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Marbury v. Madison
Citations: 5 U.S. 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1 Cranch 137; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 24, 1803; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
William Marbury and three other individuals sought a mandamus from the Supreme Court to compel James Madison, Secretary of State, to deliver their commissions as justices of the peace for the District of Columbia. Their request was based on the fact that President Adams had nominated them, the Senate had confirmed their appointments, and the commissions were signed and sealed but not delivered. Despite requests for the commissions, Madison did not comply, nor did he provide satisfactory information regarding their status. Additionally, the Senate declined to certify the nominations. When summoned to testify, clerks from the State Department objected to being sworn, claiming confidentiality, but the court ordered them to answer. The acting Secretary of State, Mr. Lincoln, also refused to answer questions, asserting potential confidentiality and self-incrimination. The court emphasized that no confidential information was sought. Chief Justice Marshall noted the case's complexities and the necessity for a thorough exposition of the principles underlying the court's decision. The key issues included whether the Supreme Court could issue a writ of mandamus, whether it could do so against a Secretary of State, and specifically whether it could order Madison to act in this instance. No cause was shown by Madison to deny the issuance of the mandamus, leading to the current motion. The court has addressed several critical questions regarding the applicant's right to a commission. The primary inquiry is whether the applicant has a right to the commission he requests, which stems from a congressional act from February 1801 that established justices of the peace in Washington County, appointed by the President for five-year terms. It is established that a commission for William Marbury was signed by President John Adams, but it was never delivered to him. To determine Marbury's entitlement to this commission, it is necessary to confirm whether he was formally appointed; if so, he would have rights to the completed commission as his property. The U.S. Constitution outlines the process of appointment and commissioning officials. The President nominates and appoints officers with Senate consent, while he is required to commission all appointed officers. The process involves three distinct steps: nomination (a voluntary act by the President), appointment (also voluntary but requiring Senate involvement), and commissioning (which may be a constitutional duty). The distinction between appointment and commissioning is emphasized, noting that Congress can delegate the appointment of certain inferior officers to different bodies, which may require the President to issue a commission as a duty. This raises the question of whether the President's obligation to commission extends beyond those appointed solely by him, suggesting that the legislative branch could mandate such a duty in specific instances. The constitutional distinction between the appointment to an office and the commissioning of an officer is significant, maintaining that the president’s act of commissioning is separate from the appointment itself. An appointment can be evidenced by public acts other than the commission, potentially granting the officer rights or enabling duties independent of the commission. In the specific case addressed, the president’s appointment, made with Senate consent, is evidenced solely by the commission. The commission serves as conclusive evidence of the appointment, which occurs when the president completes all necessary actions, culminating in signing the commission. This signature marks the formal appointment, finalizing the president's decision and the legislative intent that the secretary of state is mandated to affix the seal of the United States only after the commission is signed. The subsequent actions of the secretary are governed strictly by law, ensuring that the procedure is followed precisely, without deviation based on the president's preferences. The signing of the commission signifies that the appointment is no longer provisional, establishing a definitive moment when executive control over the officer ceases. The secretary of state is required to adhere to the law as a United States officer, acting under legal authority rather than presidential instructions. The act of affixing the seal to a commission is deemed a ministerial duty, essential for validating an appointment. Once the seal is affixed, the appointment is considered complete, and no further actions by the government are necessary. The executive cannot appoint without collaboration from others if the seal is not affixed, and arguments suggesting that the commission is akin to a deed requiring delivery for validity lack persuasive support. Even if such a principle were accepted, the president must personally deliver the commission as part of the appointment process. The law anticipates that the secretary of state, not the appointee, receives the commission for sealing. While specific formalities are required for letters patent, a formal delivery to the appointee is not mandated. The appointment is solely the president's act, while the transmission of the commission is a separate duty assigned to the secretary. The timing of the commission's delivery does not affect the validity of the appointment, which is already established. The relevance of possessing the original commission to perform office duties remains an open question. A loss of a commission could result in an individual losing their office due to negligence, accident, fraud, fire, or theft. However, a copy from the secretary of state's records is considered as valid as the original commission, as established by Congress. This copy does not require proof of the original's transmission or loss to be valid and serves as complete evidence of the original's existence and the appointment made. Even if the original commission were misplaced, this would not affect the validity of the copy. The law stipulates that when commissions are signed and sealed, their recording is considered complete regardless of whether they have been manually entered into official records. A copy of this record holds the same authority as the original and can be demanded under prescribed legal terms. The keeper of records cannot erase a recorded commission or deny a copy to a requester. The appointment to an office occurs solely upon the president's signing of the commission; acceptance by the officer is a separate act that does not affect the validity of the appointment. The officer has the right to accept or refuse the commission, but this