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Starkey v. Boulder County Social Services
Citation: 569 F.3d 1244Docket: No. 08-1013
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; June 29, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
Stephen Starkey, his wife Bedra, and their three children filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Boulder County Department of Social Services (BCDSS) and six of its employees, alleging violations of their constitutional rights. The Starkeys claimed that the Defendants removed their custody and contact with their children due to disapproval of the family's religious beliefs and failed to provide a safe environment while the children were in BCDSS custody. They asserted violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive-due-process rights to family integrity and the children's rights to safe placement, as well as First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. Additionally, they brought claims under Colorado law, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The District Court dismissed damage claims against BCDSS and the individual Defendants in their official capacities on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds and denied injunctive relief. It later granted summary judgment against the Starkeys on their § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants in their personal capacities. With no federal claims remaining, the court declined to retain jurisdiction over state-law claims. On appeal, the Starkeys argued that BCDSS was not entitled to sovereign immunity, objected to the striking of parts of their affidavits, and contended that the district court erred in granting summary judgment due to genuine issues of material fact regarding the Defendants' constitutional violations. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision to strike portions of the affidavits and found that the Starkeys did not provide sufficient evidence of constitutional violations, thus affirming summary judgment for the individual Defendants. Consequently, the claims against BCDSS and the individual Defendants in their official capacities also failed as there was no underlying constitutional violation, allowing the court to avoid a decision on the sovereign immunity issue. In the background, it was noted that the children had reported abuse by Mr. Starkey to BCDSS, prompting a neglect petition and subsequent criminal charges, to which Mr. Starkey pleaded no contest, receiving 18 months’ probation. On August 25, a state court hearing regarding the D.N. Petition resulted in the judge placing the children in the temporary custody of BCDSS, based on the guardian ad litem's belief that foster care was necessary for the children's best interests. The judge's order included: (1) legal custody granted to BCDSS, (2) supervised visitation for Mr. Starkey and Ms. Kozlowski, and (3) required psychological and interactional evaluations for both parents. Following a transfer of the case to Defendant Miller on September 13, a subsequent hearing revealed Mr. Starkey admitting to the lack of proper parental care due to conflicts at home. The court adjudicated the children as “dependent or neglected” and prohibited contact between Mr. Starkey and the children until psychological evaluations were conducted. On October 29, Dr. Suzanne Pinto's evaluation raised concerns about Mr. Starkey's psychological state, suggesting he had isolated the children and that they expressed significant distress only after being removed from his care. Although he did not entirely fit the profile for paranoid schizophrenia, he exhibited strong delusions that contributed to abusive behavior. Dr. Pinto recommended against returning the children to Mr. Starkey. During the November 4 hearing, the judge approved a treatment plan for the family, affirming that the children should remain in BCDSS custody. Subsequently, BCDSS separated A.B. from her siblings in foster care, while all three children had weekly visits with their mother and stepfather, but none with Mr. Starkey. At the January 27, 2005 permanency hearing, despite Defendant Miller’s absence, Defendant Russell testified that the children feared their father and were reluctant to visit him, leading the judge to conclude that returning the children to Mr. Starkey and Ms. Kozlowski was inappropriate at that time. In February 2005, the case was reassigned from Defendant Miller to Dusti Moats, a non-defendant. By April, Mr. and Mrs. Starkey began supervised visits with their children. A.B. later reported to Moats that the children's allegations against their father from August 2004 had been exaggerated, expressing a desire for unsupervised visits and part-time living with him. C.D. confirmed similar sentiments, while E.F. continued to allege abuse but also wished for unsupervised visits. On June 15, the case transferred to Defendant Kintzing, with A.B. returned to Ms. Kozlowski's custody the same day, followed by C.D. and E.F. on June 30. By August 1, Mr. Starkey and Ms. Kozlowski shared custody. On August 31, Mr. Starkey picked up the children for his scheduled parenting time. Four days later, he returned C.D. and E.F. to Ms. Kozlowski but kept A.B. with him. On September 7, he picked A.B. up from school due to an anxiety attack and later took her to a church youth group. After leaving her with church leaders, A.B. returned home around 1 a.m. The next day, Mr. Starkey had to take A.B. home from school due to another anxiety attack, and later that day, Ms. Kozlowski took her to the emergency department for continued anxiety issues. On September 9, Defendant Kintzing was informed by Ms. Kozlowski that A.B. had been hospitalized for an anxiety attack. Kintzing spoke with the Starkey family's therapist, Joe