Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 3, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
Ruby Dell Harris appeals the district court's summary judgment favoring KING Broadcasting, the Washington Firm, Ltd., and the City of Seattle. She argues that she provided clear evidence of actual malice by KING in portraying her in a false light and raised genuine material issues regarding the Firm's good faith in investigating her workplace harassment complaints. Additionally, she claims sufficient evidence to counter the City's summary judgment motion. The court affirms the district court's decision, determining no errors were made in dismissing her claims.
Harris contests the summary judgment on her false light claim against KING. The appellate review follows a de novo standard, assessing if genuine factual issues exist and whether the correct substantive law was applied. In First Amendment cases, appellate courts must independently review the record to ensure free expression is not infringed upon, but they are not required to overlook procedural rules that prevent resolving disputed facts at the summary judgment stage.
A public official must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice to succeed in a false light claim, defined as publishing knowing a statement is false or with reckless disregard for its truthfulness. Although Harris presented some evidence of actual malice, it fails to meet the high clear and convincing standard required. Notably, she highlighted a statement from KING reporter Duane Pohlman about wanting to "shock the public" regarding alleged misuse of taxpayer money. However, evidence of bias does not inherently indicate malice, and while circumstantial evidence can be relevant, Harris's evidence does not sufficiently establish the requisite state of mind for actual malice.
Evidence that a defendant deliberately crafted a narrative before an investigation and sought to align the evidence with that narrative can indicate actual malice. This principle is supported by case law, such as in Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., where evidence of manipulating test results demonstrated malice. Ms. Harris’s claim that Mr. Pohlman aimed to “shock the public” with his report is merely a paraphrase of his deposition and does not constitute substantive evidence of a biased editorial stance. Mr. Pohlman testified that his purpose in following Ms. Harris was to assess taxpayer spending related to a management seminar.
Ms. Harris's assertion regarding Mr. Pohlman's observation of her during lunch as a contradiction suggesting malice is countered by KING's justification that monitoring her was necessary to track her participation in seminars. The conference schedule indicated that seminars ran from 10:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m., necessitating observation during lunch to ensure proper tracking.
Furthermore, Ms. Harris's argument that KING's omission of her evening activities from its report indicates malice is unpersuasive, as the conference schedule made a clear distinction between daytime seminars and nighttime events. KING claimed Ms. Harris attended only 3 hours of seminars, and this claim does not infer malice.
Lastly, while Ms. Harris contends that she provided evidence countering the allegations against her during a press conference prior to KING's broadcast, her cited evidence from the broadcast does not support a finding of reckless disregard. The content of her statements lacks the necessary probative value to imply malice.
Ms. Harris's generalized denial of wrongdoing does not sufficiently demonstrate that KING acted with malice, as such denials are common and do not inherently indicate actual malice unless they contain doubt-inducing content. The inclusion of her denials in KING's broadcast further counters any inference of malice. Additionally, the district court correctly ruled that the Firm was entitled to immunity under Wash. Rev.Code 4.24.510, which protects individuals who communicate in good faith to government entities from civil liability. The standard for good faith is aligned with the actual malice standard. Ms. Harris's claim that the Firm's lack of a reasonable investigation proves actual malice is unconvincing since she does not identify any false statements in the report. The Firm's decision not to interview certain witnesses suggested by Ms. Harris does not imply malice, especially as the report indicated that the underlying complaints could not be substantiated due to witnesses refusing to cooperate. Ms. Harris also acknowledges her obligation under City Resolution 30004 to investigate complaints timely, and the resolution does not condition this obligation on the validity of the complaints. Her disagreement with the report’s conclusion regarding her seriousness toward the complaints is deemed an opinion rather than a factual assertion. The district court's decision to grant the City’s motion was therefore upheld.
Ms. Harris argues the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment on her claim that the Commission lacked authority to investigate her handling of workplace harassment complaints. She cites Seattle Municipal Code 4.08.040, which states that two Commissioners form a quorum, and invokes a common law rule that a majority of a quorum is necessary for action. Ms. Harris contends that the two voting Commissioners disagreed, invalidating the quorum for the investigation into her management. She references a letter from Commissioner Fossos indicating his vote was limited to the harassment allegations, not her performance. However, the Firm argues this letter is unauthenticated hearsay and thus inadmissible in summary judgment proceedings, as established in relevant case law. Consequently, Ms. Harris did not provide admissible evidence showing a lack of majority agreement among Commissioners regarding the investigation. Additionally, the district court pointed out that the Seattle Municipal Code does not stipulate a majority vote requirement for Commission actions, nor does it create a private right of action for such non-compliance. The court affirmed the summary judgment for the City, awarding costs to the appellees. On appeal, Ms. Harris does not dispute her public official status or the finding of falsity but claims that KING's reliance on 'complaining subordinates' demonstrates actual malice. However, without evidence that her supervisors would confirm her account, KING's failure to contact them does not establish actual malice and merely indicates negligence, according to established legal standards.
