Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; June 23, 2011; Federal Appellate Court
Shalen Thomas appeals his sentence following a guilty plea for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He contests the classification of a prior conviction for resisting arrest under Pennsylvania law as a “crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States (2010). The court affirms its previous ruling that Pennsylvania’s resisting arrest statute qualifies as a crime of violence, thereby supporting the District Court's determination of Thomas's base offense level as 24. This level was established due to Thomas having at least two felony convictions related to either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, specifically noting his prior convictions for heroin and cocaine offenses, as well as resisting arrest.
Thomas argued that his base offense level should have been lower, at 20, if resisting arrest were not considered a crime of violence. However, the District Court maintained the higher level after reviewing adjustments, resulting in a final offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of V, which led to a sentencing range of 84-105 months. Ultimately, Thomas was sentenced to 105 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
In reviewing the appeal, the court applies a standard of abuse of discretion, evaluating both procedural and substantive aspects of the sentencing. It found no procedural errors and deemed the sentence substantively reasonable, concluding that the District Court's decisions aligned with the established guidelines. The opinion also clarifies that under Pennsylvania law, resisting arrest can result in misdemeanor charges based on the risk of bodily injury or the use of substantial force to overcome resistance.
"Crime of violence" is defined as any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for over one year, which includes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person, or specific offenses like burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives that present a serious potential risk of physical injury. This definition aligns closely with "violent felony" as per the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). In United States v. Stinson, a conviction for resisting arrest under Pennsylvania law was deemed a crime of violence because it involved purposeful and aggressive actions that posed a serious risk of injury. The ruling clarified that it fell under the "residual clause" of the definition. Following the Supreme Court's Johnson v. United States decision, which found that simple battery in Florida did not qualify as a violent felony due to its lack of "violent force," Thomas contended that his Pennsylvania conviction should similarly be excluded. However, the court noted that Stinson's ruling pertained to the residual clause, where "physical force" does not apply, unlike the first clause referenced in Johnson. The absence of "physical force" in the residual clause is critical. Consequently, the District Court's classification of Thomas's resisting arrest conviction as a crime of violence under the Guidelines was upheld, and his base offense level calculation was deemed correct. Thomas also claimed procedural and substantive unreasonableness in his sentencing, specifically citing the District Court's failure to consider his request for a downward variance to avoid sentencing disparities compared to similar offenses in other states.
Various states have differing classifications, definitions, and penalties for resisting arrest, with Pennsylvania categorizing it as a crime of violence. This aligns with rulings from multiple circuits, including the Fourth, First, and Eighth Circuits, which have similarly classified resisting arrest as a crime of violence under federal guidelines. The New Jersey statute also reflects this classification.
Although the District Court did not explicitly address Thomas's variance motion under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6), it did consider his request for a variance under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and provided sufficient reasoning in both its written findings and oral statements at sentencing for categorizing Thomas’s resisting arrest conviction as a crime of violence. The Court addressed any potential unwarranted disparity in sentencing, refuting Thomas’s argument regarding substantive unreasonableness of his sentence.
The District Court's assessment of the sentence's reasonableness was based on a comprehensive evaluation of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). It determined that a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range was justified due to the nature of the offense and Thomas’s extensive criminal background, which included previous convictions for firearm possession, drug offenses, and aggravated assault. Consequently, the Court did not commit any procedural or substantive errors in imposing Thomas’s sentence, leading to the affirmation of the District Court’s judgment.
