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Hanely v. International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers

Citation: 69 F. App'x 292Docket: No. 02-3027

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; July 2, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Timothy R. Hanely appeals the district court's December 7, 2001, judgment that granted summary judgment to the International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (IBLE), its General Committee for CSXT Northern Region, Donald Menefee, and CSX Transportation (CSXT) in his hybrid breach of contract and duty of fair representation claim under the Railway Labor Act. The appeal is based on the determination that Hanely's complaint is time-barred by the six-month statute of limitations outlined in 29 U.S.C. 160(b). 

The procedural history reveals that Hanely, a CSXT engineer, filed his initial complaint on September 15, 2000, alleging that CSXT breached the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by altering its engineer seniority roster, and that IBLE and Menefee failed to adequately represent his grievance regarding this breach. After IBLE clarified Menefee's position, Hanely amended his complaint to correctly name him. The district court addressed potential joinder of M.E. Shroyer, another engineer involved in the seniority dispute, but Hanely's subsequent amendments did not include claims against Shroyer.

Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which Hanely also contested with a cross-motion. The district court ultimately ruled in favor of the Defendants, dismissing the case with prejudice. The appeal stems from this ruling, with the court upholding the dismissal based on the statute of limitations. The document outlines the structure of railroad employee representation, distinguishing between engineers and train service employees, with IBLE representing the former.

GCAs are independent entities, each with its own management and funding, capable of negotiating for their members unless this authority is delegated to IBLE. CSXT operates a railroad system across the U.S. and Canada, while IBLE represents CSXT engineers. The Plaintiff was hired by CSXT on September 12, 1994, began the engineer training program on September 26, 1994, and completed it on May 1, 1995, subsequently joining IBLE and establishing his seniority date as May 1, 1995.

Under the 1985 CBA between CSXT and IBLE, existing ground service employees have preferential rights for engineer positions, with Article XIII, Sections 3 to 5 outlining these procedures. If a qualified ground service employee does not wish to fill an open engineer position, CSXT may hire new employees, as stated in Article XIII, Section 4(4). Additionally, the CBA with UTU grants priority to ground service employees employed before November 1, 1985, for promotion to the engineer training program. 

An established practice exists for addressing situations where a more senior ground service employee is overlooked for an engineer position. If passed over, the senior employee is allowed to become an engineer after completing training and is placed on the roster according to their rightful seniority. Shroyer, a CSXT employee since 1973, sought to apply for the engineer training program but faced management obstruction, leading to complaints filed through his UTU representative, J.T. Reed, in August 1994. These complaints indicated that CSXT had hired new employees instead of allowing Shroyer to apply, violating the CBA.

CSXT's Manager of Labor Relations, Jon King, investigated and found merit in Shroyer’s claims. Following this, King communicated with Reed, and Shroyer submitted a formal application on September 22, 1994. However, by this time, it was too late for Shroyer to join the upcoming training program starting September 26, 1994.

Shroyer was promised by CSXT that he would be assigned to the upcoming engineer training program and, upon successful completion, would be placed on the Engineer Seniority Roster ahead of new-hire employees. On November 13, 1994, CSXT assured that if Shroyer completed the training, his seniority would be adjusted accordingly. Shroyer completed the program on July 7, 1995, and was promoted to engineer on the same day. A subsequent letter from CSXT confirmed Shroyer's placement ahead of new-hire T.R. Hanely, as per the earlier commitment.

In March 1995, Plaintiff learned rumors suggesting Shroyer would be placed ahead of him on the seniority roster and approached union representative David Morehead for clarification. Morehead indicated that such a change would violate the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and provided Plaintiff with a copy of it. Plaintiff was ultimately informed in September 1995 that Shroyer had indeed displaced him on the roster, leading to lost job opportunities due to the seniority system.

Morehead advised Plaintiff to file a time claim for lost wages and suggested he treat the seniority change as illegal, potentially seeking compensation for the difference in earnings between him and Shroyer. Plaintiff filed three claims for back pay with CSXT on October 17, 1995, which were denied on November 9, 1995. Following this, Morehead communicated with CSXT representatives regarding the claims and the potential correction of the seniority roster.

