United States v. Randock

Citation: 330 F. App'x 628Docket: Nos. 08-30268, 08-30308

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 22, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

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Steven and Dixie Randock appeal their sentences for conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. 371, 1341, and 1343. They entered identical plea agreements for thirty-six months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release, though they contested the sentencing guidelines calculation and the nature of their sentences. The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 3742, ultimately affirming Steven's sentence while reversing and remanding Dixie’s case.

Both Randocks challenge an eighteen-level enhancement applied to their offense levels under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1 due to the fraud’s estimated loss of between $2.5 and $7 million. They argue that the court improperly used gain as a measure of loss. The court found that the fraudulent sales of academic credentials caused an indeterminate loss, justifying the use of gain as an alternative measure, and thus did not err in applying the enhancement.

Steven further contends that the court wrongly determined he did not have an “extraordinary physical impairment” warranting a downward departure to home detention under U.S.S.G. 5H1.4. The district court, supported by medical opinions indicating his condition could be managed in prison, did not err in its assessment.

Dixie challenges a 240-hour community service condition imposed as part of her supervised release, claiming it was not included in the plea agreement. As she did not object at the lower court level, a "plain error" review applies, requiring proof of clear error that affects substantial rights. If such conditions are met, the court may grant relief if the error undermines the integrity of judicial proceedings.

A Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement binds the district court to the agreed-upon sentence and conditions, prohibiting piecemeal acceptance or rejection. In this case, the court improperly imposed a community service condition that was not part of the plea agreement, which specified a 36-month sentence without such a condition. This constituted plain error affecting substantial rights and procedural fairness, necessitating a remand for the court to either eliminate the community service requirement or allow the defendant, Dixie Randock, to withdraw her plea. Although the court has discretion to impose community service under certain statutes, the lack of objection from Randock during the sentencing and her counsel's indication that no plea withdrawal was sought complicate the matter. The dissent notes that Randock did not provide precedent to support her claims regarding the imposition of the community service condition and its implications on her rights or the integrity of judicial proceedings.

Precedent indicates that courts have found plain error under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreements only when a district court significantly alters or extends a sentence. In *United States v. Gilchrist*, the court identified plain error when a twelve-month supervised release was imposed against an agreement of none, and in *United States v. Mukai*, it found plain error when a five-year imprisonment sentence was modified to five years probation, which was substantially less than the agreed minimum. In the case at hand, Randock’s sentence was neither significantly modified nor lengthened, as the community service requirement did not extend the sentence or supervised release period. Additionally, Randock did not object to this sentencing or file a motion to withdraw the plea based on Rule 11(c)(1)(C) violations. Consequently, the imposition of community service did not compromise the fairness or integrity of the judicial process, failing to meet the standard for overturning a sentence per *United States v. Davenport*. Furthermore, community service was not a standard condition of supervised release, as it was categorized as a "special condition" in the judgment, which included thirteen standard and six special conditions. The disposition is not to be published and is not precedent except as specified by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.