does not invalidate the appointment itself. If an appointed individual declines the position, a successor is nominated based on the refusal, not due to a vacancy created by a previous officeholder. The court concludes that once a commission is signed by the president and sealed by the secretary of state, the appointment is complete. If an officer is removable at the executive's discretion, that discretion ends once the appointment is made. Conversely, if the officer is not removable, the appointment confers legal rights that cannot be revoked. In the case of Mr. Marbury, his appointment was solidified by the signing and sealing of his commission, and the law provides him with a right to hold the office for five years independently of executive influence, granting him protected legal rights. Withholding a commission is deemed unlawful and violates a vested legal right. The inquiry then shifts to whether legal remedies are available for such violations. Civil liberty entails the right to seek legal protection against injuries, a fundamental duty of government. In Great Britain, even the king can be petitioned respectfully and adheres to court judgments. Blackstone's Commentaries assert that every legal right, when infringed, warrants a legal remedy, and all injuries, except those under ecclesiastical, military, or maritime jurisdiction, fall within common law courts. The government of the United States, defined as a government of laws, must provide remedies for violations of legal rights; otherwise, it risks losing this status. The text questions whether the case at hand falls under "damnum absque injuria," where a loss is incurred without an accompanying injury. Such cases do not typically include positions of trust or profit, like the justice of the peace in the District of Columbia, which is protected by law. The inquiry further examines whether the withholding of a commission is solely a political act of the executive branch, exempting it from legal scrutiny. While some actions may be strictly political, not every duty in government is beyond legal accountability. For example, the law mandates the Secretary of War to place certain veterans on the pension list; a refusal to comply would not leave the veterans without a remedy. The question arises whether heads of departments are accountable to the law, challenging the notion that they are above legal recourse. Legislative acts do not provide extraordinary privileges, nor do common law doctrines support such claims. Personal injury from the king to a subject is considered impossible; however, property rights can be violated by the crown through its officers, who can be held accountable for errors. According to the 1796 act concerning land sales, a purchaser becomes fully entitled to the property upon payment and proper documentation, and the president must grant a patent upon meeting these conditions. If the secretary of state withholds or fails to provide the patent, it is unreasonable to suggest that no legal remedy exists for the injured party. The examination of the legality of departmental acts depends on their nature; some are subject to judicial review while others are not. The U.S. Constitution grants the president certain political powers, which he exercises at his discretion and is accountable only to the nation and his conscience. Appointed officers act under the president’s authority, making their acts the president’s acts, and their discretion cannot be controlled by others. However, when a law imposes specific duties on these officers, and individual rights hinge on their performance, they become accountable to the law and cannot disregard vested rights. Therefore, if an officer fails to perform a legally mandated duty affecting individual rights, the aggrieved party retains the right to seek legal redress. The president holds the political power to nominate and appoint officials at his discretion, and once an appointment is made, the president has exercised his full authority. If an officer is removable at the president's will, a new appointment can be made, terminating the officer's rights. However, if the officer cannot be removed, their rights are legally protected and cannot be revoked by the president. The determination of whether a right has vested is a judicial matter, requiring court evaluation. For instance, if Mr. Marbury acted as a magistrate and a suit arose regarding his appointment, the court would assess the validity of his appointment. The court concludes that the appointment was finalized once the president signed the commission and the U.S. seal was affixed, granting Marbury a legal right to the office for five years. He also has the right to the commission, and any refusal to deliver it constitutes a violation of that right, for which he can seek legal remedy. The nature of the writ he seeks and the court's power to grant it are key considerations. A mandamus, as defined by Blackstone, is a court order directed to an authority requiring the performance of a specific duty, especially when a person is wrongfully denied access to their rights and lacks other legal remedies. Lord Mansfield elaborates that the court should issue a mandamus in cases of rightful office execution or public service when the individual is dispossessed of such rights. The writ in question is intended for situations lacking a specific legal remedy where justice and good governance necessitate one. It should be directed at a government officer, mandating them to perform a duty associated with their role, as established by prior court determinations aligned with justice. The applicant must demonstrate a lack of other legal remedies. The relationship between the President and department heads complicates legal inquiries into their actions, often leading to hesitance in such investigations. Claims made in court to assert legal rights should not be misconstrued as intrusions into executive prerogatives, as the court's function is to resolve individual rights rather than scrutinize executive discretion. If the matter pertains to a legally recorded document accessible to the public, it does not interfere with executive matters and allows for judicial consideration of the claim. Should a department head engage in illegal actions while acting under their office, this does not grant them immunity from legal proceedings. The determination of whether a mandamus is appropriate hinges on the nature of the action required, not on the status of the official involved. If an official's duties involve exercising executive discretion, requests for court intervention would generally be dismissed. Where a law mandates an official to perform an act impacting the absolute rights of individuals, and the president does not have the authority to direct or prohibit this act, courts are obligated to provide judgment for the injured party, akin to how they would