Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; January 15, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Suzanne Orfescu's appeal regarding the partial denial of long-term disability benefits and attorney's fees was affirmed. The district court determined that Orfescu was not disabled from May 1999 until November 12, 1999, was disabled from November 13, 1999, to March 14, 2000, and was not disabled thereafter. To qualify for benefits, she needed to prove an inability to perform substantial duties related to her education, training, or experience. The court found no medical evidence supporting total disability before November 13, 1999, or after March 14, 2000. Evidence included Prudential’s correspondence with Dr. Kazanehian, which indicated Orfescu could return to work by February 1999, and an employability evaluation by Jeff Gordon confirming her capability to work. Dr. Kazanchian's April 1999 letter suggested disability but lacked recent examination support.
Post-March 14, 2000, Orfescu's claims of total disability were also unsupported; Dr. Salkinder indicated she could return to work with restrictions, while other doctors, Darrow and Gart, found no correlation between her complaints and objective findings. The district court's credibility assessments of medical reports were upheld, and its findings, although seemingly inconsistent, aligned with the evidence and legal standards. The court also did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees, as most Hummell factors were against awarding them. Judge Silverman concurred, affirming the disability determination but suggesting the earlier finding of no disability may have been erroneous if the November 1999 to March 2000 disability was accepted.
Orfescu's medical condition was consistent from May 4, 1999, to March 14, 2000, with no evidence of change during that timeframe. Although she may not have had proof of total disability from May 4 to November 13, 1999, the critical issue was whether she demonstrated her disability at trial. Both parties concurred that her medical condition remained unchanged throughout both examined periods, indicating that if she was deemed totally disabled in the latter period (November 13, 1999, to March 14, 2000), she must have also been totally disabled in the earlier period. Prudential’s counsel acknowledged that the district court's finding of intermittent disability was inconsistent with the evidence but opted not to cross-appeal on that matter. Since Orfescu did appeal, she is entitled to succeed on this issue, resulting in a partial affirmation and reversal of the district court's decision, directing an award of benefits for the period from May 4, 1999, to November 13, 1999. This decision is not to be published or cited in future cases, as stipulated by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
