People v. Nickens

Citations: 685 N.W.2d 657; 470 Mich. 622Docket: Docket 123992

Court: Michigan Supreme Court; July 20, 2004; Michigan; State Supreme Court

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Defendant Dennis L. Nickens was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I) involving personal injury and coercion (MCL 750.520b(1)(f)). Over his objections, the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser charge of assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration (MCL 750.520g(1)). The jury acquitted Nickens of CSC-I but convicted him of the assault charge. The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the assault charge was a necessarily lesser included offense of CSC-I. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was not and deemed the trial court's jury instruction erroneous. However, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed this decision, ruling that the assault charge is indeed a necessarily lesser included offense of CSC-I and reinstated the assault conviction.

The facts indicate that the complainant, who had an intermittent relationship with Nickens, reported an incident on September 9, 2000, where Nickens assaulted her following a confrontation regarding her relationship with another man. She described being physically attacked, including being punched and having her clothing torn, leading to significant injuries. The complainant reported the assault to the police on September 14 and later obtained a personal protective order against Nickens.

Defendant was charged with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree (CSC-I) under MCL 750.520b(1)(f). During the jury trial, the trial court instructed the jury on assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration, despite the defendant's objections. The jury acquitted the defendant of CSC-I but convicted him of the lesser offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the lesser offense, as it is not a necessarily included offense of CSC-I according to the precedent set in People v Cornell. The court granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal.

The standard of review for whether assault with intent to commit CSC is included within CSC-I is de novo. The trial court also instructed the jury on aggravated assault, but since the jury did not convict on that charge, the opinion does not address its validity. The analysis references Cornell's ruling that a lesser offense instruction is only appropriate if the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense, meaning all elements of the lesser offense are subsumed in the greater offense. Defense counsel objected to the lesser offense instructions, preserving the issue for appeal.

The elements of assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration, as defined by MCL 750.520g(1), were misinterpreted by the Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that the correct elements are simply (1) an assault and (2) intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration, without requiring an aggravating circumstance or improper sexual intent.

When a statute defines a crime and its punishment without specifying its elements, courts must refer to common law. An assault can manifest as either an attempted battery or an unlawful act that instills reasonable apprehension of immediate battery. These two forms are termed 'attempted-battery assault' and 'apprehension-type assault.' A battery, defined as intentional and harmful or offensive touching, is the successful execution of an attempted-battery assault. An attempted-battery assault is a lesser included offense of a completed battery since a battery cannot occur without first being attempted. 

For first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I) involving personal injury and the use of force or coercion, MCL 750.520b outlines that a person is guilty if they engage in sexual penetration under certain circumstances, including causing personal injury while using force or coercion. Force or coercion may manifest through actual physical force, threats of violence, or unethical medical practices, among others. 

The court must determine if CSC-I under MCL 750.520b(1)(f) inherently includes an 'assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration' under MCL 750.520g(1). Specifically, the issue is whether the elements of the latter are necessarily contained within the former, implying that one cannot commit CSC-I involving personal injury and force or coercion without first committing an assault with intent to commit sexual penetration.

MCL 750.520g(1) is determined to be a lesser included offense of MCL 750.520b(1)(f) in cases of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the First Degree (CSC-I) involving personal injury and the use of force or coercion for sexual penetration. Whenever such an act occurs, it inherently involves an attempted-battery assault with the intent to commit sexual penetration. The term "force or coercion" implies that an assault has taken place, as any physical force or coercion results in nonconsensual and harmful touching, constituting a battery. Consent is invalidated if obtained through coercion, meaning that sexual penetration under such circumstances cannot be considered lawful consent. Consequently, nonconsensual sexual penetration equates to an attempted-battery assault and a battery, fulfilling the assault requirement of MCL 750.520g(1).

Both prongs of MCL 750.520g(1)—the commission of an assault and the intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration—are inherently satisfied under MCL 750.520b(1)(f). There are no conceivable situations where an actor could unintentionally use force or coercion for sexual penetration, thus lacking the necessary mens rea for both statutes. The distinction between general and specific intent crimes is noted but deemed insignificant in this context, especially following the abolition of the defense of voluntary intoxication by MCL 768.37. The court references previous rulings to clarify that the requirement for specific intent in an included offense does not necessitate that the greater offense also demands specific intent. Overall, the court affirms that the logic of requiring specific intent for more serious crimes is inconsistent with established legal principles.

Differing requirements for lesser offenses stem from the distinct nature of crimes and their historical legislative definitions. Specific intent is required for lesser crimes to safeguard individuals from conviction based on minimal evidence, whereas substantial overt acts in more serious offenses negate this necessity. There is no legal mandate that more severe crimes require proof of the same or greater intent as lesser crimes.

In this case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the lesser offense of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct (CSC) involving sexual penetration. This instruction is valid when all elements of the lesser offense are encompassed within the greater offense and evidence supports such an instruction. MCL 750.520g(1) is recognized as a lesser included offense of MCL 750.520b(1)(f). The evidence, including the complainant's testimony about the defendant's violent actions, justified the trial court's instruction. Consequently, the court concluded that assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration is a necessarily lesser included offense of CSC-I with personal injury and coercion. The Court of Appeals' decision was reversed, and the defendant’s conviction for assault was reinstated.