Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; October 5, 2017; Federal Appellate Court
Corey Jones appeals his 180-month prison sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York after being convicted of assaulting a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111. Jones contends that, following the Supreme Court’s Johnson v. United States decision, New York first-degree robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under the Career Offender Guideline, thus challenging his designation as a career offender. However, the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Beckles v. United States confirmed that the residual clause of the Career Offender Guideline is not unconstitutional. The court found that New York first-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under this residual clause, negating the need to consider Jones' argument regarding the force clause. The court deemed Jones' sentence substantively reasonable and affirmed the district court's decision, remanding the case for any further necessary considerations.
Background context reveals that Jones was serving a federal sentence for gun possession when he threatened a halfway house staff member, which led to his transfer to prison custody. In the process of being taken into custody, he assaulted two Deputy U.S. Marshals, resulting in injuries to one marshal. The pre-sentence report initially set a base offense level for the assault but ultimately classified Jones as a career offender due to his prior felony convictions, significantly increasing his sentencing range. The district court accepted these findings and imposed a sentence of 180 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Jones disputes both his career offender designation and the reasonableness of his sentence on appeal.
Jones' appeal was initially resolved in his favor, with the government conceding the residual clause was void for vagueness and the court concluding the force clause was inapplicable to him. However, the opinion was vacated pending the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles, which addressed the constitutionality of the Career Offender Guideline's residual clause. The Supreme Court ruled that this clause is immune from void-for-vagueness challenges, aligning with the general belief post-Johnson v. United States that the clause was unconstitutional.
Following Beckles, the court invited further briefs to determine whether first-degree robbery under New York law qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause. The court found that it does, thus negating the need to consider Jones' arguments related to the force clause. Jones had previously contested his career offender designation solely based on his juvenile status at the time of his robbery conviction, without disputing that robbery in New York constitutes a crime of violence.
The court will review his current challenge under a plain error standard, which requires showing that (1) an error occurred, (2) it was plain, (3) it affected substantial rights, and (4) it undermined the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. The appeal involves the relationship between state criminal law and federal sentencing guidelines, specifically whether first-degree robbery in New York, as defined in New York Penal Law §§ 160.00 and 160.15, is categorically a crime of violence. Under New York law, robbery involves the forcible stealing of property, which is defined as a larceny that involves the use or threatened immediate use of physical force. First-degree robbery includes additional aggravating factors that increase its severity, such as causing serious physical injury, being armed with a deadly weapon, or using a dangerous instrument.
The Career Offender Guideline enhances sentences for federal defendants meeting specific criteria: (1) the defendant must be at least 18 years old at the time of the current felony conviction; (2) the current conviction must be a felony classified as a crime of violence; and (3) the defendant must have at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. At the time of Jones’ 2015 sentencing, the definition of "crime of violence" included both a "force clause," which encompasses felonies involving the use or threat of physical force, and a "residual clause," which covers offenses presenting a serious risk of physical injury.
The methodology for determining if a state conviction qualifies as a predicate offense for federal sentence enhancement involves two approaches: the categorical approach and the modified categorical approach. The categorical approach examines only the legal elements of the state statute to establish whether they align with the federal definition. If the state statute encompasses conduct beyond the federal definitions, it does not qualify as a crime of violence.
The Supreme Court emphasizes that the inquiry should be limited to the legal elements of the statute, excluding facts of the underlying crime, to avoid unfairness and potential errors associated with non-elemental facts. This ensures the focus remains on the existence of prior convictions rather than the specifics of how those crimes were committed.
State statutes may criminalize multiple acts in the alternative, prompting courts to use the modified categorical approach if the statute is "divisible" into separate crimes. A statute is considered divisible if it lists elements in the alternative, defining multiple crimes rather than merely presenting various factual means of committing a single crime. In applying the modified categorical approach, courts can examine a limited class of documents (e.g., indictment, jury instructions) to identify the specific crime for which a defendant was convicted.
