Court: Supreme Court of the United States; December 1, 1781; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Miller, Libellant and Appellant v. The Ship Resolution involved a motion for a rehearing in the Federal Court of Appeals regarding a prior decree. The Appellants argued that the decree contained factual errors and that new, material testimony had emerged since its issuance. They asserted that the principle of "humanum est errare" justified the rehearing, highlighting that the community's interest in concluding disputes must be balanced with the pursuit of justice. They emphasized the timely filing of their petition upon receiving notice of the decree, suggesting that the discovery of new evidence indicated that the Resolution might be British property, similar to other vessels tied to the same parties.
Opposition to the rehearing noted potential negative consequences of granting new trials at every request, arguing that the costs associated would not deter misuse. It was contended that the Law of Chancery principles did not apply, as those cases often involve new suits where parties might be surprised, unlike the current case. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the new evidence referenced did not pertain directly to the ship in question but to another vessel, and thus should not serve as a basis for the rehearing.
Ultimately, the Court decided to allow the rehearing due to the unique circumstances, noting that this decision should not set a precedent. They emphasized that no previously determined points could be re-litigated unless the facts changed due to new evidence. After further argumentation, a revised decree was issued on January 24, 1782, modifying the earlier decree only concerning a portion of the cargo. The Court acknowledged the new evidence presented and the arguments from both sides in its consideration.
The opinion asserts that the ship Resolution should be treated as neutral property, entitled to rights and privileges of neutrality under Congressional Ordinance, based on the articles of capitulation and British proclamation that temporarily protected it from capture during its journey from Dominica to Amsterdam. The neutrality of the States General was deemed intact despite the rupture with Great Britain, as the proclamation limited the scope of the war and exempted the ship from hostilities.
However, upon further consideration, the opinion shifts regarding the nature of the war. It distinguishes between perfect and imperfect wars, defining a perfect war as one that completely disrupts national peace and transforms a neutral nation into a belligerent. The war initiated by Great Britain was classified as a perfect war, which obliterated the neutrality of the States General, making them a party in the conflict rather than a common friend to all involved nations.
Consequently, the States General cannot regain their neutral status until peace is restored with Great Britain, which requires mutual agreement. The British proclamation alone cannot re-establish the ship's neutrality; it only affords limited protection from capture. The ship Resolution and its cargo have been captured and are libelled as prize. The burden of proof (onus probandi) lies with the captors, who must demonstrate that the ship or cargo is indeed a prize. Without such proof, condemnation cannot occur, and any wrongful capture allows the injured party to seek damages. Privateers are restricted to capturing vessels that are the property of enemies; unjustified captures expose the captors to liability, emphasizing the need for proper conduct at sea and the requirement for captains to provide security against wrongful seizures.
The sea is accessible to all nations without exclusive ownership. A privateer cannot assume a ship encountered on the high seas is enemy property solely based on its location; such an assumption could unjustly allow the privateer to target its own nation's ships. If a privateer seizes a ship, it must justify the act of violence and prove the ship belongs to an enemy before obtaining condemnation. In this case, the privateer claims just grounds for seizure based on the ship and cargo being in the possession of British subjects, which is presumed evidence of ownership. However, this presumption is weakened because the ship was originally captured from Dutch subjects. Therefore, the possession does not support condemnation, as it can be contested.
The law of nations requires a method to identify the ownership and nationality of ships to prevent indiscriminate hostility during wartime. Accordingly, nations mandate that ships carry documentation (Ship Papers) to serve as presumptive evidence of ownership. Additional documents like bills of lading provide further prima facie evidence. The outcome of prize determinations relies on these documents; if they indicate the ship and cargo are not enemy property, they must be acquitted unless opposing evidence is presented. Conversely, if the documents indicate enemy ownership, condemnation follows unless clear evidence to the contrary is provided by those contesting the capture.
The legal documents, including the manifest, clearance, bills of lading, depositions, certificates from the Chief Justice of Dominica, a French Governor's passport, and correspondence from shippers, collectively establish that the ship is owned by Brantlight. Son, subjects of the States General from Amsterdam, while the cargo belongs to British capitulants in Dominica, entitled to commerce rights per the capitulation following the island's conquest, except for parts shipped by Morson Co., Vance Co., and Lovel, Morson Co. The burden is on the captors to counter this evidence; if they fail, an acquittal must be granted. Although the captors' counsel argues that the individual documents do not substantiate the claims when viewed separately, the collective evidence does support them, except for specified cargo portions.