O’Cleary, who indicated that Mr. Starkey had described A.B.'s condition as a “conversion ritual reaction” rather than an anxiety attack. Later, Kintzing conversed with Joel Jezek, a West Pines counselor who evaluated A.B. He noted the extreme difficulty in obtaining responses from her during the evaluation, mentioning A.B.'s references to being saved and Ms. Kozlowski's concerns about possible religious brainwashing by Mr. Starkey. Jezek expressed concerns about A.B.'s mental state, describing it as the most unusual he had encountered in his career. On September 9, following Kintzing's petition for protective orders, the state court granted temporary custody of the children to Ms. Kozlowski, permitting Mr. Starkey only supervised contact. A.B. was admitted to the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Ft. Logan the next day under a 72-hour mental health hold, remaining there for 11 days. On September 12, the state court held a hearing regarding the protective orders, where BCDSS advocated for the continued temporary custody arrangement, citing that two of the children experienced anxiety attacks after contact with Mr. Starkey. BCDSS supported its case with testimonies from experts, including Dr. Michael Stackpool, who treated A.B. at Exempla Lutheran’s emergency department after her admission for a "five-day anxiety attack." A.B. had just returned from her first unsupervised visit with her father in ten months, during which she underwent a “spiritual cleansing.” Dr. Stackpool noted A.B. was tearful and unable to discuss anything other than the impact of Hurricane Katrina, exhibiting hyperventilation and dramatic pauses. He recommended that Mr. Starkey's visits with A.B. be supervised and communicated this to Social Services. Dr. Elisabeth Konlos-Hrobsky also testified, having previously evaluated E.F. at a scheduled appointment. E.F. displayed significant anxiety, having been shown a website by Mr. Starkey about medication fatalities, which contributed to his distress. When Dr. Konlos-Hrobsky met E.F., he was curled up in a chair and exhibited physical symptoms of anxiety, confirming his fears about medication. Following these testimonies, Mr. Starkey presented his case. The West Pines counselor provided Dr. Stackpool with incorrect information regarding A.B.'s custody situation, notably that A.B.'s visit with her father was her first unsupervised visit in ten months, when in fact joint custody had commenced weeks prior. Additionally, any spiritual cleansing A.B. underwent occurred at Victory Church, not involving Mr. Starkey directly. Pastor Doug Walker testified that A.B. attended a youth service on September 7, where youth leaders prayed with her, which he described as a “spiritual cleansing.” BCDSS counsel argued for the children to remain in Ms. Kozlowski's sole custody, deeming the nature of the church event irrelevant but highlighting A.B.'s panic attack following five days with her father. Concerns were raised about Mr. Starkey's influence on the children, particularly regarding E.F., who was traumatized by medication-related fear. The guardian ad litem supported these concerns, leading the judge to determine that Ms. Kozlowski should retain custody for the children's best interests, emphasizing A.B. and E.F.'s mental well-being. Following the ruling, discussions arose about prohibiting religious discussions in unsupervised visits. BCDSS's attorney clarified that religious discussions could occur in a therapeutic context but should be avoided in unsupervised situations to keep visits light. Mr. Starkey's attorney objected, citing First Amendment rights. The judge's written order granted temporary custody to Ms. Kozlowski and allowed supervised visits for Mr. and Mrs. Starkey without restrictions on religious speech. A subsequent minute order specified a minimum of two supervised visits weekly, emphasizing sensitivity to the children's needs and allowing religious discussions as long as they were initiated by the children, ensuring that the visits left the children feeling supported and cared for. On September 21, 2005, A.B. was discharged from Ft. Logan, with a discharge report indicating concerns from her social worker about her being 'brainwashed' religiously by her father, who had started his own church. The report advised that the family should seek help before A.B. could return home. On the same day, a state court hearing was held regarding A.B.'s custody, where the Boulder County Department of Social Services (BCDSS) sought temporary custody, while Mr. Starkey requested custody. Nurse Practitioner Mary Hamilton, who had treated A.B. at Ft. Logan, testified about A.B.'s feelings of chaos within her family and her emotional caretaking of her parents. Hamilton noted A.B.'s fear of her father and her indecision about where to live during treatment. Despite acknowledging receiving secondhand information blaming Mr. Starkey for A.B.'s hospitalization, Hamilton maintained her recommendation for foster care was based on her direct observations. She expressed that returning to either parent would lead A.B. back into emotional distress. The children's guardian ad litem concurred with Hamilton's assessment, and the judge decided that A.B. should be placed in BCDSS custody for her safety and stability. Following her discharge, A.B. was placed in a group foster home with supervised contact allowed for both parents. Subsequently, E.F. and C.D., siblings of A.B., were initially placed in joint custody with both parents but eventually moved to Mr. Starkey's custody. On December 12, Mr. Starkey submitted a therapist's evaluation in support of A.B.'s placement with him, leading to a district court order on December 28 granting him custody. The Starkeys allege violations of their Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process rights regarding family integrity, their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion, and their children's Fourteenth Amendment rights to a safe environment in government custody. The district court dismissed claims against BCDSS and individual Defendants in their official capacities due to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, ruling that BCDSS is a state entity. Summary judgment was granted to individual Defendants Smith, Park, Baldwin, Russell, and Miller, with the court finding insufficient evidence of constitutional violations. Additionally, Defendant Kintzing was afforded qualified immunity due to evidence showing her conduct was objectively reasonable. On appeal, the Starkeys argue that BCDSS should not be considered an arm of the state and challenge the summary judgment for individual Defendants. They also contest the district court's decision to strike portions of their affidavits submitted in support of their claims. The court affirmed the rulings on the affidavits, noting issues such as lack of personal knowledge and inadmissible hearsay. The Starkeys did not adequately address all grounds for striking the affidavits, leading to the rejection of their challenge. The absence of a constitutional violation means BCDSS and the individual Defendants cannot be held liable, allowing for affirmation of the district court's judgment without needing to address the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue. The district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, according to the standards set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against BCDSS employees in their personal capacities. Summary judgment is warranted when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Starkeys claim violations of their substantive due process rights concerning family integrity due to the deprivation of custody and contact with their children. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental rights of parents regarding their children's care, custody, and control. However, this right is not absolute and must be balanced against governmental interests. The court does not need to determine if the governmental interest in child welfare outweighed the Starkeys’ rights, as the Defendants assert an alternative defense: that they did not cause any alleged interference with the Starkeys’ rights. The state court was responsible for significant decisions regarding custody and visitation. The Starkeys do not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the state court that justified its custody and visitation orders but claim these orders were induced by false statements from Defendants, constituting fraud. While it is acknowledged that obtaining court orders through fabricated evidence could be a constitutional violation, the evidence provided by the Starkeys does not demonstrate that the state court's decisions were based on knowingly falsified evidence by Defendants. Four court orders are referenced, with the Starkeys failing to clarify whether they allege fraud concerning the initial order from August 2004. Although they assert Defendants were aware of false allegations made by the children, there is no evidence indicating that Defendants had knowledge of these falsehoods until May 2005, nine months after the first order was issued. Thus, the Starkeys have not presented evidence to support their claim of fabricated evidence leading to the first order. The Starkeys claim that three court orders from September 2005 were based on false allegations made by the Defendants, specifically that Mr. Starkey subjected A.B. to a coercive “spiritual cleansing” leading to her hospitalization. They assert that the Defendants provided misleading information to A.B.'s caretakers, who then conveyed it to the court. To support their claims, the Starkeys reference testimony from Dr. Stackpool indicating A.B. had a history of emotional abuse by Mr. Starkey and had experienced a spiritual cleansing. They also cite a concern from A.B.'s social worker about potential religious brainwashing and Hamilton’s testimony about secondhand information attributing A.B.'s hospitalization to Mr. Starkey. The Starkeys identify seven factual assertions related to these claims, including Mr. Starkey’s history of emotional abuse, the timing of A.B.'s hospitalization after a visit with him, and his involvement in religion. For their case to succeed, the Starkeys need to prove that these assertions were false, that the Defendants originated them, that the Defendants knew they were false, and that the court relied on them in its orders. The summary indicates that none of the assertions meet all four criteria. Two assertions—regarding Mr. Starkey being heavily into religion and starting his own church—are uncontested by the Starkeys. Mr. Starkey's testimony suggests he has conducted worship services at home and has acted as a preacher, though he has not explicitly denied starting a church. The Starkeys did not provide evidence supporting their claims that Defendants fabricated allegations of Mr. Starkey abusing the children or brainwashing them. The children reported both physical and emotional abuse to BCDSS in August 2004 and later indicated that their allegations were exaggerated, but did not fully recant. Mr. Starkey pleaded no contest to child abuse charges related to these allegations. Additionally, Dr. Pinto's October 2004 evaluation deemed Mr. Starkey an abusive individual. While it is possible he did not emotionally abuse his children, the evidence does not show that any Defendant knowingly made false accusations. Regarding the brainwashing claim, only A.B.’s discharge report from Ft. Logan mentioned this allegation, but prior information provided