United States v. Hausler

Citation: 409 F. App'x 4Docket: No. 09-3890

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; November 7, 2010; Federal Appellate Court

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Patrick Hausler was indicted for advertising, possessing, and distributing child pornography, ultimately pleading guilty to one charge of advertising child pornography with intent to distribute under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A). He was sentenced to 25 years in prison followed by a life term of supervised release. Hausler filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel sought to withdraw, stating there were no nonfrivolous grounds for an appeal per Anders v. California. The review focused on potential issues identified by the counsel and Hausler's response.

Counsel considered Hausler's desire to withdraw his guilty plea and assessed the voluntariness of the plea. It was noted that the district court failed to inform Hausler of his right to counsel, the possibility of restitution, and the elements of the charge. Additionally, the judge did not inquire if the plea was influenced by threats or promises. These omissions were reviewed for plain error due to Hausler not seeking to withdraw his plea in the trial court.

The court found that Hausler, already represented by counsel at the plea, was aware of his right to counsel, rendering that omission inconsequential. As for the restitution warning, since no restitution was ordered, this was deemed immaterial. The absence of an inquiry about threats or promises was also considered negligible due to the signed plea agreement stating no such inducements were made. Lastly, regarding the failure to advise Hausler about the elements of the charge, the court adopted a totality of circumstances approach and concluded that Hausler understood the charges, as he admitted to the facts supporting his conviction and confirmed comprehension of the crime's elements in his plea agreement.

Counsel also evaluated whether Hausler could challenge his sentence, concluding that it did not exceed statutory maximums and thus was lawful under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A) and § 3583(k).

Appellant's counsel examined potential errors in the sentencing guidelines calculations, specifically questioning the trial court's decision not to grant credit for acceptance of responsibility. The sentencing judge denied this reduction, citing that, while Hausler had pled guilty timely, he continued to engage in criminal behavior by advertising and distributing child pornography while on bond. This conduct supported the trial court's finding of a continuous pattern of criminal activity inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.

Counsel also evaluated whether the trial court's conclusion about Hausler's criminal activity was based on clearly erroneous facts. Testimony from two government witnesses at the sentencing hearing indicated that Hausler accessed computers and distributed child pornography after his release, and the defendant did not contest this testimony, leaving no grounds to challenge its credibility.

Further, counsel assessed whether the sentencing court treated the guidelines as mandatory or presumptively reasonable, ultimately concluding there was no evidence of such errors. The attorney also reviewed if the court adequately considered the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The sentencing judge explicitly addressed the defendant's history, the need for deterrence, the seriousness of the offense, and the guidelines range, finding the sentence of 300 months imprisonment appropriate.

Finally, Hausler's attorney considered whether the judge properly addressed mitigating circumstances presented by the defense. The court acknowledged the argument regarding Hausler's potential for treatment due to addiction but found it unpersuasive. It was determined that the judge was not obliged to address the defendant's pro se arguments regarding his efforts for treatment, employment history, community contributions, or constitutional claims related to sentencing disparities with other statutes. These arguments were deemed common and insufficient to warrant special consideration.

Prosecutors often opt to enforce the most punitive laws available, allowing them to select charges that carry the highest sentences when multiple laws are violated. In this context, it would be baseless to claim that the trial court inadequately explained the sentence. The defendant's appointed counsel reviewed the sentence's reasonableness and found it within the guidelines range, making it presumptively reasonable. No evidence in the record contradicts this presumption, rendering arguments against the sentence's length frivolous.

Counsel also assessed the possibility of contesting the district judge's forfeiture order regarding the confiscated hard drive. The plea agreement explicitly required the defendant to forfeit these hard drives, meaning any challenge to the forfeiture would violate the agreement. Furthermore, the defendant relinquished any interest in the hard drive upon entering the plea, granting him no standing to contest the forfeiture. This challenge is likewise deemed frivolous.

Lastly, the defendant expressed a desire to modify certain supervised release terms, but counsel correctly noted that such requests should be made through a motion to the district court rather than through an appeal. Consequently, the motion to withdraw from the appeal is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.