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United States v. Sorensen
Citation: 307 F. App'x 52Docket: No. 07-30230
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; January 5, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
Ronald Dale Sorensen appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the calculation of his advisory sentencing guidelines range. The appellate court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 3742, affirming Sorensen's conviction but vacating his sentence, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress de novo, examining factual findings for clear error. Sorensen contends that the warrant for his residence lacked probable cause due to the officer's failure to disclose Sandra Mitchell's drug use and mental state to the magistrate judge. However, the magistrate was already aware of Mitchell's circumstances, having considered earlier applications related to her. The court finds that her initial invocation of the right to counsel did not undermine the probable cause determination. Sorensen also argues for suppression based on the claim that Mitchell did not validly waive her Miranda rights. The court notes that there was no finding of an invalid waiver, and Sorensen cannot assert Mitchell's rights for his own suppression claim. Furthermore, a defendant cannot contest a search warrant's validity based on a third party's illegal search or seizure. Regarding the involuntariness of Mitchell's statements, the court states that a defendant typically lacks standing to challenge a third party’s rights, yet acknowledges that coerced confessions may violate due process. After reviewing the circumstances, the court finds no evidence of coercion or intimidation affecting Mitchell’s statements, concluding they were voluntary despite her drug use. In assessing Sorensen's sentence appeal, the court emphasizes that it first checks for significant procedural errors and then evaluates the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. The initial calculation of the advisory sentencing guidelines range must be accurate, as established by post-Booker principles. Sorensen contends that the district court made an error in calculating his advisory guidelines range by only reducing his offense level by one point, from 32 to 31, instead of applying a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. 3El.1(a). The Sentencing Guidelines do not permit a one-level adjustment for such acceptance. The court's use of an offense level of 31 was therefore erroneous. It remains unclear if the court fully recognized whether Sorensen 'clearly demonstrated' acceptance of responsibility. Consequently, Sorensen’s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for the district court to reassess his acceptance of responsibility per U.S.S.G. 3El.1(a) and to reevaluate the 3553 factors while recalculating the advisory guidelines range. The conviction is affirmed, but the sentence is vacated and remanded. The document notes that there is no evidence that Mitchell requested hospitalization or was hallucinating while in custody, and these arguments are not addressed.