for any other individual. This principle is rooted in historical context, as seen in a 1792 act which tasked the Secretary of War with placing certain disabled officers on a pension list based on circuit court reports. Although this act was later deemed unconstitutional, the courts proceeded to act as commissioners, raising the question of the rights of those reported. In 1793, Congress mandated that the Secretary of War and the Attorney General ensure a Supreme Court adjudication on such claims. Following this, a mandamus was sought to compel the Secretary to include individuals on the pension list based on judicial reports. The court ruled that while a mandamus could be issued to a department head for legally mandated actions affecting vested interests, it would not issue in this instance unless the report conferred a legal right. The judgment from this case resolved the merits of similar claims, compelling individuals to follow the new legal processes established post-unconstitutional act. The current motion for a mandamus differs in that it does not pertain to a specifically mandated act by statute. A commission is to be delivered to the applicant, who has a vested legal right to it, established by his appointment to an office that cannot be revoked at the executive's discretion. The Secretary of State holds the commission, which is intended for the applicant, and cannot lawfully withhold it. Although the action of detinue was initially considered a potential remedy, it was determined that a mandamus is more appropriate since the value of a public office cannot be quantified, and the applicant is entitled to the office itself, either through the commission or a certified copy. The Supreme Court has the authority to issue writs of mandamus to individuals holding office under U.S. authority, including the Secretary of State. If the court lacks this authority, it would imply that the law is unconstitutional. The Constitution grants the Supreme Court comprehensive judicial power, extending to all cases under U.S. law, including this matter concerning the applicant's rights. While original jurisdiction is specified for certain cases, it remains possible for Congress to assign additional original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases that fall under its judicial power. The text asserts that if Congress were allowed to determine the distribution of judicial power between the Supreme Court and inferior courts, the constitutional definitions of jurisdiction would be meaningless. It argues that the Constitution's delineation of original and appellate jurisdiction must be strictly adhered to; otherwise, the language would be rendered ineffective. The document emphasizes that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is clearly defined: it has original jurisdiction in specified cases and appellate jurisdiction in others. Any interpretation that allows Congress to alter this distribution undermines the Constitution's intent. The text further clarifies that for the Supreme Court to issue a mandamus, it must be within the scope of appellate jurisdiction. While mandamus can be issued to courts, directing it to an officer for a document essentially mimics initiating an original case, which does not fall under appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the necessity of such a writ to exercise appellate jurisdiction is questioned, reinforcing that the court's actions must align with its defined jurisdictional boundaries. The authority granted to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus to public officers is questioned as being constitutionally warranted. This raises the fundamental issue of whether an act contrary to the Constitution can be considered law. The excerpt emphasizes that the people possess the original right to establish governing principles for their happiness, which form the foundation of the American system. Such principles are deemed fundamental and intended to be permanent, with the Constitution serving as a written delineation of the powers of government. The text argues that if the limits set by the Constitution can be disregarded by the legislature, the distinction between limited and unlimited governmental powers disappears. It asserts that the Constitution is the superior law, not subject to change by ordinary legislative acts; thus, any legislative act in conflict with it is void. The necessity of a written constitution implies that such acts cannot bind the courts or have legal effect. The excerpt ultimately questions whether a legislative act that is void still obligates the courts to enforce it, suggesting that doing so would contradict established constitutional theory. The judicial department is tasked with interpreting the law and resolving conflicts between laws, particularly when one law opposes the Constitution. When both a law and the Constitution apply to a case, the court must determine which prevails. The Constitution is deemed superior to ordinary legislative acts, and courts must consider it as paramount law. Ignoring the Constitution would undermine the foundation of written constitutions, effectively allowing the legislature to operate beyond its limits, contrary to the principles of governance that restrict legislative power. The Constitution explicitly extends judicial authority to cases arising under it, implying that judges must reference the Constitution when making decisions. Specific provisions of the Constitution, such as prohibitions on export duties and ex post facto laws, highlight the necessity for judges to adhere to constitutional mandates, emphasizing that failure to do so would violate the rights intended to be protected by the Constitution. A rule of evidence is established that cannot be altered by legislative action, raising the question of whether legislative changes, such as allowing one witness or an out-of-court confession to suffice for conviction, can override constitutional principles. The framers of the Constitution intended it to govern both courts and the legislature, as evidenced by the requirement for judges to take an oath to support it, which directly relates to their official duties. The text suggests that it would be unethical for judges to be used to violate the very oath they take. The legislative oath reinforces this view, emphasizing the obligation to administer justice impartially and in accordance with the Constitution and U.S. laws. The necessity of this oath is questioned if the Constitution does not serve as a guiding framework for judges. Furthermore, the Constitution asserts its supremacy as law, stating that only laws made in alignment with it hold that status, thereby affirming the principle that any law contradicting the Constitution is void. Courts, along with other government branches, are bound by the Constitution, necessitating adherence to its provisions.