Hallet and Bowne v. Jenks and Others

Citations: 7 U.S. 210; 2 L. Ed. 414; 3 Cranch 210; 1805 U.S. LEXIS 254

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 18, 1805; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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A writ of error was filed in the case of Hallet and Bowne v. Jenks regarding a policy of insurance under the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, as established by the act of September 24, 1789. The primary issue was whether the insured risk was illegal under the non-intercourse law of June 13, 1798. Although there were additional questions, the court was limited to interpreting the relevant statute.

The facts revealed that on April 27, 1799, the defendants insured the plaintiffs against risks for $1,000 on 25,000 pounds of coffee aboard the sloop Nancy, which had an added clause stating the coffee was "the property of the plaintiffs, all Americans." The sloop was U.S.-owned and embarked on a voyage from Rhode Island, but during the journey, it had to stop at Cape-Francois due to distress. There, public officials seized most provisions from the vessel, and the captain and supercargo, who were part owners of the cargo, sold the remaining provisions.

They entered into a contract for payment with the French officials, which was never honored. With the remaining proceeds, they purchased additional cargo, including coffee and sugar, which was then sent to New York. The sloop, containing 30,000 pounds of coffee (with 25,000 intended for the insurance policy), set sail from Cape-Francois but was subsequently captured by a British frigate and claimed as enemy property and for violating U.S. trade laws.

At the time of capturing the sloop, a document was found on board, dated 11th Thermidor, year sixty of the French Republic, issued by J. Hedouville, which authorized the free passage of an American vessel owned by Mr. E. Born Jenks from Providence, Rhode Island, to Cape-Francois for trade. The sloop, claimed by Zebedee Hunt, was condemned by a Vice-Admiralty court as enemy property subject to confiscation, thus being declared a lawful prize. The plaintiffs, who were American owners of the insured property, abandoned their claim to the underwriters. 

The relevant Congressional act stated that no U.S.-owned vessel could sail to French territory or engage in commerce with French residents after July 1, 1798, under penalty of forfeiture. Furthermore, any vessel intending to embark on a foreign voyage would require a bond ensuring it would not travel to French territories unless under distress or force, with proof required for such circumstances. The court's consideration revolves around whether the insurance related to an illegal transaction, as prohibited by the act of Congress, and if the purchase of the cargo in Cape-Francois was lawful, thereby validating the insurance policy.

The act delineates two distinct offenses concerning vessels going to French ports. The first offense prohibits any vessel from entering a French port, with exceptions for acts of God or public enemies. The second offense relates to engaging in trade or traffic once in such a port, emphasizing that the entry must be voluntary, although trading inherently cannot occur under compulsion. The statute aims to prevent intercourse with France, and the bond condition reflects this intention by differentiating between entering a port and trading, allowing for exceptions only for entry due to distress. If a vessel enters a port without being compelled by distress but engages in trade, it is liable to forfeiture under both offenses. The special verdict indicates that the captain and supercargo sold cargo without compulsion, despite claims of coercion by port officers. The jury's reasoning suggests that such coercion was not of the nature that would excuse legal violations. The act of February 27, 1800, clarifies that without specific provisions allowing for certain transactions, any such actions would contravene the law. One counsel posits that the first section of the 1798 act describes two offenses, while the opposing counsel argues that it constitutes a single offense.

A ship must engage in both bringing and carrying cargo to be considered employed in traffic. If a ship does not carry cargo voluntarily, its actions do not constitute trafficking, and any sale of the cargo under those circumstances lacks legitimacy. If a vessel is compelled to land cargo due to necessity, such as repairs or adverse weather, this does not equate to voluntary trafficking. Prohibitions against relading cargo do not prevent actions if those prohibitions are enforced by government authority. The purpose of the relevant act of Congress was to prevent voluntary interaction with certain nations, not to obstruct U.S. citizens from salvaging their property from loss. Traffic is defined as a consensual contract; thus, transactions under compulsion do not constitute valid traffic. The owners were not obligated to abandon their jeopardized property, and the master was not required to accept payment that he knew would default. Previous circuit court rulings affirmed that certain circumstances did not fall under the act, leading to the enactment of a specific section to close loopholes and deter fraud. Key argued that relying on necessity must not extend beyond what is necessary; while landing cargo may be justified, selling it exceeds that necessity. The intention behind the act is to prevent all trading with France, as evidenced by a ship's intent to trade rather than return home directly. If a ship intended to trade and was sold to a French agent, it could be subject to forfeiture.

The court concluded that the case does not fall under the 1798 non-intercourse law, emphasizing that a pre-existing intention to violate the law is not required. It ruled that circumstances such as being forced by weather to enter a French port, along with the seizure of part of the cargo by French officials, do not constitute an offense under the act. The court noted that the plaintiff could not have abandoned the property and sought government redress instead of breaching the law, as the situation was one of necessity. Even in a state of war, if the vessel was compelled to land and sell its remaining cargo due to public officers' restrictions, it would not be considered illegal trading with the enemy. The judgment was affirmed with costs, referring to earlier cases for legal precedent.