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Williams v. City of Southfield
Citation: 99 F. App'x 44Docket: No. 03-1746
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; April 28, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
The City of Southfield and its officials, Brindon, Black, and Comerford, appealed a district court's denial of their motion for attorney fees after the dismissal of Wendell Paul Williams's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. Williams initially filed a pro se complaint alleging discrimination during a building inspection, leading to multiple defendants being added, including a judge and prosecutor. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which was partially granted after a magistrate judge's recommendation. Williams chose not to amend his complaint despite being given a 60-day period for such action. Following further proceedings, the case was ultimately dismissed on October 31, 2002. The defendants subsequently sought attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but Williams did not respond. The magistrate judge recommended denial, and the district court accepted this recommendation without objections from the defendants. The appellate court determined that the defendants waived their right to appeal the denial of fees due to their failure to file timely objections to the magistrate's report. Although exceptions to this waiver rule exist, none were found applicable in this instance. Additionally, even if the waiver did not apply, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the attorney fees. A prevailing defendant can recover attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if the district court finds that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even if there was no subjective bad faith. The court should grant pro se plaintiffs some leniency in evaluating whether attorney fees are justified. A pro se plaintiff's complaint, even if it fails to survive a motion to dismiss, does not automatically entitle the defendant to attorney fees. In this case, although Williams's complaint was dismissed for failing to state a claim, some claims initially survived the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the court allowed him to amend his complaint. Given these factors and Williams's pro se status, his complaint was not deemed unreasonable enough to warrant an award of attorney fees. The district court's decision to deny fees was therefore not an abuse of discretion, leading to the affirmation of its order.