United States v. Brown

Citations: 822 F.3d 966; 100 Fed. R. Serv. 437; 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8777Docket: Nos. 14-1363, 14-1364, 14-1426, 14-2689

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; May 13, 2016; Federal Appellate Court

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A conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine in Kewanee, Illinois, involving drug dealer Frederick Coleman and his associates, led to charges in 2012 against several individuals, including Coleman, Jerry Brown, Darrion Capers, and Nicholas Clark. They were indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute over 280 grams of crack cocaine, violating federal law. Qubid Coleman and James Tatum pleaded guilty and are not part of the appeal. Following a twelve-day trial, evidence presented included prior drug sales in Chicago, the establishment of a Kewanee operation, and the involvement of various runners in distribution activities. The conspiracy utilized cash transfers through Western Union and MoneyGram and was monitored through controlled buys and extensive surveillance by law enforcement. After their conviction, Coleman and Brown received life sentences, while Capers and Clark were sentenced to 188 and 120 months, respectively, along with terms of supervised release. The appellate court found no reversible errors and affirmed the district court's judgments.

Defendants challenge the district court’s evidentiary handling during their trial, asserting an abuse of discretion in the rulings, particularly regarding the admissibility of MoneyGram and Western Union records. They filed a pre-trial motion to exclude these records, which the court denied, and they raised objections again during the trial. The government obtained these records via subpoenas, detailing wire transfers between the defendants and alleged conspirators. Inspector Nicholas Welgat summarized the records, presenting them as business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, which allows summaries of voluminous records to be admitted if made available to the opposing party. Rule 803(6) permits hearsay documents that document regularly conducted activities, provided certain criteria are met, including timely record creation and trustworthiness. The defendants argue that the involvement of third-party customers in generating these records should disqualify them under Rule 803(6). However, case law, specifically United States v. Emenogha, indicates that corroborating evidence can address hearsay concerns stemming from third-party involvement. In that case, bank records were deemed admissible despite similar challenges because of sufficient corroborative testimony from bank officials.

In Johnson v. Lutz, the New York court ruled a police report inadmissible as a business record due to reliance on bystander information rather than the officer's personal knowledge. The admissibility of records in Emenogha hinged on the bank's requirement for ID and the presence of a confirming witness. Comparisons were drawn with United States v. Lieberman, where a hotel guest card was rejected due to lack of identification requirements, and United States v. Zapata, where a registration card was accepted because the hotel verified identities. The Tenth Circuit found Western Union records inadmissible for sender identity due to lack of ID checks but acceptable for recipients, while the First Circuit reached a similar conclusion. In the present case, the district court’s decision to admit Western Union and MoneyGram records was upheld, despite concerns about the absence of identification for some transactions, due to corroborative witness testimony that supplemented certifications. Inconsistencies in witness accounts were deemed relevant to evidentiary weight rather than admissibility. The trial court's discretion in establishing the foundation for business record exceptions was affirmed, as demonstrated in United States v. Towns, where pharmacy records were admitted based on the requirement of ID and signatures. Although the government's presentation of summary charts was criticized as potentially sloppy, the evidence was deemed reliable enough for jury consideration, with any further assessment left to the jury.

The admission of summary exhibits by the district court, even if erroneous, was deemed harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt, as per Fed.R.CRIM.P. 52(a). The defendants argued that the MoneyGram and Western Union records were crucial to the government's case, but the evidence against them included extensive witness testimonies, controlled buys monitored by law enforcement, and recorded communications revealing the conspiracy's operations. 

Additionally, the defendants raised a Confrontation Clause objection regarding the admission of testimony related to the MoneyGram and Western Union records, but this claim was not presented at trial and was thus reviewed only for plain error under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). A reversal for plain error requires a clear mistake affecting the trial's outcome. The court concluded that the records were nontestimonial, meaning the Confrontation Clause did not apply, as it pertains only to testimonial evidence that requires unavailability and prior cross-examination opportunities. Business records, such as those from Western Union and MoneyGram, are generally classified as nontestimonial since they are created in the ordinary course of business, not for legal proceedings. Previous cases supported this classification, establishing that routine business records are not subject to the same confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment.

