Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; June 15, 2018; Federal Appellate Court
Wendell Weaver was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to forty years in prison. He subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming violations of his constitutional rights due to the trial court's disqualification of his chosen attorney, ineffective assistance from the replacement counsel, the use of certain testimony during the trial, and the admission of evidence regarding 'other crimes.' The district court denied this petition, which was upheld on appeal.
Key facts include Weaver's arrest on August 12, 2003, for the murder of Randy Sanders. The trial court disqualified Weaver's attorney, Charles Murphy, due to a conflict of interest involving a potential state witness, Rondell Traywick. Weaver's motion to exclude evidence of his prior incident involving a firearm was denied. At trial, witness Danny Callico testified that he was present when Sanders was shot, claiming Weaver fired into Sanders's car. Additional evidence linked a pistol recovered from Weaver to the crime scene.
Officer Pinal testified about the circumstances of recovering the firearm from Weaver, including an incident where Weaver pointed the gun at him while fleeing. Cross-examinations revealed Callico's criminal background and inconsistencies in his statements to law enforcement. Bystander Clifton Lewis testified he saw shooting but could not identify the shooter. Weaver's defense pointed out the lack of direct evidence and questioned the reliability of Callico's testimony. Ultimately, the jury convicted Weaver of first-degree murder.
Weaver's attempts to challenge his conviction through state court were largely unsuccessful. The Illinois appellate court upheld his conviction, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal. Subsequent state post-conviction and pro se petitions for relief from judgment were dismissed, with the dismissals affirmed on consolidated appeal, and the Illinois Supreme Court again denied his request for leave to appeal.
In December 2012, Weaver filed a federal habeas corpus petition asserting several claims: denial of his right to counsel of choice, ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call witnesses and adequately cross-examine a key witness, violation of due process due to the use of coerced and perjured testimony, and due process violations from the admission of evidence related to other crimes. The federal district court denied the petition.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), relief can be granted if a state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, or based on an unreasonable factual determination. The court reviews the last state court decision addressing the merits, which in Weaver's case were the Illinois appellate court's rulings on direct appeal and post-conviction petitions.
The review found the state appellate court's decisions on Weaver's choice-of-counsel, ineffective assistance, and due process claims to be reasonable. However, his claim regarding "other evidence" was deemed procedurally defaulted. The court noted that Weaver's choice-of-counsel claim failed due to the trial court's disqualification of his counsel over a conflict of interest related to a potential witness, which was established before the trial.
Gary 'Lupe' Mullen informed Traywick that he and Weaver were involved in a shooting. Weaver argued that his disqualification from counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right, referencing Wheat v. United States, which establishes a presumption in favor of a defendant's counsel of choice. However, this presumption can be overridden by an actual or potential conflict of interest. The Illinois appellate court reasonably applied Wheat, starting with the presumption that the Sixth Amendment protects the right to counsel, while acknowledging that this protection is not absolute. The court cited the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Ortega to assess whether Weaver could retain his counsel despite a potential conflict. It found that the trial court had identified a potential conflict due to Charles Murphy's prior relationship and ongoing communication with Traywick, who was considered a possible witness against Weaver. The appellate court supported the trial court’s decision to disqualify Murphy, emphasizing the need to maintain the integrity of the trial and the public's right to a fair verdict. The court distinguished this case from Rodriguez v. Chandler, where relief was granted due to a less clear conflict. In Weaver's situation, Murphy's dual representation posed clearer risks, such as potentially compromising Traywick's testimony. Furthermore, the appellate court rejected Weaver's argument that Traywick's failure to testify warranted relief, affirming that disqualification decisions are based on pre-trial circumstances, not hindsight. Consequently, the Illinois appellate court's application of Wheat was deemed reasonable, leading to the conclusion that Weaver's choice-of-counsel claim failed.
Weaver's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are unsubstantiated. He argues that trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine witness Callico, did not call a witness to testify about Callico's inability to identify the shooter, failed to dispute Officer Pinal’s testimony with additional witnesses, and neglected to present witnesses who would testify that another individual confessed to the crime. Weaver must show that the state court misapplied the Strickland standard, which requires demonstrating that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and that this performance likely changed the case outcome. The state courts are afforded broad discretion in this evaluation, and a clear error in applying Strickland is needed to grant a writ of habeas corpus.
1. Regarding cross-examination of Callico, the Illinois appellate court found that counsel adequately challenged Callico's credibility overall, despite not addressing a specific prior statement. This assessment was reasonable.
2. For the failure to call Callico's associate, Delaney, Weaver did not prove that counsel failed to investigate him, only that he was not located. The decision not to call Delaney is presumed strategic, and Weaver did not overcome this presumption, especially since counsel used Delaney's absence to undermine the prosecution's case.
3. Weaver's claim about not calling four witnesses to dispute Officer Pinal’s testimony was also found reasonable by the appellate court, as it is presumed counsel’s decision was strategic, and the conflicting affidavits did not negate this presumption.
4. Finally, regarding the failure to call witnesses to testify about Mullen’s confession, the appellate court's rejection of this claim was deemed reasonable as well.
Overall, none of Weaver's claims met the standard necessary to show ineffective assistance of counsel.
Weaver's claim regarding Dortch was procedurally defaulted because he did not raise it on direct appeal, which precludes federal habeas review according to Kaczmarek v. Rednour. Even if the default were excused, the appellate court reasonably determined that testimony from Dortch and Tolliver was inadmissible hearsay under Chambers v. Mississippi, as it lacked the necessary assurances of reliability due to the inability to cross-examine Lupe, who died shortly after the incident, and the lack of corroboration for their statements. Weaver's ineffective assistance of counsel claim also failed for similar reasons.
Weaver's Napue claim was rejected by the Illinois appellate court, which found no coercion or knowledge of perjury regarding Callico's testimony. The court noted that Callico's affidavit lacked sufficient facts to support Weaver's allegations, and without clear evidence to dispute the state court's factual findings, those findings must be accepted as true. Furthermore, mere inconsistencies in testimony do not prove the government's knowledge of false testimony.
Regarding Weaver's argument about the admission of "other crimes" evidence, specifically the incident with Officer Pinal, this claim was procedurally defaulted because he failed to include it in his petitions to the Illinois Supreme Court, and he did not demonstrate cause for this default.
In conclusion, the Illinois appellate court's decisions on Weaver's claims of choice-of-counsel, ineffective assistance of counsel, and due process were reasonable applications of Supreme Court precedent, and his "other crimes" claim was procedurally defaulted. The district court's judgment denying Weaver's habeas corpus petition was affirmed.
