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Harrison-Pepper v. Miami University
Citation: 103 F. App'x 596Docket: No. 03-3322
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; June 25, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Sally Harrison-Pepper appeals the summary judgment granted to Miami University of Ohio, which dismissed her claims of sex and disability discrimination and retaliation. The court upheld the judgment, citing insufficient evidence from Harrison-Pepper to create triable issues of fact. Harrison-Pepper began her tenure at the University in 1988, earning $2,000 less than her male counterpart, Hays Cummins. After learning of this disparity, she sought salary adjustments, which the University implemented. Diagnosed with lupus, she received accommodations starting in 1992, yet her employment at Miami dwindled, with only one semester of teaching over three-and-a-half years. Following dissatisfaction with her raises, she filed complaints with the University and the EEOC. At the time of her legal action, she was the lowest-paid full professor in her department. Harrison-Pepper claims the salary disparity violates Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, and contends the University failed to consider her disability accommodations when evaluating raises. She also alleges retaliation following her complaints. The district court's summary judgment was reviewed de novo, and the court noted that while the University argued some claims might be time-barred, it chose not to resolve this issue due to the lack of evidence supporting Harrison-Pepper's claims. For a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must show membership in a protected class, an adverse employment action, qualification for the position, and disparate treatment compared to similarly situated individuals outside the protected class. The district court concluded that Harrison-Pepper's Title VII gender discrimination claim could not withstand summary judgment due to inadequate evidence regarding the fourth element of a prima facie case: differential treatment compared to similarly-situated male professors. Harrison-Pepper contends that the court improperly relied on the University’s explanations for her salary disparity with male colleague Cummins. She cites Thomas v. Denny’s, Inc. to argue that using a defendant's reasons at the prima facie stage undermines a plaintiff's ability to prove pretext. However, the cited cases pertained to the third element of qualification rather than the fourth element of differential treatment. The court agreed with the district court's assessment that Harrison-Pepper did not provide sufficient evidence of her treatment compared to male counterparts. Even if a prima facie case were established, summary judgment would still be warranted as she failed to rebut the University’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanations—namely, merit differences and budgetary constraints for her lower salary. The burden was on Harrison-Pepper to demonstrate that the University’s reasons were factually unfounded, not motivating, or insufficient. Harrison-Pepper argued that her absence did not influence the University’s decisions, referencing higher raises for male professors post-leave. The University countered that these comparisons were flawed due to differing years and that she was uniquely absent for six consecutive semesters. Additionally, while Dean Ellison rated both her and Cummins' work as 'high,' he clarified that their contributions were assessed based on individualized expectations, which did not create a material fact dispute against the University’s rationale. Harrison-Pepper's claim relies solely on her assertion that her contributions were equivalent to those of her male colleagues, which does not sufficiently challenge the University's rationale for her salary. The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the University regarding her Title VII claim, as she failed to provide evidence contradicting the University's reasons for her salary increases. Under the Equal Pay Act, a prima facie case requires demonstrating that the employer pays one sex less than the other for equal work, defined by substantial equality in skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions. Relevant factors include hire dates, experience, workload, departmental placement, and evaluation criteria. Harrison-Pepper and her male counterparts had similar hire dates, experience, workloads, and evaluations. She contended that the district court erred in finding insufficient evidence of her performance and credentials, as well as those of a comparator. However, the University successfully justified pay disparities through its merit-based raise system, supported by affidavits from former deans detailing the criteria for raises. The subjective nature of these criteria does not negate the merit-based defense. The University’s evidence regarding Harrison-Pepper’s absences further substantiated its rationale for salary differences. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Harrison-Pepper's Equal Pay Act claim. To succeed in a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, Harrison-Pepper must demonstrate four elements: (1) she is a disabled individual under the Act; (2) she is qualified for her position despite her disability; (3) the University discriminated against her solely due to her disability; and (4) the University receives federal financial assistance. The district court granted summary judgment to the University, determining that Harrison-Pepper did not provide evidence that salary decisions were influenced by her disability. The University was unaware of her lupus when hiring her, negating claims of a reduced starting salary based on her condition. Although she argued that her raises were smaller due to reduced participation in activities, the record showed her absences were largely unrelated to her medical condition, and accommodations did not guarantee larger merit-based raises. Regarding her retaliation claim under Title VII, Harrison-Pepper needed to prove that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) the University was aware of this activity, (3) the University took adverse action against her, and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and adverse action. Despite her assertion that her raise percentages decreased after filing complaints, temporal proximity alone does not establish causation. Therefore, the district court's decisions regarding both claims were upheld, affirming the summary judgment in favor of the University.