United States v. Stevens

Citation: 168 F. App'x 264Docket: No. 04-6111

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; February 20, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

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Loy Chris Stevens, a federal prisoner, requested a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court denied his request, concluding he did not demonstrate "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," leading to the dismissal of his appeal. Stevens had been convicted on fourteen counts involving illegal possession of firearms and drugs, receiving a life sentence in 2000. His appeal was procedurally terminated after he missed the deadline to file his opening brief. Attempts to reinstate the appeal and a subsequent petition for rehearing were denied. In his habeas petition, filed after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, he claimed numerous constitutional violations, particularly ineffective assistance of counsel. For a COA to be granted, the applicant must show that reasonable jurists could debate the resolution of the petition. The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel requires demonstrating that the attorney’s performance was unreasonably deficient and resulted in prejudice, as outlined by the Strickland v. Washington standard. If prejudice is not proven, the court need not assess the performance's constitutionality.

Mr. Stevens's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are found to lack merit. He abandoned an argument regarding his attorney's failure to object to certain jury form aspects, which is not considered in this evaluation. Several claims are dismissed due to his inability to demonstrate prejudice, including the failure to request recusal of Judge Miles-LaGrange, objections to government misconduct, and several procedural actions, such as not subpoenaing witnesses or raising a Bruton objection related to a co-defendant's statement. Without showing a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would differ if these actions were taken, these claims are rejected.

Additionally, claims asserting ineffective assistance related to the prosecution for multiple firearms and narcotics violations are also dismissed. Mr. Stevens argues that his prosecution for multiple firearms offenses constituted double jeopardy; however, the court clarifies that each firearm possession charge was based on distinct incidents, unlike the precedent he cites. Therefore, his attorney's failure to object to these convictions is justified. Similarly, there is no basis for his counsel to object to the separate narcotics charges, as the court found no error in treating them as distinct offenses during sentencing.

Mr. Stevens's reliance on the cases Rutledge v. United States, Blockburger v. United States, and United States v. Gore does not substantiate his argument regarding separate incidents of criminal conduct in relation to sentencing guidelines. The distinction between double jeopardy and the continuity of crimes for sentencing purposes is clarified. Regarding the classification of methamphetamine, Mr. Stevens's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to failure to contest its Schedule II classification is negated by precedent in United States v. Zamora, which confirms methamphetamine's appropriate classification, thus ruling out counsel's deficiency. Concerning his prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the district court upheld that possession of a shotgun can be prosecuted under this statute irrespective of state law. The court also determined that there is no "antiquity" exception to § 922(g)(1) and that Mr. Stevens did not provide evidence that the shotgun in question qualified as an antique under the law, as it was not demonstrated to be manufactured before 1898. Although a separate antique rifle was introduced as evidence, it was not the firearm Mr. Stevens was charged with possessing.

Three witnesses provided testimony regarding a shotgun found in Mr. Stevens's home, with no evidence suggesting it was an antique. Agent Delbert Knopp seized the shotgun, while Agent James S. Allison noted Mr. Stevens claimed it belonged to his ex-wife's mother. Jeanne Burns, Mr. Stevens's ex-wife, stated the shotgun was "old" but not treated as an heirloom. Consequently, Mr. Stevens did not demonstrate that the shotgun was antique and thus exempt from prosecution under § 922(g)(1), leading to the conclusion that his counsel was effective in not raising the antiquity defense.

Additionally, Mr. Stevens argued ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to object to his sentencing under the 1998 United States Sentencing Guidelines instead of the 1995 version. The first count of conviction arose from conduct in December 1995, while the last occurred in January 1999. The district court, referencing United States v. Sullivan, determined that Mr. Stevens's conduct was continuous, justifying the application of the 1998 guidelines. Despite Mr. Stevens's disagreement with this finding, he provided no substantial evidence to support his claim. Thus, the court concluded that he was properly sentenced under the 1998 guidelines, and his counsel was not deficient for failing to object.

Lastly, Mr. Stevens's claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel related to evidence seized from two addresses were addressed. The trial court confirmed that Mr. Stevens's attorney had indeed objected to the admission of this evidence, indicating that the actions complained of were taken by counsel, and therefore, Mr. Stevens's claims were found to lack merit.

Mr. Stevens contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to object to "double counting" during sentencing, specifically regarding enhancements under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines section 2D1.1(b)(1). However, the district court indicated that an objection on this basis was already raised, negating claims of attorney deficiency. Furthermore, several of Mr. Stevens's claims were found to be procedurally barred because they were not raised on direct appeal. To overcome this procedural default, a defendant must demonstrate cause and actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Mr. Stevens argued that the dismissal of his appeal constituted cause, but the court clarified that such cause must stem from external factors impeding counsel's compliance with procedural rules. Despite his claims of ineffective assistance, Mr. Stevens failed to assert that his counsel was ineffective for not filing a timely appeal. The court noted that any lateness in filing the notice of appeal did not prejudice him, as the appeal was still heard. Additionally, Mr. Stevens did not provide reasons for his failure to file his opening brief on time. As a result, his procedural default was not excused, leading to the conclusion that his double jeopardy, due process, and government misconduct claims were procedurally barred. Lastly, Mr. Stevens argued that his double jeopardy claims should be viewed as ineffective assistance of counsel claims, but the court maintained they were appropriately classified as substantive and thus barred.

The district court interpreted Mr. Stevens's pleadings broadly, even considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that were not explicitly raised. However, the court ultimately determined that there was no ineffective assistance, which maintained the procedural bar against his claims. Mr. Stevens also contended that the district court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing for his § 2255 motion. The review of this denial is based on whether there was an abuse of discretion. Mr. Stevens failed to provide adequate justification for the need for an evidentiary hearing, merely citing cases without explaining their relevance to his situation. Consequently, the court found no clear error in the district court's judgment and denied his request for a Certificate of Appealability (COA), dismissing the appeal. His motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted, but the order is not considered binding precedent except under specific legal doctrines.