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Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.
Citation: 167 F. App'x 227Docket: No. 05-0854-CV
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; December 29, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Plaintiffs-appellants filed their action on November 19, 1998, in the Southern District of New York, which was dismissed by defendants-appellees under Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6), allowing for amendments. An amended complaint was submitted on August 9, 1999, against two concert promoters and three booking agencies, which survived a second dismissal motion. After three years of discovery, defendants filed multiple motions for summary judgment, all of which were granted by the district court. The appellate court reviews the summary judgment de novo, requiring that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Appellants abandoned several claims not addressed in their appellate brief. Under Section 1981, a plaintiff must demonstrate intentional discrimination that interferes with a contractual relationship. Appellants failed to present sufficient facts to support claims of racial discrimination impacting contracts. Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies aimed at depriving individuals of equal protection under the law and allows for recovery of damages from conspirators. In Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1999), the court established that a plaintiff must specifically allege overt acts related to a conspiracy under § 1985(3), and found no evidence of a racially motivated conspiracy. The appellants failed to present any evidence that could lead a reasonable juror to infer the existence of such a conspiracy. Under the Sherman Act, § 1 prohibits contracts or conspiracies that restrain trade, with most antitrust claims analyzed under the rule of reason. Certain restraints are deemed unlawful per se due to their clear anti-competitive effects and lack of redeeming qualities. Although the district court applied the rule of reason correctly, had it used the per se analysis, summary judgment would have still been favored due to the absence of evidence for any agreement. Consequently, the District Court's judgment was affirmed.