Several objections have been raised regarding the competency and credibility of the evidence, particularly against the certificates of the Chief Justice, labeled as a British Judge and an enemy. However, the court holds that the Chief Justice, despite his British ties, cannot be deemed an enemy due to his official capacity and the obligations of his office under the French government. His certificates are considered presumptively valid evidence. Furthermore, objections based on the lack of superior evidence, such as an attested copy of the articles of capitulation, while significant against the captors, do not impact the claimants' position. The articles of capitulation are recognized as a binding treaty among Great Britain, France, and America, obligating all parties, including neutral nations, to honor its terms, which the captors' counsel acknowledges.
Papers on board indicate fair commerce and affirm that the cargo belongs to capitulants, except where noted. If individuals are not capitulants but British subjects, they have breached the capitulation by engaging in fraudulent commerce, leading to a moral obligation violation. Claimants rely on two presumptions: one from the documents presented and another based on the belief that individuals do not violate moral duties. These presumptions remain uncontested, and the burden to contest them falls on the captors, who must produce the best evidence available to them. An attested copy of the articles and names would serve this purpose, proving both who are capitulants and who are not.
Concerns have been raised about the absence of the ship's register, which could create suspicion. However, the circumstances surrounding the capture by a British privateer and subsequent capture by an American privateer do not justify such suspicion. Both captains had an interest in withholding the register if it indicated the ship belonged to subjects of the States General, and neither captain provided an oath confirming that all papers found on board were presented to the court.
Claims of contradictions between the Manifest and the Bills of Lading are addressed. The Manifest lists shippers, while the Bills of Lading indicate different owners. The term "shippers" does not necessarily imply ownership, as it can refer to agents or factors acting on behalf of the true owners. Additionally, although the 17th article of the capitulation suggests that merchants can sell their merchandise, it also allows for the possibility that agents can possess and manage goods on behalf of others, indicating a special property interest rather than general ownership.
Shippers were reluctant to disclose the names of individuals in the Bills of Lading due to awareness that they were not capitulants, which would have led the Governor to deny them a License, Passport, and Certificate. The necessity of these documents was to protect the ship and cargo from capture at sea. If the Manifest, Passport, and Certificate were inconsistent with the Bills of Lading, indicating that the individuals named were not capitulants, it reflects a potential fraudulent scheme to misrepresent the legitimacy of the cargo, risking capture and confiscation.
Prudence, likely mandated by government regulations, required proof that both shippers and cargo owners were capitulants before a ship could embark. In this case, over three-fourths of the cargo was shipped by agents. The Governor and Chief Justice certified the shippers and owners as capitulants, supported by depositions as needed, compliant with local laws and practices.
Contradictions arose regarding the ownership of the ship as the Bills of Lading appeared to consign cargo to Brantlight & Son, leading to claims that ownership could not reside with them. However, the Bills did not absurdly direct freight payments to Brantlight & Son; instead, freight was payable to the captain, responsible for crew wages and related debts. This arrangement secured the captain's indemnification in case of the owners' bankruptcy.
Further contradictions were noted between the Bills of Lading and a sworn statement regarding the ship's ownership. The assertion that consigning a ship to its owners was absurd was dismissed, as "consignment" is a commercial term used to denote the recipient of the ship, applicable to both owners and others without contradiction.
The papers found on the ship Resolution do not sufficiently establish that the vessel was owned by Brantlight & Son upon its arrival at St. Eustatius in early 1780. Testimonies from Morson and Captain Waterburgh confirm that Brantlight & Son retained ownership at least by October 1780 and were still recognized as the owners in a letter dated March 6, 1781, just before the ship left Dominica. This letter indicates that Captain Waterburgh made disbursements on behalf of Brantlight & Son, implying they had not relinquished ownership. No evidence of a change in ownership or transfer of the ship has been presented.
Furthermore, while it is argued that the cargo belongs to non-capitulants, the same letter acknowledges that shipments had halted due to the rupture with Holland, but the British Proclamation later protected Dutch vessels, allowing for some shipments to resume. Kender Mason is mentioned as a shipper; however, evidence shows that he only shipped a part of the cargo. The bulk of the cargo was consigned by Alexander Henderson, acting as an agent for British capitulants, alongside contributions from James Morson and other parties. Documentation, including bills of lading and depositions, confirms that most of the cargo was owned by British capitulants and not Kender Mason. Thus, the ownership of the ship and cargo remained with Brantlight & Son and other British subjects, protecting them from being classified as prizes by either British or American privateers.