to Kintzing indicated that Ms. Kozlowski had told Kintzing about Mr. Starkey "religiously brain abusing" the children. A West Pines counselor also expressed concerns about a possible brainwashing dynamic. For assertions 2 and 3, the Starkeys failed to demonstrate that Defendants were responsible for inaccurate statements made by Dr. Stackpool about A.B.'s visit with her father before her hospitalization and the alleged spiritual cleansing. Although Dr. Stackpool could not identify the source of these statements, he learned about them from a counselor. The Starkeys attempted to discredit Dr. Stackpool’s testimony, but factual corrections were made during their case presentation, indicating joint custody started weeks prior to A.B.'s hospitalization and that the spiritual cleansing occurred at Victory Church without Mr. Starkey's direct involvement. Assertion 7, claiming Mr. Starkey caused A.B.'s hospitalization, relies solely on secondhand information from a psychiatric nurse, Hamilton, who mentioned hearing such information from her caseworker during cross-examination. The Starkeys did not pursue further clarification on this point. Vague testimony from the Starkeys cannot substantiate their claim that a Defendant accused Mr. Starkey of causing her hospitalization. The Starkeys have not demonstrated that any false information from Defendants influenced the state court’s decisions that affected their family integrity. They failed to provide evidence regarding the arguments presented during the September 9, 2005 hearing, where the court granted temporary custody of the children to Ms. Kozlowski and limited Mr. Starkey’s contact. The September 12 order, which affirmed this custody arrangement, is supported by a transcript that does not indicate any false information from Defendants had an impact. Dr. Stackpool’s opinion, based on his observations of A.B. in the hospital and information from a West Pines counselor, is deemed independent, with no link to BCDSS personnel. Although there were factual inaccuracies in his testimony, they were corrected during the proceedings, making it speculative to claim they influenced the court's decision. Dr. Konlos-Hrobsky’s testimony focused on E.F.’s emotional state after interactions with Mr. Starkey and is similarly unconnected to any BCDSS allegations. The September 21 state court order placing A.B. in BCDSS custody was based solely on the expert testimony of Mary Hamilton, a psychiatric nurse, who noted A.B.’s chaotic family situation and expressed that a stable environment away from her parents would be beneficial. Hamilton's observations and conclusions, which did not reference the Starkeys’ allegations, were pivotal in the court's decision. A.B. had expressed fluctuating preferences regarding her living situation during her time at Ft. Logan, leading the court to determine that foster care would be in her best interests. The court emphasized A.B.'s need for stability and safety, allowing her to focus on age-appropriate development rather than the turmoil of her parents' high-conflict divorce. The Starkeys failed to demonstrate that any alleged misinformation impacted Hamilton’s testimony or the state court's decision, resulting in the affirmation of summary judgment for the individual Defendants concerning the Starkeys’ family-integrity claim. Regarding the Starkeys' First Amendment free exercise claim, they argued that Defendants conspired against them due to their Pentecostal beliefs. However, the evidence presented was insufficient to substantiate claims of religious bias. The sole supportive document was a comment from A.B.'s discharge report mentioning concerns about potential religious brainwashing, made during a time of A.B.'s emotional distress. Additionally, testimonies indicated that A.B. experienced intense religious practices while in her father's care. Despite these concerns, the report did not explicitly critique the Starkeys' religious beliefs. Ultimately, the Starkeys could not establish a causal link between any alleged bias and the loss of custody, limiting their claim to the deprivation of contact with their children. The Starkeys’ family-integrity claim was rejected due to the absence of evidence linking the Defendants to the alleged deprivations, which were instead ordered by a state court based on independent professionals' testimony regarding the children's best interests. Consequently, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the individual Defendants. The Starkeys also alleged a violation of the children's substantive-due-process rights to a safe and secure environment while in BCDSS custody, referencing the period between September and December 2005. They claimed that certain individuals attempted to place the children in harmful conditions, alleging horrific living situations and abuse. However, their claims lacked evidentiary support, as the sole reference was struck from an affidavit, and no additional evidence was provided until a reply brief, which the court declined to consider due to procedural rules. Furthermore, the district court dismissed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against BCDSS and its employees in their official capacities, citing Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, as BCDSS is deemed an arm of the state of Colorado. BCDSS and its employees request affirmation of the dismissal based on sovereign immunity. Typically, the court must address the sovereign immunity issue before the merits of the claim. The assertion of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional under the Eleventh Amendment, requiring resolution prior to considering any underlying claims. The Supreme Court, in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, prohibited "hypothetical jurisdiction," where