Beauregard v. Lewis County

Docket: No. 06-35878

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 7, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

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Eugene and Susan Beauregard appeal a district court's summary judgment favoring various Lewis County officials and entities. The appellate court affirms the lower court's decision, noting that summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court reviews the facts in favor of the non-moving party without weighing evidence or making credibility determinations.

The Beauregards' claims under the Commerce Clause, Thirteenth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment were dismissed as legally barred. The Commerce Clause does not provide a remedy for discrimination, while the Thirteenth Amendment does not support an independent cause of action. Additionally, the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow for direct monetary claims.

Regarding statutory claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985, the court determined these claims were either time-barred or did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. The applicable three-year statute of limitations meant only actions occurring after November 2002 could be considered, which included the sheriff's involvement in a property dispute and a denied road permit application. The Beauregards' claims under the Fourteenth Amendment were found insufficient as they did not establish a genuine issue of material fact. To pursue a 1983 claim against a government entity, one must prove that employees acted under a policy or practice that violates civil rights, along with demonstrating intentional discrimination. The court concluded that the Beauregards failed to meet these requirements.

The district court determined that the Beauregards failed to provide adequate evidence linking a county policy or custom to their alleged injuries or proving intentional discrimination by county employees. Their reliance on statements regarding Lewis County's predominantly white population was deemed insufficient to establish a discriminatory policy or custom. Consequently, summary judgment was affirmed. 

Regarding the Beauregards' claim that the denial of their road expansion permit constituted tortious interference with a contractual relationship, the court found that the claim was not time-barred despite an error in the district court's reasoning. However, the court ruled that the Beauregards did not meet the necessary legal elements for a prima facie case of tortious interference under Washington law, particularly lacking evidence that Lewis County had knowledge of any valid business expectancy or that it interfered with improper intent or means.

The court declined to address a new claim regarding a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment raised for the first time on appeal but indicated that the Beauregards could pursue this claim in another forum. The court encouraged the parties to discuss any remaining issues for potential amicable resolution. Appreciation was expressed to the pro bono attorney for the Beauregards for effective representation. The decision was affirmed, noted as non-precedential under 9th Cir. R. 36-3.