Wall v. Stanek

Docket: No. 14-2878

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; July 21, 2015; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves Rebecca Wall challenging the constitutionality of her consent to a blood-alcohol test after being informed that refusing the test was a crime. Wall filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Hennepin County Sheriff Richard Stanek, claiming that the county had a policy of conducting warrantless, nonconsensual blood-alcohol tests, thus violating her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court found no constitutional violation and dismissed the case based on Wall's voluntary consent, referencing the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in State v. Brooks, which supported the constitutionality of the blood draw. Wall appealed the summary judgment granted to the county, asserting that the county's policies led to a constitutional rights violation. The appellate court reviews the case de novo, emphasizing that without a constitutional violation, the county cannot be held liable under the precedent set by Monell v. Department of Social Services.

The Fourth Amendment safeguards individuals' legitimate expectations of privacy, defined by subjective expectations recognized as reasonable by society. In the case of Wall, there is agreement that her blood draw constituted an invasion of privacy that society acknowledges as reasonable. The crux of the matter is whether this search was "unreasonable." The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches, only those deemed unreasonable, which is determined by weighing the individual’s privacy interests against legitimate governmental interests.

Consent to a search is deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The county provided evidence showing Wall consented to the blood draw after failing to provide a urine sample. Wall contests this consent, carrying the burden to prove that her will was overborne, impacting her capacity for self-determination. 

Wall argues that the choice between consenting to the blood draw or facing legal penalties created an unconstitutional dilemma. The Supreme Court previously addressed similar issues regarding implied consent laws in South Dakota v. Neville, where the Court upheld the constitutionality of penalties for refusing a blood-alcohol test, determining that the state could compel a suspect to take the test given its safety and commonality. Thus, the legitimacy of offering a blood test remains intact, even with potential penalties for refusal.

Minnesota imposes criminal penalties for refusing a blood alcohol content (BAC) test under Minn.Stat. 169A.20, subd. 2. The Supreme Court case Neville did not fully consider the severe consequences of refusing such tests, despite the law allowing a suspect’s refusal to serve as evidence in a DWI conviction. The 2013 case Missouri v. McNeely addressed concerns over warrantless searches in the context of drunk driving, emphasizing that while the Fourth Amendment's totality-of-the-circumstances analysis does not permit a blanket exigency exception, states possess various legal methods to enforce drunk-driving laws and obtain BAC evidence without nonconsensual blood draws. All states have implied consent laws requiring motorists to consent to BAC testing upon arrest for suspected drunk driving, with significant penalties for refusal.

The argument against implied consent laws is countered by the Supreme Court’s established precedent, which suggests that appellate courts should adhere to controlling case law even if it appears to conflict with other decisions. The Supreme Court has consistently highlighted the dangers posed by drunk driving, acknowledging its severe societal impact. While blood draws are considered searches affecting privacy rights, the court has determined that the intrusion from such tests is minimal, as they are commonly performed and generally pose little risk or discomfort.

The blood-alcohol test is characterized as safe, painless, and widely accepted, serving as an effective method for assessing an individual's level of alcohol influence. Courts have affirmed that such tests do not significantly infringe upon an individual’s privacy or bodily integrity, and that medically drawn blood tests are reasonable under suitable circumstances. Minnesota law stipulates that by operating a vehicle, an individual is deemed to have consented to chemical testing for alcohol detection. Deputy Russeth lawfully requested a fluid sample from Wall after she exhibited signs of impairment, supported by her failure in several field tests. The test is mandated when an officer has probable cause of impaired driving and preliminary tests indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher. Deputy Russeth provided Wall with Minnesota's implied consent advisory, detailing her options and the possibility of consulting an attorney before making a decision. While Wall faced a challenging decision regarding consent, this alone does not invalidate her consent. The court found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, affirming the district court's summary judgment in favor of the county. Wall did not contest the officer's choice of tests, and the record lacks details on the comparative availability or efficacy of blood, breath, or urine tests.