Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; June 4, 2018; Federal Appellate Court
The government appeals a judgment from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York that convicted Juan Castillo of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced him to nineteen months' imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. The central issue on appeal is whether Castillo's prior conviction for manslaughter in the first degree qualifies as a 'crime of violence' for sentencing enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Four key questions arise: (1) whether the government waived arguments related to the former 'residual clause' of the Guidelines by conceding its vagueness; (2) the definition of 'manslaughter'; (3) whether New York's manslaughter in the first degree aligns with the generic definition of manslaughter; and (4) whether the District Court erred in its advisory sentencing range calculation based on the characterization of Castillo's prior conviction.
The court concludes that: (1) the government did not waive its arguments regarding the residual clause; (2) the generic definition of manslaughter includes reckless unlawful killing; (3) New York's manslaughter in the first degree is narrower than this generic definition; and (4) the District Court erred by not classifying Castillo's prior conviction as a 'crime of violence.' Consequently, the court vacates Castillo's sentence and remands the case for resentencing.
Background details include Castillo's 2006 conviction for manslaughter following a 2003 shooting, and his arrest in 2015 for possessing a firearm after discarding it from a window. The parties disputed which version of the Sentencing Guidelines should apply and whether the manslaughter conviction warranted a 'career offender' enhancement.
Constitutional considerations under the Ex Post Facto Clause necessitate that a sentencing court applies the Guidelines Manual in effect at the time of sentencing. In this case, the August 2016 Guidelines were applicable, but a violation occurs if a defendant is sentenced under a newer version that imposes a higher sentencing range than the version in effect at the time of the offense, the November 2015 Guidelines in this instance. Therefore, the court must evaluate both editions to determine whether Castillo's 2006 Manslaughter Conviction qualifies as a 'crime of violence' under each.
Castillo argued for the application of the November 2015 Guidelines, asserting they yield a lower sentencing range because his manslaughter conviction does not qualify as a 'crime of violence' under those Guidelines. He acknowledged that his conviction would have qualified under the 'residual clause' of Section 4B1.2(a)(2), but contended that, following the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, that clause was unconstitutional, thus impacting its application in the Guidelines. Castillo maintained that the government could only argue his conviction was a 'crime of violence' under the 'force clause' or the enumerated offenses in Application Note 1, neither of which he believed applied to his case. He argued that manslaughter could occur through omission and therefore did not necessarily involve force, and Application Note 1's interpretation was tied to the void 'residual clause.' Consequently, Castillo claimed that without enhancements for a prior 'crime of violence,' the applicable advisory range was 15 to 21 months, requesting a sentence of one year and one day.
The government countered, asserting that Castillo's 2006 Manslaughter Conviction constituted a 'crime of violence' under both the November 2015 and August 2016 Guidelines. They calculated an advisory range of 30 to 37 months under the August 2016 Guidelines and recommended a sentence within that range. The government focused on the 'force clause' and Application Note 1, arguing that Castillo's conviction involved knowingly or intentionally causing bodily harm, thus qualifying as a 'crime of violence' under both provisions.
On October 6, 2016, the District Court sentenced Castillo to 19 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, after determining that his 2006 Manslaughter Conviction did not qualify as a 'crime of violence' under the November 2015 Sentencing Guidelines. The advisory sentencing range was set at 15 to 21 months. Following this, the government, authorized by the Solicitor General, filed a notice of appeal on December 7, 2016. The appeal included a request for additional briefing to clarify how courts should define offenses listed in the Sentencing Guidelines when various legal sources provide differing definitions. The New York State Attorney General was invited to submit an amicus brief.
The central issue on appeal was whether New York's first-degree manslaughter under N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) qualifies as a 'crime of violence' under the Guidelines. The appellate court concluded that it does qualify, leading to the vacating of Castillo's sentence due to a procedural error in the advisory Guidelines calculation, and the case was remanded for resentencing.
The court reviewed the sentence for both procedural and substantive reasonableness, focusing on the sentencing court's compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. It noted that procedural error occurs with incorrect Guidelines calculations. Castillo argued that the government waived reliance on the 'residual clause' of the Guidelines by conceding its vagueness in the District Court. However, the court disagreed, referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in Beckles v. United States, which clarified that the 'residual clause' is not unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, the court maintained its authority to examine this legal question independently, allowing the government to argue based on the validity of the 'residual clause.'
The central issue on appeal is whether first-degree manslaughter under New York law qualifies as a 'crime of violence' as defined in the November 2015 Guidelines. To assess this, the 'modified categorical approach' is applied, which involves comparing the state statute to the generic offense definition rather than examining specific facts of the conviction. This includes analyzing the elements of New York Penal Law § 125.20(1) against the generic definition of manslaughter. The generic definition is informed by the contemporary understanding of the term, often reflecting its usage in various jurisdictions, including federal statutes and legal sources.
Historically, murder and manslaughter encompass criminal homicide, with murder defined as an unlawful killing with 'malice aforethought' and manslaughter as an unlawful killing 'without malice aforethought.' The concept of 'malice aforethought' includes various mental states, leading to classifications of murder. Manslaughter is categorized into voluntary, committed in a heat of passion upon adequate provocation, and involuntary, resulting from criminal negligence or recklessness. Additionally, liability for manslaughter can arise from reckless omissions when there is a duty to act. The inquiry now focuses on whether the elements of New York's manslaughter statute align with or are narrower than the generic definition.
