Landers v. Bollinger Amelia Repair, Ltd. Liability Corp.
Docket: No. 10-30236
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; December 8, 2010; Federal Appellate Court
The court addressed whether a maritime relationship existed between Bollinger Amelia Repair, L.L.C. (BAR) and Steve D. Landers when Landers used BAR's gangway. The court determined that no facts or legal basis indicated a maritime relationship between BAR and the crew member of the docked vessel, the M/V ROSEANNA. The vessel, owned by Kevin Gros Offshore, L.L.C., arrived at BAR's dock with a damaged hull, making its own gangway unusable. Landers and another crew member retrieved a gangway from BAR's dock, which was inspected and deemed safe by a Kevin Gros employee. While removing the gangway, Landers was injured when it malfunctioned.
Landers sued BAR for negligence under maritime law after settling with Kevin Gros. The district court granted summary judgment to BAR, ruling no maritime relationship existed and that Landers' Louisiana tort claims were time-barred under a one-year statute of limitations. Landers' motions to reopen the case and for a new trial were denied. Although Landers only appealed the denial of his motion to reopen, the court found sufficient intent in his appeal to also consider the summary judgment against BAR, as both issues were interconnected and BAR would not suffer prejudice from this broader review.
The district court's summary judgment in favor of BAR is reviewed de novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material issue is one that could affect the case's outcome, and the court must view facts favorably for the nonmoving party. Landers contends that BAR, by requiring the use of its gangways for docked ships, assumed a maritime duty to provide a safe gangway under general maritime negligence law. However, Landers acknowledges that BAR, as a dock owner, did not have a duty to furnish a gangway or a duty of seaworthiness since it is not the vessel owner. Landers seeks to establish new legal precedent for when a dock owner assumes the vessel owner's duties. The court declines to expand maritime jurisdiction in this manner, affirming that the district court correctly rejected the application of maritime law to this case. Maritime law does cover gangways, and vessel owners have a fundamental duty to ensure safe boarding and departing means for crew members, which is a nondelegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. This duty is tied to the owner/operator relationship of the vessel. Thus, the doctrine of seaworthiness does not apply to dock owners who do not own or operate the vessel. Furthermore, the dock owner's duty to a vessel's crew is governed by state law absent a maritime relationship. The court finds no evidence linking BAR's gangway policy to a maritime relationship with Landers and notes that there is no evidence showing BAR's involvement in the crew's use of its gangway. It is established that the M/V ROSEANNA lacked a usable gangway, and only Kevin Gros's employees interacted with the BAR gangway.
Landers fails to cite any legal precedent supporting his claim that a dock owner can take on the role of a shipowner and trigger maritime tort liability by requiring the use of its gangway. Instead, he invokes the 'Good Samaritan' rule, which holds that a party providing services may be liable for harm due to negligence if certain conditions are met. However, Landers does not clarify how this principle applies to maritime liability as opposed to state negligence law. The argument that requiring the use of the gangway implies BAR assumes a shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is fundamentally flawed since the seaworthiness doctrine is limited to vessel owners or operators, as established in prior case law.
The District Court's decision not to extend this doctrine to a husbanding agent, as seen in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Company, was upheld. Landers' assertion that BAR's policy for mandatory use of its gangway establishes a duty under maritime negligence law lacks legal and logical support. The court reaffirmed that dock owners do not hold a general maritime duty to ensure a crew member's safe boarding and disembarking from a ship, as noted in Florida Fuels. Customary practices do not create legal duties, and the mere provision of access at some docks does not obligate dock owners to do so for every crew member.
The district court's grant of summary judgment to BAR and denial of Landers' motion to reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) were affirmed, as Landers did not present new evidence or demonstrate errors in fact or law. The opinion is not to be published as precedent, and the court assumed, in favor of Landers, that BAR owned the dock while noting inconsistencies in testimony regarding the placement of the gangway. The court rejected BAR's argument that Landers waived his claim regarding maritime status since it was addressed in the district court proceedings.
