Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; January 22, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Sammy R. Pearison, a Tennessee resident proceeding pro se, appeals a district court's dismissal of his employment discrimination case under Title VII, the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Pearison, an African-American former security guard for Pinkerton’s, filed his complaint on May 13, 2002, claiming race discrimination and discrimination based on an undisclosed disability. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Pinkerton’s on the ADA claim, citing Pearison's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The individual defendants were dismissed without prejudice after Pearison failed to serve them within the required timeframe. Pinkerton’s subsequently moved to dismiss the Title VII claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Pearison did not file his complaint within ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. Pearison contested this, claiming he did not receive the notice due to an outdated address. The district court postponed its ruling to allow for additional records and ultimately converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. The court concluded that Pearison's Title VII claim was time-barred because he did not inform the EEOC of his address change and failed to file suit within the statutory period. Pearison's ADA claim was not reasserted on appeal, and issues not raised are deemed abandoned. The court reviewed the dismissal of the individual defendants for abuse of discretion and found none, affirming the district court’s actions.
Pearison failed to demonstrate good cause for not complying with Rule 4(m), as he did not make a reasonable effort to timely effect service of process, nor did he attempt to follow the relevant federal and state rules regarding service of process by mail. The review of the summary judgment is conducted de novo, adhering to the same standards as the district court. Summary judgment is warranted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The court affirmed the summary judgment for Pinkerton’s, Inc. on Pearison’s Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA) claim, which is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311. Pearison's claim accrued on September 30, 1998, the date of his resignation, and he had until September 30, 1999, to file suit, which he failed to do, as he filed on May 13, 2002.
Similarly, Pearison's Title VII claim is also time-barred. The EEOC’s failure to send the right-to-sue (RTS) letter to Pearison's current address resulted from his neglect in not updating his mailing address with the EEOC. This oversight did not pause the ninety-day filing window mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Pearison had a duty to inform the EEOC of any address changes, and failure to do so contributed to his lack of notice of the RTS letter. There is no basis for equitable tolling in this instance, as Pearison's neglect and lack of diligence are not excusable. He had constructive notice of the RTS letter when it was sent to his last known address. Consequently, the district court's judgment is affirmed.
