United States v. Jimenez

Citation: 895 F.3d 228Docket: Docket No. 17-287-cr; August Term, 2017

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; July 10, 2018; Federal Appellate Court

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Jose Jimenez pled guilty to possession of ammunition, violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(6), after being dishonorably discharged from the military. He challenged the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(6) under the Second Amendment, asserting his entitlement to protection under it. The court applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the law's validity as applied to Jimenez, affirming the district court's judgment. 

On June 3, 2015, Jimenez was arrested after being involved in an attempted undercover firearms purchase. He had driven Oscar Sanchez, who was attempting to sell handguns to an undercover NYPD detective. Jimenez claimed ignorance of the transaction's nature. After the deal fell through, ATF agents, who were monitoring the situation, pulled over Jimenez's vehicle. During the stop, Sanchez handed Jimenez a round from his handgun, which led to a search revealing Jimenez possessed a 9-millimeter round in his pocket. 

Jimenez had a criminal history, including a dishonorable discharge from the Marines for several offenses, including conspiracy and drug-related crimes. Federal law prohibits those dishonorably discharged from the military from possessing firearms or ammunition. Following his indictment on July 28, 2015, Jimenez's motion to dismiss the indictment based on the Second Amendment was denied by the district court. He pled guilty while preserving his right to appeal and was sentenced to three years' supervised release. He filed a notice of appeal the day after the judgment was entered on January 11, 2017.

Jimenez's challenge to his prosecution and conviction for possessing ammunition following a dishonorable discharge rests on the Second Amendment. However, the court finds his claim to be a facial challenge, which it cannot entertain since Jimenez has already been convicted under the challenged law. The court emphasizes that constitutional analysis must begin with the specific conduct of the defendant rather than hypothetical scenarios. If the statute is constitutionally applied to the defendant, he lacks standing to question its constitutionality for others (referencing pertinent case law). Consequently, since Jimenez's Second Amendment rights were not violated in his case, his arguments regarding the statute's potential applications to others are dismissed, and he is deemed to have failed in stating a facial challenge.

In evaluating Second Amendment challenges, the court follows a two-step framework established by the Supreme Court in Heller. First, it assesses whether the law in question affects conduct protected by the Second Amendment. If it does, the next step involves determining the level of scrutiny for constitutional evaluation. The court will review de novo any district court's decision related to Second Amendment violations.

Regarding Jimenez specifically, there are indications that the Second Amendment may not apply to him. No appellate court has reviewed this particular ban since Heller. However, Heller noted that longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill remain valid, which has previously been upheld by the court concerning ex-felon access to firearms. Furthermore, not all gun regulations invoke the Second Amendment, which protects only weapons that are commonly used and typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.

The Second Amendment does not safeguard the unlawful possession of firearms related to drug trafficking, as established in United States v. Bryant. Additionally, individuals deemed "unvirtuous," including felons and those considered incapable of virtue (such as children or the mentally ill), are not entitled to the protections outlined in Heller. This distinction indicates that felons are fundamentally different from those who have a right to bear arms, though they do not entirely lose their constitutional rights upon conviction. However, the specific actions or traits that may disqualify individuals from Second Amendment protections remain undetermined, leading to complex legal questions that have divided courts.

The approach taken typically assumes Second Amendment applicability in challenges to firearm regulations, evaluating whether such laws meet the necessary scrutiny level. If a law withstands scrutiny, it does not matter if it implicates the Second Amendment. In assessing Jimenez's potential Second Amendment rights, the court considers the law's proximity to the core right and the extent of the burden it imposes. Laws that significantly encroach on core rights are subject to strict scrutiny, while those imposing lesser burdens may fall under intermediate scrutiny. The court recognizes that self-defense in the home is central to Second Amendment rights and considers Jimenez's claim that a total ban on firearm possession due to an unfavorable military record imposes a substantial burden on these protections.

