Nejo v. Tamaroff Buick Honda Isuzu Nissan

Citation: 88 F. App'x 881Docket: No. 02-1794

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; February 22, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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In a legal appeal, Olukayode O. Nejo contests the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial after a jury found no negligence on the part of Tamaroff Buick Honda Isuzu Nissan. Nejo, who had his SUV’s tires rotated at Tamaroff, claims that the right front wheel detached while driving, leading to a serious accident and cognitive injuries. He argues that the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, as it found no negligence rather than addressing disputed issues of causation or damages. Additionally, Nejo challenges the inclusion of Michigan Standard Jury Instruction 6.01(c), which allowed the jury to infer that missing vehicle parts would have been unfavorable to his claims. He contends that those parts were under Tamaroff's control, thus making the instruction inappropriate.

The appellate court affirmed the district court's decisions, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the new trial or in providing the jury instruction. Evidence presented during the trial primarily focused on the extent of Nejo's injuries, which, while not directly relevant to negligence, was considered in the overall assessment of the case. Tamaroff contested Nejo’s credibility, influencing the jury's ability to disbelieve his account of the incident. Nejo, who had a strong academic background and secured a consulting position after his studies, has not returned to work since the accident.

Tamaroff's evidence raised suspicions that Nejo may have staged the accident, with Nejo presenting fourteen witnesses, including key witness Thomas Brady. Brady encountered Nejo's SUV, which was stopped in the snow on I-696, missing its right wheel. He observed Nejo had blood near his nose, appeared dazed, but was coherent. Brady noted the loose wheel was found 40 to 50 feet away and suggested that the lug nuts weren't properly secured. He took Nejo to a pool hall to contact a tow truck and later to the emergency room, where Nejo was diagnosed with a chest contusion and neck sprain, but no head injury was documented.

Nejo's medical witnesses, primarily physicians and psychologists, testified he was healthy prior to January 4, 1999, but exhibited cognitive decline, depression, and anxiety post-accident. Dr. Steven Rothke, Nejo's psychiatrist, diagnosed him with traumatic brain injury but acknowledged that Nejo's reported symptoms were greater than objective findings from tests like MRI and EEG, which returned normal results. Rehabilitation expert Dr. Susan Keeshin stated there was no physiological basis for Nejo's complaints.

Regarding mechanical issues, mechanic Christopher Tubbs, who worked on Nejo's vehicle post-tow, suggested the accident resulted from faulty lug nut installation or a wheel defect. However, he found no damage to the wheel hub or studs, which is unusual in incidents where a wheel detaches. Nejo was unable to produce the damaged parts Tubbs had given him. Accident reconstruction expert James Stocke opined that improper tightening of the lug nuts led to the incident, ruling out deliberate damage scenarios.

Stocke asserted during cross-examination that the lack of damage to the vehicle's right front lug struts and sheet metal did not change his view that the wheel detached due to Tamaroff's improper installation. Nejo testified he could not produce the damaged auto parts, claiming he lost them and had no memory of their whereabouts after receiving them from Tubbs. Regarding the accident, Nejo described his SUV's erratic movement across lanes before stopping, resulting in a head injury and loss of consciousness. He later contacted Tamaroff for assistance but claimed no help was provided. Nejo reported a decline in his mental faculties post-accident, although he completed his dissertation with honors afterward. Under cross-examination, he acknowledged inconsistencies in his accounts of the accident provided to various doctors. Tamaroff's mechanic, Kenneth Cetnar, testified he routinely re-tightened lug nuts and stated that there were no pre-existing mechanical issues with Nejo's vehicle. Cetnar noted that if a wheel detached, it would typically cause damage to the lug studs, which were undamaged in Nejo's case. Kevin Klingensmith, Tamaroff's service manager, supported Cetnar's testimony and recounted a phone exchange with Nejo, where Nejo expressed dissatisfaction with the assistance offered. Tamaroff also presented medical professionals who disputed Dr. Rothke's assessment of Nejo's brain injury, with Dr. Frank Judge finding a herniated disk during an independent examination.

