Knight v. State University of New York at Stony Brook
Docket: Docket No. 17-54-cv
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; January 28, 2018; Federal Appellate Court
Plaintiff Anthony Knight, an African-American electrician, filed a lawsuit against the State University of New York at Stony Brook for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, following his termination after reporting racist graffiti at his worksite. The trial involved disputes over Knight's employment status under Title VII, leading to a jury trial where conflicting evidence was presented. Knight requested a judgment as a matter of law declaring him an employee, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, presided over by Judge Joanna Seybert, denied this request and allowed the jury to decide. The jury ultimately concluded that Knight was not an employee.
On appeal, Knight contended that the district court erred by submitting the employment question to the jury, misinstructing the jury on the employee determination, failing to support the jury's finding with sufficient evidence, and making other unrelated errors. The court affirmed the decision. Knight, a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, was referred to Stony Brook by the Union for a construction project. After reporting the graffiti, his employment was terminated after approximately six months. Stony Brook countered that Knight was not its employee, and the court referenced the Reid factors, a set of thirteen criteria used to establish employee status, which include aspects such as control over work, skill required, payment methods, and the nature of the working relationship.
Conflicting evidence was presented regarding Knight's employment status with Stony Brook. Knight's testimony suggested he was an employee, as Stony Brook provided some tools, but it was also shown that electricians had to supply their own basic tools. Knight argued that Stony Brook controlled the work process, receiving specific daily assignments, while Stony Brook contended that electricians had substantial control over their work, with only an overview provided. Knight indicated he received benefits from Stony Brook, but Stony Brook countered that these benefits were paid to the union, which distributed them to members.
Undisputed facts included Knight being paid by the State Comptroller and classified as an employee for tax purposes, while Stony Brook demonstrated the construction work was not part of its usual business and that Knight's employment was temporary. The evidence presented was mixed, with several factors disputed and others not favoring either party decisively. Knight moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), but the district court denied this and submitted the question of Knight's employment status to the jury, instructing them to consider the Reid factors. The jury ultimately found Knight was not an employee, resolving the case in Stony Brook's favor without addressing the other elements of Knight's retaliation claim.
On appeal, Knight argued that the question of his employment status should have been decided by a judge rather than submitted to the jury, asserting this was a legal issue. The court noted that such a determination is a question of law, reviewed de novo, and referenced a similar case where a plaintiff claimed the issue of employment status was improperly submitted to a jury.
Determining employment status may involve questions of fact or law, but submitting this issue to the jury did not necessitate a new trial. The district court has discretion to request a general verdict, and the plaintiff did not incur harm to substantial rights by allowing the jury to address the 'employee' issue within general instructions. Errors affecting substantial rights are not grounds for reversal under 28 U.S.C. § 2111, thus no reversal was warranted. The precedent set by Kirsch is applicable, reinforcing that the question of a worker's employment status can be presented to juries with appropriate legal instructions.
In addressing jury instructions on the Reid factors, Knight contends these factors should not have been included since Stony Brook did not argue that he was an independent contractor. The correctness of jury instructions is assessed as a legal question reviewed de novo. The Supreme Court's Reid decision established that when Congress refers to 'employee' without a clear definition, it implies a conventional master-servant relationship based on common-law agency doctrine, which is evaluated using thirteen non-exclusive Reid factors. These factors were confirmed as the appropriate standard for assessing employee status under Title VII, even if they primarily differentiate employees from independent contractors. Knight did not propose an alternative test for determining employee status, apart from mentioning the 'joint employer' theory in specific instances.
The court addressed the issue of whether Knight was an employee of Stony Brook, rejecting the application of the "joint employer" theory as outlined in Arculeo v. On-Site Sales, Mktg. LLC, emphasizing that it does not resolve whether an individual is an employee of a single entity. The court upheld the use of the Reid factors to determine Knight's employment status. Knight contended that these factors demonstrated he was an employee, but the court ruled he was barred from this argument on appeal due to his failure to file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) after the jury's verdict, as established in Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. The jury's determination that Knight was not Stony Brook's employee was based on disputed evidence regarding the Reid factors, which required factual resolution by the jury.
Knight also challenged various evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, but these were deemed irrelevant since the jury had been instructed to consider them only if it first found Knight to be an employee. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, noting that conflicting testimonies regarding the timing of Knight's report of graffiti and his termination did not alter the jury's findings, which were decided on other grounds.
A district judge is not in error for choosing not to require a special verdict, regardless of the reasoning behind the decision. The Supreme Court has affirmed that in cases under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), the jury is responsible for determining the employer/employee relationship. In Baker v. Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., it was established that although the classification of an individual as an employee is a legal question, it involves factual elements suitable for jury consideration when guided by appropriate legal instructions. If evidence clearly indicates the absence or presence of a master-servant relationship, the court makes that determination; otherwise, it is the jury's role to decide after receiving court instructions on relevant factual matters. Furthermore, in response to Knight's assertion that Stony Brook failed to prove he was an independent contractor, it is highlighted that the defendant does not need to label the plaintiff's relationship. Instead, the burden lies with the plaintiff to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the fact-finder, that he qualifies as an employee under the statute, regardless of how his status may be labeled.