The argument presented misinterprets the precedent established in Heller, which emphasizes that the Second Amendment protects the right of "law-abiding and responsible citizens" to use arms for self-defense. The court has consistently applied this qualification in its rulings. While Chester claims a right to possess a firearm for self-defense, his situation does not align with the core protections defined in Heller, particularly as he does not meet the criteria of being "law-abiding and responsible." The court affirms that individuals found guilty of felony-equivalent conduct by military tribunals, such as Jimenez, are excluded from these core protections. The definition of a felony indicates a significant breach of law, and the Supreme Court has deemed felon bans as "presumptively lawful." Jimenez’s court-martial for serious offenses, including trafficking in stolen firearms, reinforces this exclusion. The court also notes that military tribunal judgments hold finality similar to civil court rulings. Therefore, individuals convicted in such tribunals do not retain the status of "law-abiding" under Heller. Although Jimenez’s interests regarding firearm possession are significantly burdened by Section 922(g)(6), which prohibits him from possessing firearms due to his dishonorable discharge, this law does not provide him with alternative means to possess firearms. The court typically employs intermediate scrutiny when evaluating substantial burdens on non-core rights.

To meet intermediate scrutiny, a law must be substantially related to an important governmental interest. Jimenez acknowledges the government's interest in regulating firearms for public safety, which has been consistently recognized as compelling. The court has determined that state regulation of the right to bear arms is more stringent than that of other constitutional rights, provided the government supports its rationale with evidence.

Jimenez critiques Section 922(g)(6) by arguing that the government fails to provide empirical data or expert testimony to justify its belief that dishonorably discharged veterans should not possess firearms. However, the government counters that individuals convicted of felonies are generally seen as more dangerous with weapons, and since Jimenez's discharge resulted from felony-equivalent conduct, this rationale applies to him.

Section 922(g)(6), part of the Gun Control Act of 1968, establishes firearm possession bans for various "special risk groups," including felons and those with mental health issues. The military discharge provision aligns with these groups, aiming to restrict access to firearms for individuals deemed a threat due to their past behavior. The law was informed by historical examples, such as Lee Harvey Oswald, who utilized military training to commit violence.

Dishonorable discharges typically result from serious offenses, often paralleling civilian felonies, suggesting that individuals in this category may pose a heightened risk when handling firearms. The court finds no basis to assume that Jimenez is more capable of responsible gun handling solely due to the nature of his military discharge.

Oswald's marksmanship training is mentioned in the context of military tribunals, which have fewer procedural protections than civilian courts. However, Congress's use of these tribunals to determine dishonorable discharges is deemed reasonable, as their operations are consistent with the Constitution, and their judgments prevent subsequent civilian prosecutions for resolved charges. The Supreme Court has endorsed Congress's reliance on courts-martial convictions for imposing civil disabilities, such as mandatory sex-offender registration. It is argued that Congress is better equipped than the judiciary to make public policy decisions regarding firearm regulation. Consequently, it is reasonable for Congress to restrict individuals deemed irresponsible by the military from bearing arms in civilian life.

Jimenez's argument that his conviction for possession of ammunition—considered less dangerous than firearms—should alter the analysis is dismissed. The court holds that Congress is justified in banning both ammunition and firearms possession. The regulation of firearms stems from their potential to inflict severe harm, and without ammunition, guns lose their lethality. The court concludes that Jimenez's conviction does not infringe upon the Second Amendment rights.

Although the term "citizens" is used, it suggests that some non-citizens may also be covered under the Second Amendment. The court refrains from addressing debates about the prevention of firearm possession for those dishonorably discharged for non-felony-equivalent conduct, as Jimenez lacks standing to challenge other applications of the statute. The document notes other forms of punitive separation and indicates that the legislative intent of Section 922(g)(6) includes all discharges under dishonorable conditions. Future courts are left to interpret which discharges fall under the "dishonorable" classification according to 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(6), with guidelines from the Manual for Courts-Martial established in 1984.