Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; February 19, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
Willie Davis, an incarcerated pro se plaintiff, is appealing the dismissal of his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which alleges violations of his due process and Eighth Amendment rights related to the non-delivery of a package and excessive force used during a confrontation about it. The court reviews the dismissal de novo and considers Davis's pro se status.
Regarding the excessive force claim, Davis acknowledges the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies per the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) but disputes the district court's finding that he did not do so. The court assesses three factors to determine exhaustion: availability of remedies, potential waiver by defendants, and any special circumstances that may excuse non-exhaustion. Davis does not argue that remedies were unavailable, nor does he contest receiving the Superintendent’s decision on his grievance concerning excessive force. He claims his prior communication with the Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee should excuse his failure to formally appeal. However, this argument is invalidated by the Supreme Court's ruling in Woodford v. Ngo, which mandates "proper exhaustion," meaning adherence to all procedural requirements. Since Davis did not fully utilize available remedies or present special circumstances, his excessive force claim was rightfully dismissed.
As for the due process claim related to the undelivered package, the district court did not address it specifically. The defendants acknowledge that the current record does not sufficiently support a dismissal based on exhaustion for this claim. However, the appellate court indicates it can affirm the dismissal on other grounds where adequate record support exists.
Davis's allegations of property loss, whether intentional or negligent, do not support a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because New York provides adequate post-deprivation remedies, such as a Court of Claims action. This satisfies the requirement established in Hudson v. Palmer, which precludes a due process claim if adequate state remedies are available. Even if Davis had exhausted administrative remedies, the existence of these remedies prevents his claim. The court also dismissed Davis's assertion of denial of timely medical care, as he did not raise this issue during administrative proceedings and later clarified that he is not pursuing that claim on appeal. The Superintendent’s decision, which must be appealed using a specific form within four working days, is documented in a manner compliant with state regulations. The judgment of dismissal is affirmed, and all other arguments presented by the plaintiff on appeal were found to lack merit.
