Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; October 3, 2013; Federal Appellate Court
Beau Brindley, representing defendant Juan Britton, was held in contempt of court by the district court under Fed.R.Crim. P. 42(b) for failing to appear at a status conference. After issuing an order to show cause, the court held a hearing and subsequently found Brindley in contempt, remanding him to custody for two days. He appealed the decision and filed an emergency motion for release, which was granted by the court. The contempt finding was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
In July 2011, Britton was charged with cocaine conspiracy offenses, with Brindley and Michael Thompson entering appearances for him. A joint trial for Britton and co-defendant Antonio J. Colon was scheduled, but Brindley failed to appear at a hearing concerning a motion to continue the trial date. During a June 2012 status conference, a jury trial was set for February 2013, and a deadline for pretrial motions was established. Colon filed motions, but Britton did not.
On November 6, 2012, the court ordered a status conference for November 26, requiring Brindley to appear in person. When he failed to appear, a show cause hearing was scheduled for November 30. On November 28, Brindley responded, citing a lack of expectation for the order and claiming he was involved in another trial at the time of the scheduled conference. He apologized for the oversight and requested a continuance of the show cause hearing, citing other commitments that would prevent his appearance. He suggested being available by telephone on December 3 as an alternative.
On November 29, the district court denied a motion to continue and required Brindley to appear in court on November 30. The government filed a notice indicating that Timothy Witczak, from Brindley's law firm, had entered an appearance in the case of People v. Eatman, where trial was scheduled for December 10, 2012. Witczak filed a motion by telephone on November 28 to continue the trial date, with a hearing set for November 30 at 9:30 a.m. The Assistant State’s Attorney informed the federal prosecutor that Witczak had requested a continuance, and the ASA indicated no objection to the motion. Witczak was the sole defense attorney of record at that time.
Brindley responded to the notice, clarifying that while Witczak handled preliminary matters, he would be the trial attorney. Brindley mentioned that Witczak requested his presence at the November 30 hearing to ensure the continuance was granted. Brindley initially believed the trial was to be held that day but later learned it was only the motion to continue that was scheduled. Witczak's affidavit confirmed his obligation to appear for the motion and his expectation of its approval.
During the show cause hearing on November 30, Brindley was sworn in and explained his absence from a status conference on November 26, asserting it was not willful. He reiterated that he thought he needed to be present for the trial on the 30th when Witczak requested his attendance, and he denied knowingly providing false statements during the proceedings.
The judge contacted the chief judge in Will County regarding the Eatman case and expressed skepticism about Brindley's explanation for his absence at a show cause hearing. The prosecutor informed that the Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) had indicated the hearing was set only on the 28th, after which Witczak communicated his intent to file a motion to continue, to which the ASA did not object. The judge concluded that Brindley attempted to fabricate a false excuse for not attending the hearing, resulting in a contempt finding. He was remanded to U.S. Marshal custody for 48 hours, but later filed an appeal and an emergency motion for release pending that appeal, which was granted.
Subsequent to Brindley's motion, the district court determined that it contained false statements and that Brindley had lied about his absence on November 30. The court noted violations of 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) and (3), finding that Brindley willfully disobeyed a court order and made false statements. The court held him in contempt under Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(b). Brindley argued that the finding was erroneous, claiming improper use of summary contempt procedures and insufficient evidence for a contempt charge. The government concurred on the procedural error but suggested remand for further proceedings under Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a).
The summary explains that federal courts can punish contempt via imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 401, which defines contempt as misbehavior obstructing justice or disobedience to court orders. Distinctions are made between direct and indirect contempt; direct contempt can be punished summarily when witnessed by the court, while indirect contempt requires adherence to more formal procedures. The court must see or hear the contemptuous conduct to apply summary procedures, which were not satisfied by Brindley’s actions.
The failure to appear at the November 26 status conference was not in the court's actual presence, and mere tardiness or absence does not constitute direct contempt under Rule 42(b). Statements claimed to be false in the motion to continue also did not take place in the court's presence, as a filing in the clerk’s office cannot amount to contempt. The judge's reliance on extrinsic evidence for fact-finding at the show cause hearing indicates that summary disposition was inappropriate. Brindley’s conduct did not obstruct court proceedings, negating the need for immediate punishment.
Brindley contests the sufficiency of evidence for contempt, asserting a lack of willfulness in his absence and intentionality in his statements regarding the Eatman trial setting. The court acknowledges the discretion to address this challenge but notes that the existing record lacks evidence of willful failure to appear or obstruction of justice. The better approach is to remand the case for further proceedings under Rule 42(a), as the record does not rule out the possibility of establishing contempt.
The contempt proceedings may continue under a different district judge, following Judge McCuskey's recusal. A prosecutor's referral is necessary, but potential charges remain unclear. Arguments regarding contempt should first be addressed in the district court. Lastly, Brindley’s concerns about double jeopardy are unfounded, as the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent retrial after a conviction is overturned due to procedural errors. The district court's contempt finding is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
