sturm, arranged for a private investigator to interview Jett, who, on May 17, 2004, claimed that York had threatened to kill Teagle and Hunter over a drug deal. Jett alleged he witnessed Teagle and Hunter approach York's car before the shooting and later found a gun in York's lap, which he disposed of. He admitted to lying during the trial to protect York's reputation, motivated by anger after York had killed his friend and endangered his children.
Teagle's habeas petition included corroborative statements from Anthony Eure and Mikal Muhammad, asserting that York had previously threatened Teagle and Hunter and had a violent reputation. Eure claimed he informed Teagle’s trial counsel about York's aggression, but was not called to testify.
The District Court denied the habeas petition as time-barred under the AEDPA's statute of limitations, ruling that Teagle was not entitled to statutory tolling since his third postconviction relief petition was rejected as untimely. Even if equitable tolling were possible, the court found that Teagle did not demonstrate actual innocence.
Teagle appealed, contending that the one-year statute of limitations should be equitably tolled based on claims of actual innocence. The court noted that while other Circuits have considered this issue, it had not yet ruled on it. Even assuming actual innocence could toll the limitations period, Teagle failed to meet the demanding Schlup standard, which requires "new reliable evidence" showing it is more likely than not that he would not have been found guilty. The court found Jett’s recantation insufficiently reliable without additional corroborating evidence, leading to the conclusion that Teagle’s evidence did not satisfy the standard for equitable tolling.
Courts regard recantation testimony with skepticism due to its inherent unreliability, particularly when it admits to perjury. Testimony that is not "new," meaning it was available during the initial trial but not presented, is similarly viewed with caution. Even if three affidavits were considered new evidence, they do not sufficiently demonstrate that a reasonable juror would likely find the petitioner, Teagle, not guilty. The affidavits suggest that York was violent and had threatened Teagle prior to his death, supporting the defendants' trial claims but also indicating a strong motive for Teagle to act against York. One affidavit supports the assertion that York was armed, yet does not clarify who drew their weapon first, leaving room for a juror to conclude that Teagle acted first given he was armed and approached York after being threatened.
The District Court's ruling denying habeas relief is affirmed, as the parties did not provide state court testimony records, and the court's summary of trial testimony is unchallenged. Teagle's argument regarding entitlement to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) is not considered because it falls outside the certificate of appealability. Although the court can expand this scope, it declines to do so, as the District Court's determination that Teagle's postconviction relief application was untimely is not debatable among reasonable jurists. As established, an untimely postconviction petition does not meet the criteria for being "properly filed." The court notes that defense counsel should have filed a protective petition in federal court, given the elapsed time between conviction and the third application for state postconviction relief, especially following the untimely dismissal of the second application. Lastly, statements from witnesses corroborate the violent encounter prior to the shooting, and one witness claims he informed Teagle's counsel of relevant information, which was not pursued.
