Campbell v. Altec Industries, Inc.

Citations: 605 F.3d 839; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9085; 2010 WL 1740691Docket: No. 09-13472

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; May 3, 2010; Federal Appellate Court

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Certification has been made to the Supreme Court of Georgia regarding a pivotal question of state law necessary for resolving an appeal related to Ronald J. Campbell, Jr., who was injured while operating a bucket truck manufactured by Altec Industries, Inc. and equipped with a defective lift cylinder from Texas Hydraulics, Inc. Campbell and his wife initiated a lawsuit under theories of strict liability and negligence, claiming defective design and manufacturing. The relevant statute, O.C.G.A. 51-1-11, allows for tort claims against manufacturers for injuries caused by defective personal property but includes a ten-year statute of repose beginning from the first sale of the property.

Altec and THI sought summary judgment, arguing Campbell's claims were barred by this statute, as it allegedly began on January 14, 1998, when the lift cylinder was placed on a test chassis, which is over ten years prior to Campbell's lawsuit filed on February 4, 2008. However, the final assembly of the bucket truck occurred later in March 1998, with delivery to Georgia Power Company in April 1998. Existing case law presents conflicting interpretations on when the statute of repose begins: one case suggests it starts upon the actual use of an item, while another indicates it begins when a component is installed and the product becomes operational. 

Due to the lack of definitive precedent on when the statute of repose starts concerning the specific circumstances of this case, the court certifies the question to the Supreme Court of Georgia: whether the statute begins upon (1) assembly or testing of a component, (2) assembly of a finished product, or (3) delivery of the finished product to the initial purchaser. This determination is crucial for Campbell's ability to proceed with his claims.

The phrasing of the question posed to the court is not intended to limit its consideration of the case's issues or the selection of triggering events. The complete record and parties’ briefs are provided to assist the court. Campbell's lawsuit against Altec and THI involves a failure to warn regarding the bucket truck's dangers. Following the district court's summary judgment on Campbell's product liability claims, he sought to withdraw the remaining failure to warn claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), which requires either the opposing party's consent or the court's leave. Campbell argued that this withdrawal would render the district court's judgment final and appealable, stating he would not renew the claim afterward. 

The jurisdictional question regarding the finality of the district court's judgment, as per 28 U.S.C. 1291, was raised due to whether Rule 15 or Rule 41 was the appropriate procedure for the claim's dismissal. Rule 41(a)(2) permits dismissal at the plaintiff's request only by court order if the requirements of subsection 41(a)(1) are unmet. Unlike Rule 41, which does not allow for selective claim dismissal, Rule 15(a) is suitable for eliminating specific claims. Consequently, the court determined that Rule 15 was the correct avenue for Campbell's claim dismissal. However, a claim dismissed under either rule is typically without prejudice unless specified otherwise. The court found that Campbell's motion and his statement regarding not renewing the claim effectively resulted in a dismissal with prejudice, rendering the summary judgment a final decision, thus establishing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.

Additionally, the court recognized a distinction between those who buy products for inventory and those who intend to use them, but this distinction was deemed irrelevant to the case. The Georgia Supreme Court's ruling in Pafford, which could influence the interpretation of the statute of repose, was noted, but it was unclear if this conflicted with the intermediate court's ruling in Johnson. If the testing of the lift cylinder initiated the statute of repose, Campbell's suit would be untimely; if not, his suit was filed within the permissible ten-year period.