a court assumes jurisdiction without confirming it, which leads to potentially advisory opinions. However, an exception exists where a court can rule on the merits without first establishing jurisdiction if those merits have already been determined in a related case. This scenario, referred to as "foreordained," allows the court to avoid jurisdictional questions when the outcome is already clear from prior decisions. The Supreme Court's cases, such as Norton v. Mathews and Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, illustrate this principle. In Norton, the Court did not need to resolve a complex jurisdictional issue because the merits had already been settled in a companion case, Mathews v. Lucas, making the jurisdictional question irrelevant to the outcome. Steel Co. endorsed this approach, confirming that the preemption of jurisdictional questions for already decided matters does not constitute an overreach of judicial authority. The Court in Avrech opted not to resolve a jurisdictional issue because a subsequent Supreme Court decision had conclusively determined the merits of the case. After oral arguments, the Court requested supplemental briefs regarding jurisdiction but ultimately decided the case based on the merits due to the implications of Parker v. Levy, which was argued concurrently and necessitated a reversal of the lower court's decision. The Court noted that it was unnecessary to address jurisdiction in light of the clear outcome on the merits, even suggesting that arguing jurisdiction under such circumstances could be less compelling. The Steel Co. decision did not limit this approach to specific cases, as two justices indicated that there could be various situations where courts might prioritize merits over jurisdiction. Several circuit courts have utilized this "foreordained" exception. For instance, in Center for Reproductive Law v. Bush, the Second Circuit found it unnecessary to assess the standing of an NGO challenging a policy on foreign aid and abortion because a prior ruling had already upheld the policy against a similar challenge. The Second Circuit asserted that when a constitutional challenge has previously been addressed by the same court, it can resolve the case on the merits without examining jurisdiction, as adjudicating the standing issue would be akin to issuing an advisory opinion. The First Circuit did not address a jurisdictional issue regarding a habeas corpus petition filed by an alien challenging a deportation order tied to a 1987 aggravated-felony conviction. The court determined that existing circuit precedent, particularly Sousa v. INS, resolved the merits of the case, making it unnecessary to assess the district court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The court noted that while the jurisdictional question was close and novel, the established precedent definitively rejected the alien's objections to the removal order. Thus, the appellate court could bypass the jurisdictional analysis as the merits determination was already conclusive. In a related case, Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. v. Pinnacol Assurance, the court addressed claims stemming from a previous tort suit involving a mentally disabled worker. Carolina Casualty sued Pinnacol after it refused to negotiate a settlement for the injured worker's claim. The district court granted summary judgment to Pinnacol. On appeal, while Pinnacol contested the merits and questioned the standing of both plaintiffs, the court found that Carolina Casualty had standing but failed on the merits because Pinnacol had no coverage duty. Furthermore, the court ruled that even without resolving Fox's standing, the outcome of Carolina Casualty's claim predetermined Fox's claim would also fail, making a jurisdictional determination unnecessary for the second plaintiff. Claims in this case involve the Starkeys against multiple defendants, specifically distinguishing between individual defendants in personal capacities and those in official capacities. The court determined that the individual defendants did not violate any constitutional rights of the Starkeys, which is crucial because liability for BCDSS and the individual defendants in their official capacities hinges on the existence of an underlying constitutional violation by the individuals in their personal capacities. Citing Graves v. Thomas, the court emphasized that a municipality cannot be liable without a constitutional violation by its officers. Consequently, the Starkeys are unlikely to succeed on their claims, and the court chose not to address jurisdiction issues related to the Eleventh Amendment. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. The Starkeys claimed that the defendants provided no evidence, yet the court noted the presence of substantial documentation, including sworn testimonies and agency records, which were not contested. Additionally, the Starkeys alleged that Defendant Kintzing made an inappropriate suggestion regarding Mr. Starkey but failed to connect this to any constitutional violation, thus rendering it unnecessary for further discussion. Claims of religious bias were referenced but lacked supporting evidence, as portions cited did not substantiate such claims, and an assertion of religious bias in Mrs. Starkey's affidavit was struck by the court. While a favorable judgment for the individual defendants does not preclude claims against BCDSS or officials in their official capacities, the individual defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity if their actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional right at the time. The court reiterated that the affirmation of the individual defendants’ judgment was based on the absence of a constitutional violation.