New York's first-degree robbery statute is deemed divisible, outlining four categories based on specific actions, such as causing serious injury or using a deadly weapon. In typical cases, courts would review records to determine which category applied, but if records are unavailable, they can still evaluate whether the least act proscribed by the statute qualifies as a predicate offense for career offender enhancement. The least act identified is "forcibly stealing property" while "armed with a deadly weapon."
The core question is whether this act constitutes a crime of violence under the residual clause of the Career Offender Guideline. Previous opinions focused solely on the force clause and did not address the residual clause, especially since it was deemed unconstitutional based on Johnson II. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles, which ruled that the Guidelines cannot be void for vagueness, the court is now positioned to determine if New York's first-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause.
Jones’ conviction for first-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause. The minimum conduct associated with this offense, which both parties agree upon, involves "forcibly stealing property" while armed with a deadly weapon. The residual clause defines a crime of violence as any offense presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, which is clearly satisfied by the actions of a robber in this context. The commentary to the Guidelines at the time of Jones’ sentencing explicitly categorized robbery as a crime of violence, and such commentary is given controlling weight unless it conflicts with federal law, violates the Constitution, or is erroneous. Jones did not identify any issues with this classification.
To categorize a prior conviction as a crime of violence, a categorical approach is taken, comparing the state statute to the generic definition of robbery. There is a consensus across all states that robbery involves taking property by force or intimidation, reinforcing that New York's definition of first-degree robbery aligns with this understanding. Jones argues that New York’s statute is broader than the generic definition, claiming it allows for the use of force after taking property. However, the New York law specifies that "forcible stealing" includes the “use or threat of immediate use of physical force” during the act of committing larceny, indicating that the requisite force must occur in the course of the theft itself, consistent with the generic definition of robbery.
Robbery's definition is broader than traditionally acknowledged, as many states have expanded it beyond the common law's requirement of force or threat occurring simultaneously with property assertion. The Model Penal Code supports this broader interpretation, accounting for situations where force is used after a theft attempt. New York law specifies that force must occur during the commission of larceny or immediate flight following theft, and no evidence shows that it criminalizes force used after the robber has reached a place of safety. Consequently, New York's definition aligns with the generic definition of robbery as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Jones' argument that first-degree robbery is not a crime of violence under this definition lacks merit, and the district court correctly sentenced him as a career offender.
Regarding the substantive reasonableness of Jones' 180-month sentence, the court applies an abuse of discretion standard. A sentence deemed substantively unreasonable must be excessively disproportionate or unsupported by law, which is rare for sentences within the Guidelines range. Jones’ Guidelines range was 210 to 262 months, adjusted to a maximum of 240 months due to statutory limits. The imposed 180-month sentence, while significant, is substantially below the calculated range and not considered unreasonable.
Jones argues that a fifteen-year sentence for assaulting a federal officer by biting the victim's finger is substantively unreasonable, especially since the injury was not permanent. However, the district court justified the sentence based on several factors: (1) the need to promote respect for the law and cooperation with law enforcement, (2) Jones' extensive criminal history, which includes seven prior convictions and designation as a career offender for two serious offenses, and (3) his significant history of misconduct while incarcerated, with twenty-seven disciplinary incidents. Jones compares his sentence to others with similar convictions who received lighter sentences for arguably more serious conduct. Nonetheless, the court emphasizes that the disparity in sentencing does not indicate that Jones' sentence is unreasonable, as his criminal history and career offender status are critical differentiators. Consequently, the court affirms the sentence and remands for further proceedings, referencing changes to the Sentencing Guidelines following Johnson v. United States, which removed the residual clause deemed problematic. This amendment aims to address confusion in application and litigation over the clause's constitutionality. Relevant to Jones, the Guidelines applied were those in effect at the time of his sentencing on April 24, 2015. Additionally, a referenced I.Q. score indicates Jones falls within the 'mentally deficient' range, but this classification does not impact the sentencing outcome. The commentary on the definition of "crime of violence" outlines various offenses qualifying under this categorization, which includes actions that involve the use or threat of physical force.