Defendants raised claims of Brady violations in a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. To succeed, defendants must demonstrate: 1) suppression of evidence by the prosecution; 2) that the evidence was favorable; and 3) its materiality to trial issues, defined as creating a reasonable probability of a different outcome if disclosed. The court ruled that no Brady violation occurred regarding witness John Hart, as the defense was informed of Hart's status as a confidential informant prior to trial, and Hart’s testimony did not constitute perjury. Additionally, the government was unaware of witness Ed Kolata's brain injury until cross-examination, and defense counsel effectively cross-examined Kolata about it. The claims regarding inconsistent grand jury testimony from witnesses Heather Murphey and Jennifer Ince also failed, as there was no evidence that the prosecution suppressed information or that they were aware of the witnesses’ intent to change their stories at trial. Furthermore, the defendants' assertion that the government failed to disclose statements regarding threats to witnesses was rejected, as such statements are not exculpatory and therefore do not qualify as Brady material. Overall, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial based on these claims.

Cumulative trial error that violates due process requires demonstrating at least two errors during trial, which, when considered together, compromised the jury's deliberation and denied a fundamentally fair trial. Reversal is not warranted if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, only one potential error was identified—improper admission of summary exhibits regarding MoneyGram and Western Union transfer records—meaning no cumulative error was present. The evidence of guilt was sufficiently strong that any alleged error was deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Regarding sentencing, the district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while interpretations of guidelines are reviewed de novo. Defendants Brown and Coleman challenge their life sentences under 21 U.S.C. 841, arguing that prior felony convictions should have been determined by a jury. However, this argument is precluded by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, which holds that prior convictions do not constitute an element requiring jury determination. Capers received a 188-month sentence based on an offense level of 34. He disputes the cocaine quantity attributed to him and his sentence length compared to another conspirator. The district court used evidence from trial and sentencing to determine drug quantities, estimating his responsibility for 2.4 kilograms of crack cocaine based on his involvement in a conspiracy that sold significant amounts of drugs weekly.

A defendant is accountable for all drugs sold in a conspiracy, including those reasonably foreseeable. For Capers’s sentence to be upheld, there must be evidence of both the overall drug quantity sold and Capers’s specific role. Capers claims the only evidence against him is approximately 8.5 grams of cocaine from a controlled buy and subsequent drugs and cash found at his arrest, asserting that the broader sales operation was not foreseeable to him. The government attempted to strengthen its case with testimony from Qubid Coleman, a co-conspirator, but the court deemed Coleman untrustworthy and opted to rely on Tatum's trial testimony, which indicated he had not conspired with Capers and had not met him previously.

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) identified Capers, Coleman, Tatum, and Clark as "runners" in the conspiracy, involved in distributing and converting drugs, but noted that Capers and Tatum were never "runners" simultaneously. The PSR concluded that Capers played a vital role in the distribution network and was fully aware of the conspiracy's scope, rejecting any role reduction. During sentencing, the court considered various theories for attributing the conspiracy's entire weight to Capers but decided it was unnecessary, settling on a drug amount equivalent to 2.4 kilos over 16 weeks, placing Capers at offense level 34. The court adopted the PSR’s findings but did not specify the evidence for attributing the entire conspiracy's scope to Capers. Nevertheless, the record supports the conclusion that Capers was aware of the conspiracy's extent, and the court did not err in aligning with the PSR's assessment of his involvement, which mirrored Tatum’s. Tatum testified about the significant daily sales of crack cocaine, reinforcing the court’s conclusion regarding Capers’s participation and awareness.

Capers argues that his sentence is excessively long compared to Clark’s, asserting that it violates the principle of avoiding unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants, as outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The court recognizes that while some sentencing disparities are justifiable, others are not. Disparities arising from the application of the Guidelines are generally considered reasonable. The district court noted that both Capers and Clark were responsible for the same quantity of crack cocaine (between 840 grams and 2.4 kilograms), but Clark received a shorter sentence due to a lower criminal history score and eligibility for the "safety-valve" provision under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a). Additionally, Clark's involvement in the conspiracy was deemed lesser than Capers's. A sentence within a correctly determined range cannot be deemed unreasonable based solely on § 3553(a)(6). Since the court did not err in determining the drug quantity linked to Capers and the differing Guidelines ranges were justified by other factors, Capers's claim of an unreasonably long sentence is rejected. The judgments of the district court for both defendants are affirmed.