On April 3, 1996, the Plaintiff communicated additional details to Menefee, which were necessary for pursuing a matter. Despite multiple attempts, Plaintiff did not receive a response from Menefee until a March 1998 meeting, where Menefee expressed a belief that the issue had been resolved. During his deposition, Menefee claimed to have investigated the matter following a letter from Morehead in December 1995, asserting he was misled into believing that a roster change was due to fraud or collusion, although he concluded that no wrongdoing occurred. He stated that the roster change would not proceed without further notification.

On August 19, 1998, Plaintiff informed Menefee about the lack of restoration of his seniority and urged prompt action. Plaintiff also sent copies of this letter to Morehead and IBLE President Clarence Monin. Subsequently, in March 2000, after retaining an attorney, Plaintiff requested documents related to the seniority dispute from Menefee and IBLE’s President, Edward Dubroski, but received no response. IBLE maintained it had no responsibility for processing grievances. When CSXT was contacted for information on Plaintiff’s claim in June 2000, it stated it had no knowledge of the matter. Consequently, Plaintiff filed a hybrid suit on September 15, 2000.

The text outlines the standard for summary judgment, indicating it is granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact. The moving party must demonstrate the absence of such an issue, while the nonmoving party must provide specific facts showing a genuine dispute. The court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party without making credibility assessments. Additionally, it references the Railway Labor Act, which establishes a framework for resolving labor disputes related to collective bargaining agreements.

To succeed in a hybrid breach of contract and breach of the duty of fair representation case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that both the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and that the union failed to fulfill its duty of fair representation. The claims are interdependent, meaning if the union is not liable for unfair representation, the employer cannot be held liable for breaching the CBA. The statute of limitations for such hybrid actions is six months, starting when the plaintiff knew or should have known about the union's alleged breach. If the claim involves the union's failure to pursue a grievance, it accrues after the grievance period under the CBA has expired. The accrual date is determined objectively, and plaintiffs cannot claim ignorance of the CBA's time limits to extend the statute of limitations.

In a recent case, the district court granted summary judgment to CSXT, concluding that the plaintiff did not raise a factual question about whether CSXT breached the CBA by allowing another employee, Shroyer, to have seniority over him. The court reasoned that since the plaintiff needed to prove both breaches to succeed, summary judgment for all defendants was warranted. Defendants argued that the plaintiff's claims were time-barred because they arose before March 15, 2000, and highlighted that the plaintiff filed his complaint on September 15, 2000. Additionally, CSXT noted that the CBA required appeals to be filed within sixty days of claim disallowance and maintained that there was no evidence of any misleading actions by CSXT that would toll the statute of limitations.

Plaintiffs' only interaction with IBLE regarding the seniority dispute involved an August 19, 1998, letter sent to then IBLE President Monin, approximately three years after Plaintiff became aware of the seniority change, rendering the complaint untimely. Menefee also contends that Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Although Plaintiff acknowledges his prior knowledge of Shroyer’s reassignment before filing his complaint on September 15, 2000, he argues that the six-month filing period was tolled due to Menefee's assurances of pursuing his claim. Plaintiff cites *Vadino v. A. Valey Engineers* to support his position.

The court affirms the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants, asserting that Plaintiffs' claim is indeed time-barred. Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between IBLE and CSXT, Plaintiff had avenues to pursue his claim, specifically under Rule 55 for monetary damages, which he did without appealing the unfavorable result, or under Rule 27 regarding seniority. Claims or appeals had to be filed within sixty days of the unfavorable decision, with deadlines of January 8, 1996, for Rule 55 and March 31, 1996, for Rule 27, based on a September 1995 accrual date. The six-month statute of limitations expired on October 1, 1996, yet Plaintiff filed suit in 2000.

The court notes that a plaintiff may avoid the limitations period if they can prove fraudulent concealment by the defendants regarding the claim's facts. However, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any misleading conduct by CSXT or IBLE. While Menefee's assurances present a closer case, the record shows that Plaintiff could have independently verified the status of his claim. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. The court concludes by affirming the district court's judgment.