Nejo's testimony regarding his injuries was challenged by Dr. Judge, who stated the likelihood of a traumatic brain injury was minimal and that Nejo’s symptoms were more indicative of a severe spinal cord injury, which should have resulted in the loss of function in his left arm, contradicting Nejo's claims. Dr. Judge suggested Nejo was exaggerating his symptoms, supported by psychologist Dr. John O’Leary, who found no psychological impairments consistent with Nejo's reported injuries and identified signs of malingering. On psychological tests, Nejo scored high on the 'FAKE BAD' scale, and his memory test results were nearly indistinguishable from random chance, indicating poor performance even compared to those with serious brain injuries. 

Accident reconstruction expert Weldon Greiger testified that Nejo may have staged the accident, although he would require inspection of parts from Nejo's truck, which were not provided. Greiger noted inconsistencies in Nejo's account of the accident, questioning the mechanics of how a wheel could detach without causing damage to the vehicle. He indicated that if the lug nuts were not attached, the wheel would have come off much sooner than Nejo claimed. During cross-examination, Greiger contradicted his earlier deposition by expressing a belief that the accident might have been staged. 

Nejo did not seek a directed verdict on Tamaroff's alleged negligence. Tamaroff's request for a jury instruction regarding Nejo's failure to preserve evidence from the accident was granted, leading the jury to potentially infer that the missing evidence would have been detrimental to Nejo's case. The jury ultimately found Tamaroff not negligent. Nejo's counsel later moved for a new trial, arguing the evidence strongly indicated Tamaroff's negligence, but the district court denied this request, stating that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude the accident did not occur as Nejo described.

Nejo filed a timely appeal against the denial of his motion for a new trial and challenged the judgment on the basis that the trial court improperly issued an 'adverse inference' instruction. In diversity cases, federal courts apply federal law to determine the necessity of a new trial under Fed. R.Civ. P. 59, following the precedent that a verdict should be set aside only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence. The jury has substantial authority, and the district court cannot overturn a jury's verdict simply because different inferences could have been drawn. On appellate review, the denial of a new trial is assessed for abuse of discretion, with a strong presumption in favor of affirming the trial court's decision unless a clear error of judgment is evident.

In this case, the medical evidence raised doubts about the legitimacy of Nejo's alleged injuries, suggesting they might have been exaggerated or unrelated to the incident involving his SUV. The jury had the authority to rule against Nejo on the grounds of causation or damages but did not. The appeal hinges on whether the evidence allowed a reasonable finding of no negligence. The parties seem to agree that if the lug nuts were not properly tightened, it constituted negligence. However, if they were properly tightened, the evidence suggests Nejo's claims of his wheel flying off are difficult to substantiate, leading to the possibility that the accident may have been staged. Despite Nejo's assertion that the failure to tighten the lug nuts caused the accident, the jury's finding of no negligence could only be justified if an alternative explanation existed for the incident, such as staging.

The district court found the evidence did not clearly favor Nejo's version of events over the jury's, and although doubts about the staged accident scenario were acknowledged, the court did not find a clear error in its judgment. The court's conclusion that the conflicting evidence did not warrant a new trial was upheld, distinguishing this case from similar precedents where new trials were granted.

An infant plaintiff in Porter sustained a head bruise in a car accident but suffered a spinal injury that was not diagnosed by the defendant hospital's physician, resulting in paralysis. The first trial found the hospital liable due to nurse negligence, but a new trial was granted by the district court, which determined that the original verdict against the nurses lacked sufficient evidence of proximate causation, particularly as expert opinions attributed primary responsibility to the physician. The court affirmed this decision, noting that the evidence against the nurses was inadequate under Ohio's strict proximate cause standard.

In contrast to the nurses' case, the court identified a genuine conflict regarding whether a defendant, Tamaroff, failed to properly secure vehicle lug nuts, complicated by doubts about the credibility of Nejo, who provided an implausible alternative narrative. The district court acted within its discretion in denying a new trial and in providing Standard Jury Instruction 6.01(c), which pertains to a party's failure to produce evidence under its control. The instruction was deemed appropriate as there was a question of fact regarding the reasonableness of Nejo’s failure to present the damaged parts, which were material and not equally available to both parties.

Testimony from Tamaroff's manager indicated that Nejo refused assistance with the vehicle, suggesting that the damaged parts were not equally accessible. Moreover, the parts were considered material evidence due to their potential impact on the accident reconstruction. The instruction allowed the jury to infer that the missing evidence could have been unfavorable to Nejo if they found no reasonable excuse for its absence, thereby preserving Nejo's claim of cognitive impairment affecting his ability to retain the parts. Consequently, the judgment was affirmed.