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Miller v. City of Simi Valley
Citation: 324 F. App'x 681Docket: No. 07-56694
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 29, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
Simi Valley police officers Dan Swanson, Christopher Hahesy, Francis Panza, Matt Buchannan, and William Lappin appeal a district court’s denial of their summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. The court has jurisdiction to determine the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity, assessing the facts favorably for Miller. The officers were found to be entitled to qualified immunity regarding Miller’s 1983 claims, as their initial handcuffing and frisk constituted a lawful investigatory stop based on reasonable, particularized suspicion. Despite potential improper subjective motivations for the stop, such as racial factors, the stop remained constitutional due to reasonable suspicion. Miller's race was one of several permissible factors aligning with eyewitness descriptions of a robber, and the context—including the recency of the crime, proximity to the scene, and time of day—supported the officers' suspicions. Although Miller's physical description differed somewhat from that provided by witnesses, it nonetheless fell within the ranges described in crime bulletins. The dissenting opinion raised concerns about discrepancies in the description provided to the police, but the court emphasized that reasonable suspicion does not require scientific certainty and that the totality of the circumstances must be considered. The dissent's comparison to a prior case involving racial profiling was deemed inapplicable, as the specific context of the situation—including time and location—contributed to the officers’ suspicions. The court reaffirmed that reasonable suspicion is assessed holistically, considering all relevant factors. The stop of Miller was deemed reasonable due to specific information from a crime bulletin and witnesses indicating that the robbery suspect was armed. The use of drawn weapons, handcuffing, and frisking did not transform the lawful investigative stop into an unlawful arrest, as supported by various legal precedents. The duration of the investigation and the use of handcuffs were justified under established case law. Officers were also reasonable in continuing the detention to investigate evidence discovered during the stop, such as a loaded handgun resembling the suspect's weapon. The district court's order is reversed, and on remand, judgment will be entered for the defendants concerning Miller's claims under Section 1983. Additionally, the dissent's comparison to United States v. Montero-Camargo is criticized, emphasizing that the racial demographics of the area and the description of the suspect provided grounds for reasonable suspicion. This ruling is not designated for publication and does not serve as precedent except as permitted by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.