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Fitzgerald v. Celergy Networks Inc.
Citation: 67 F. App'x 390Docket: No. 02-55712; D.C. No. CV-01-10279-TJH
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 6, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Defendants Art Cormier and Celergy Networks, Inc. appealed the district court's decision to grant attorney fees to Plaintiff Sean Fitzgerald under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), following an improper removal of Fitzgerald's state court claims to federal court. The appellate court affirmed this decision, noting that it is barred from reviewing remand decisions per 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) but retains jurisdiction to assess attorney fee awards. The review standard for such awards is abuse of discretion, requiring a de novo examination of the remand's legality. Defendants argued that Fitzgerald's state law claims were preempted by ERISA, asserting that his termination was linked to his benefits under ERISA-governed plans. The court emphasized two inquiries for removal: first, evaluating the plaintiff's complaint, where Fitzgerald's claims were strictly state law without invoking federal jurisdiction; second, considering if any claims were completely preempted by federal law. The court referenced Fitzgerald’s complaint, which was well-pleaded and predominantly focused on lost compensation rather than benefits, indicating that the loss of benefits was not a motivating factor for the termination. The court elaborated on the criteria for complete preemption, highlighting that federal law must demonstrate clear intent to convert state claims into federal claims. Since Fitzgerald's claims were only tangentially related to benefits plans, the court determined that removal was improper, justifying the award of attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Defendants argue that the district court failed to clearly explain its decision regarding attorney fees, citing Jordan v. Multnomah County. However, Jordan pertains to a different fee statute, and the court has wide discretion under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) to award fees. The district court did not adjust the fee amount proposed by Fitzgerald’s counsel, and Defendants did not contest the hourly rate or total hours worked, except for those related to the Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Counterclaim. The district judge's concise explanation does not represent an abuse of discretion. The attorney fees for preparing the Motion to Dismiss were justified, as they stemmed from the improper removal of the case. The district court’s award of attorney fees is upheld, and Fitzgerald is entitled to reasonable fees and costs for the appeal, to be requested through a timely motion under Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.1. This ruling is designated as non-publishable and restricted in its citation per Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.