The evidence presented through depositions, bills of lading, manifests, correspondence, and official documents demonstrates that the remaining cargo, excluding that shipped by Morson & Co., Vance & Co., and Lovel, Morson & Co., belongs to British capitulants, not Kender Mason. If Mason had any property on board, it would only pertain to the cargo from Morson & Co., Vance & Co., and Lovel, Morson & Co. However, the evidence regarding this cargo is insufficient to confirm Mason's ownership, as the only basis for such a claim stems from a letter from Morson & Co. mentioning Mason as a shipper, which lacks corroborative proof.
The letter implies that if Henderson was intended to represent Mason, then Mason could not simultaneously have property shipped by Henderson, as the letter indicates that Mason and Morson were the only ones willing to ship post-proclamation. It is argued that Mason is a principal in relation to Henderson, but no evidence substantiates this connection; Mason's correspondence is directed solely to Morson, indicating distinct interests.
Claims that both the ship and cargo belong to Morson and Mason due to a plan made in London are refuted by Morson's testimony regarding the ship's ownership and purpose. Morson swore that the ship was owned by Brantlight & Son and arrived in Dominica to load cargo belonging to capitulants, directly contradicting assertions that the ship was purchased by Mason or that the cargo was his property, as Mason is not categorized as a capitulant.
Morson's testimony regarding the plan discussed in London is deemed competent and well-informed. Counsel for the captors argue that Kender Mason's letter to Morson, sent via Hesbuysen to Waterburgh, reveals full details about the plan. However, documents found on the Eustin are said to clarify the situation, suggesting illicit commerce and violations of the articles of capitulation. Even if it is accepted that the Eustin was involved in illicit activities, the Resolution's conduct cannot be implicated. The purported illicit commerce involves British goods shipped from London to Dominica through neutral ports, which does not pertain to the Resolution since she only engaged in this trade post her arrival at Eustatia in early 1780.
It is noted that Brantlight and Son were not involved in this trade for Morson, as Morson’s letter from March 1781 indicates they were a new entity to the Dominica market. The Resolution is argued to have never participated in the illicit commerce in question, as the rupture with Holland occurred while she was docked in Dominica, halting all shipments. Although shipments resumed under a British proclamation, this protection was limited and only applicable until Dutch vessels returned home.
Furthermore, despite the claim that the Eustin's papers link Morson and Mason's plans for both vessels, it is asserted that the Resolution's voyage was legitimate and in accordance with the articles of capitulation. Mason's correspondence from Ostend in August 1781 is referenced, but it is argued that since the Resolution was captured months before this plan was finalized, any illicit implications cannot be extended to her.
The plan established at Ostend is claimed to be a continuation of a previously concerted plan from London, which was later shifted due to the rupture with Holland. It is asserted that if the Ostend plan is merely a reiteration of the London plan concerning the Resolution, it is considered valid, supported by Morson’s sworn testimony. However, the opinion is expressed that the Ostend plan is actually new, predating the rupture and necessitating Morson's residence there, which altered his commercial ties in London and dissolved his partnership.
Cargoes from Dominica, though consigned to another party, were to be managed under Morson's supervision. The Eustin's voyage was based on this plan, but the Resolution is not impacted by it. It is concluded that only parts of the cargo shipped by Morson are linked to Mason, whose ownership of the cargo is otherwise disproven. Despite arguments suggesting a clerical error in including Mason’s name, it is recognized that Mason, an active partner in multiple partnerships, acknowledged Kender Mason as a shipper, leading to a revised conclusion that this cargo must be condemned as prize due to the violation of capitulation by Mason, who is not a capitulant.
All three partnerships involved share culpability and must face consequences for their role in the shipment. The court acknowledges the concerns regarding the cargo being awarded to parties not aligned with America, despite their neutrality during the conflict, emphasizing the importance of upholding international law and public faith. Consequently, the court discharges the suspension of the original decree and affirms it in all respects, except for the cargo shipped by Morson and his partners, which is condemned for the benefit of the captors but still incurs freight charges.