Contemporary manslaughter law reflects a modern trend toward a unified definition of manslaughter, despite historical distinctions between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in many jurisdictions. States like Alabama define manslaughter as causing death recklessly or in a sudden heat of passion, while others include various states of mind or recognize concepts like "extreme emotional disturbance" without acknowledging "heat of passion." This diversity complicates the establishment of a generic definition of manslaughter, but it can be distilled through an examination of state and federal statutes, along with the Model Penal Code. The consensus is that the generic definition includes the unlawful killing of another human being recklessly, with recklessness serving as a minimum mens rea requirement. Higher culpable states of mind, such as "knowingly" or intent to inflict serious bodily injury, also fit within this definition. This position aligns with the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, contrasting with the Tenth Circuit's view that only intentional manslaughter variants qualify as violent crimes under Section 4B1.2(a).
In applying the 'modified categorical approach' to assess Castillo's 2006 manslaughter conviction under New York law, it is determined that his conviction does not meet the generic definition of manslaughter. New York Penal Law Section 125.20(1) defines manslaughter in the first degree as intentionally causing serious physical injury that results in death, establishing a mens rea of intent, which is incompatible with the generic definition's requirement of recklessness. Therefore, the mens rea elements of the New York offense are not aligned with the generic definition, necessitating an analysis of whether New York's offense is narrower than the generic manslaughter definition.
Manslaughter in the first degree under New York Penal Law § 125.20(1) is determined to be narrower than the generic definition of manslaughter. New York law categorizes mental states along a single spectrum of culpability, where recklessness, associated with second-degree manslaughter, is a lower state than the intent to cause serious injury. Therefore, committing manslaughter with the intent to cause serious injury inherently involves recklessness. Castillo’s arguments that generic manslaughter requires an intent to kill and that New York’s definition is broader due to the possibility of omission are rejected, as generic manslaughter can also occur through reckless omission when there's an obligation to act.
The court concludes Castillo's 2006 conviction for manslaughter qualifies as a 'crime of violence' under the guidelines. The District Court made a procedural error by failing to classify this conviction correctly, necessitating the vacating of Castillo’s sentence and remanding for resentencing. The District Court is instructed to decide whether to apply the August 2016 or November 2015 Sentencing Guidelines. Despite potential procedural errors in calculating the advisory range, if the District Court believed its chosen sentence was appropriate regardless of the guidelines, such errors may be deemed harmless, and substantive reasonableness would be the focus of appellate review.
In summary, the court concludes: (1) The government did not waive arguments related to the residual clause of Guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(2); (2) The generic definition of manslaughter includes reckless unlawful killing; (3) New York's manslaughter in the first degree is narrower than its generic counterpart; and (4) The District Court erred in not recognizing Castillo's prior conviction as a 'crime of violence.' The sentence is set aside, and the case is remanded for resentencing, with consideration for which guidelines to apply.
The District Court must evaluate the appropriateness of the initial sentence regardless of the Guidelines range, as procedural errors may be considered harmless if the court would have imposed the same sentence anyway. Relevant legal provisions include New York Penal Law Section 125.20(1), defining first-degree manslaughter, and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession for certain convicted individuals. The U.S. Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws, and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) mandates that courts consider the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing. The November 2015 Guidelines defined 'crime of violence' under Section 4B1.2(a), which included a 'residual clause' subsequently removed in August 2016. The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson deemed the ACCA's 'residual clause' void for vagueness, leading to the belief that the Guidelines' clause was similarly void. However, the Supreme Court later clarified in Beckles v. United States that the Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause. The 'force clause' defines 'crime of violence' as involving the use of physical force, and Application Note 1 lists specific offenses, including manslaughter. Although the government initially argued against first-degree manslaughter's classification as a 'crime of violence,' it did not pursue this argument on appeal. The government received a 30-day extension to file a notice of appeal, and despite Castillo's release from prison, the case remains live since a ruling for the government could lead to Castillo's reincarceration. The government also contends that the District Court erred in its determination that first-degree manslaughter does not qualify as a 'crime of violence' under the Guidelines' 'force clause.'
The government’s lack of argumentation on the issue at hand is deemed a waiver. It is established that issues presented without sufficient argument are considered waived. The District Court determined that the reference to 'manslaughter' in the commentary to Section 4B1.2 was void, reasoning that it stemmed from an interpretation of a 'residual clause,' which was also conceded to be void. Therefore, the enumeration of 'manslaughter' was rendered void as well. The court is not restricted by a party's concession on legal issues, allowing the government to argue points it previously conceded. Castillo contends that 'manslaughter' in Application Note 1 should only refer to 'voluntary manslaughter.' Although the Sentencing Commission updated the guidelines in August 2016 to specify 'voluntary manslaughter,' the November 2015 guidelines refer only to 'manslaughter.' Following the text of these guidelines, the court concludes that 'manslaughter' includes both voluntary and involuntary forms. The court declines to adopt the Fourth Circuit's view that the Model Penal Code defines the offense best, stating that while it can help in defining an offense, it is not definitive. The court does not address whether the generic definition of 'manslaughter' encompasses intentional killings under extenuating circumstances. It concludes that generic manslaughter requires a recklessness mens rea. Castillo has not argued that the elements of New York Penal Law Section 125.20(1) exceed the generic definition of "manslaughter."
To establish that a count constitutes a lesser included offense, a defendant must demonstrate that it is theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without also committing the lesser. Relevant case law includes People v. Usher, People v. Jones, People v. Morel, and People v. Repanti, which collectively inform the interpretation of New York Penal Law Section 125.15(1). Procedural errors in sentencing may be regarded as harmless if the record indicates that the district court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the error, as established in United States v. Cavera. The principles outlined in Pepper v. United States and Molina-Martinez v. United States further support these conclusions, particularly regarding procedural errors and their impact on sentencing. The holding specifically pertains to subsection 1 of New York Penal Law Section 125.20.
