Curtis v. Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc.

Citation: 101 F. App'x 61Docket: No. 02-6265

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; June 4, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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An appeal was made following a summary judgment favoring the employer in a retaliation case under Kentucky law, where the plaintiffs, Michael Curtis and Shayrn Bradley, claimed damages due to adverse employment actions after reporting a homosexual advance made by a manager, Scott Kerr. The district court found the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation and did not present adequate evidence that the employer's rationale for changes in job responsibilities—stemming from a company acquisition—was a pretext for illegal conduct. Even if a prima facie case were assumed, the court concluded that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to suggest the employer's explanation was pretextual. 

Following the acquisition of NovaCare, Inc. by Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Curtis and Bradley experienced changes in their roles, with Bradley remaining as manager but reporting to Kerr, who implemented new office policies. In October 1999, Kerr made a questionable comment to Curtis, which led to a report to Bradley and subsequently to Hanger executives. Although Curtis sought assurance that such incidents would not recur, he later chose not to formally pursue the matter. Subsequently, both plaintiffs reported a reduction in job responsibilities, with Curtis describing his duties as diminished to a basic tech level, despite no changes to his title, salary, or benefits. The judgment was affirmed based on the lack of evidence of pretext.

Ms. Bradley experienced a gradual reduction in her job duties, including being required to reschedule patient appointments and perform tasks typically assigned to nurses. Mr. Kerr, her supervisor, also arranged for training of another employee in specialized mastectomy work that Ms. Bradley had been handling. Despite these changes, her salary and benefits remained the same. In February 2000, Wallis Farraday, a vice president, suggested that Ms. Bradley was not generating sufficient income and asked her to prepare a résumé and a list of reasons to retain her job. Following this meeting, Ms. Bradley sought medical assistance for job-related stress, leading to a recommendation for a leave of absence, which the company granted with pay and benefits. After a counselor cleared her to return to work, Ms. Bradley instead submitted her resignation, citing harassment and a hostile work environment created by Mr. Kerr. Mr. Curtis, a colleague, resigned shortly after, indicating plans to change careers. In May 2001, both individuals sued the company for retaliation related to reporting inappropriate conduct by Mr. Kerr. The case was moved to federal court, where summary judgment was granted to the company on the grounds that no adverse employment action had occurred and that the reduction in duties was justified by legitimate business reasons. Their motion to vacate the judgment was denied, and they subsequently filed a timely appeal. Under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, discrimination based on sex and retaliation for opposing unlawful practices are prohibited, and retaliation claims are assessed similarly to those under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, allowing for proof through direct evidence or by establishing a prima facie case.

Mr. Curtis and Ms. Bradley assert they established a prima facie case of retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas framework, which requires showing: (1) engagement in protected activity under Title VII, (2) defendant's awareness of that activity, (3) an adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff, and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. They engaged in protected activity by reporting a sexual harassment complaint, and it is undisputed that the employer was aware of this. The reduction of their job duties may qualify as an adverse employment action, particularly if it constituted a demotion due to significantly diminished responsibilities. Evidence suggesting that the reduction occurred shortly after the complaint could indicate a causal link.

Although Ms. Bradley was not the target of the harassment, it is plausible that the perpetrator may have felt embarrassed about her knowledge of the incident and sought to mitigate this by altering her employment situation. The employer defended its actions as part of a legitimate reorganization of the office under new management. Summary judgment was deemed appropriate because the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence that the reorganization was a pretext for retaliation. To demonstrate pretext, plaintiffs must show that the stated reason (1) lacks factual basis, (2) did not motivate the adverse action, or (3) was insufficient to motivate the action. The plaintiffs did not dispute the factual basis for the reorganization, which was recognized as a legitimate reason for any reduction in job duties. A mere possibility that the employer was motivated by the plaintiffs' protected activity is insufficient to challenge the defendant’s non-discriminatory explanation effectively.

Mr. Curtis and Ms. Bradley failed to meet the burden of proof required to demonstrate that their employer, Hanger, acted with illegal motivation in response to Curtis’ complaint. Although the timing of their reduced duties coincided with the complaint, evidence indicated that Kerr was already in the process of making changes at the NovaCare office, suggesting lawful business restructuring rather than retaliation. Additionally, a statement from Kerr about either him or Ms. Bradley needing to leave could have been made prior to the complaint and aligns with a non-discriminatory rationale, particularly given Bradley's prior resistance to Kerr’s initiatives. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find retaliation more likely than the defendant’s neutral motive, justifying a defense motion for judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' reliance on deposition transcripts rather than live testimony did not alter this analysis. The court affirmed that the plaintiffs did not present enough evidence to support their claims, leading to a mandatory granting of summary judgment for the defendant under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.