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Lee v. York County School Division
Citation: 484 F.3d 687Docket: No. 06-1363
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; May 2, 2007; Federal Appellate Court
The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the York County School Board, its Board of Education members, and the School Superintendent regarding Plaintiff William Lee's First Amendment free speech claim. Lee, a high school Spanish teacher, alleged that the School Board violated his rights by removing postings from his classroom bulletin boards. The district court ruled that the materials were curricular and did not address public concern, rejecting Lee's argument for a First Amendment right to post such materials. In 2001, Lee began teaching at Tabb High School after a prior year at a middle school. In October 2004, the School Board received a complaint about overly religious materials on his bulletin boards. Principal Crispin Zanca was tasked with investigating the complaint, and upon reviewing the materials in Lee's absence, he found five items inappropriate for the classroom context and removed them. These included a National Day of Prayer poster and several news articles related to religious themes. Zanca later explained that there are no formal policies regarding classroom postings, but an unwritten guideline exists allowing materials relevant to the curriculum or of personal interest to teachers. Teachers at Tabb High use bulletin boards to display various materials, including quotes and articles. Principal Zanca relies on teachers' judgment for what is posted but has the authority to monitor and remove inappropriate items, guided by an unwritten policy. This policy allows broad discretion for principals to evaluate postings, deeming inappropriate those that violate the First Amendment, contain profanity, or stray from curricular objectives. Zanca assesses relevance to the curriculum when determining removals. He noted that certain materials could be appropriate in specific contexts, such as current events in relevant classes. Zanca removed five postings from teacher Lee’s classroom for being overly religious, viewing them as potentially violating the Establishment Clause and irrelevant to Spanish curriculum objectives. After being informed of a citizen's complaint, Zanca explained the removals to Lee, who subsequently sought legal permission to repost the materials but was denied. Lee acknowledged the lack of written policies on postings but recognized an unwritten practice allowing materials related to curricular objectives. He denied intending to endorse his faith through the postings, stating he chose them for their uplifting nature and believed they could be made relevant to the curriculum. Lee emphasized that teachers often use creative materials to engage students. Lee, a teacher, expressed a sense of responsibility for the emotional and social well-being of his students, citing the potential benefits of certain classroom materials, such as a poster of George Washington, an article on Attorney General Ashcroft, and a newsletter from the Peninsula Rescue Mission. He believed these items could provide hope and inspiration. On August 11, 2005, Lee filed a complaint against the School Board, claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights regarding free speech, along with a motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the injunction on September 13, 2005, and an expedited discovery was ordered. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment, acknowledging no disputes of material fact. On February 23, 2006, the court granted the School Board’s motion for summary judgment, denying Lee’s. The court applied the Pickering-Connick analysis from the precedent Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education, determining that Lee's postings were curricular in nature. It defined "curriculum" broadly, including teaching methodologies as part of a teacher's responsibilities. The court found that Lee’s materials were integral to his teaching and thus not a matter of public concern, which meant they lacked First Amendment protection. Subsequently, Lee filed a notice of appeal on March 21, 2006. The review of the summary judgment is conducted de novo, considering facts favorably to the non-moving party, and summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact. The district court's ruling that Lee’s postings of Removed Items did not qualify as speech on a matter of public concern is reviewed de novo under the Pickering-Connick framework. While public school teachers retain their First Amendment rights, their speech is subject to limitations due to their employment by government-operated institutions. The state has a greater authority to regulate the speech of its employees than that of the general public. In determining whether a public employee's speech is protected, courts balance the employee's interests in free expression against the employer's interests in maintaining efficient public service. The analysis involves two inquiries: first, whether the speech is that of a private citizen on a public concern; and second, whether the employee's interest outweighs the employer's interests. In this case, Lee's classroom postings are deemed curricular in nature, thus not constituting protected speech. Consequently, Lee cannot assert a First Amendment right to post materials without oversight from the School Board. Since Lee's speech does not meet the first prong of the Pickering-Connick test, there is no need to evaluate the second inquiry regarding the balance of interests. Furthermore, Lee's argument that his postings should be considered private citizen speech is rejected, as the context of the postings within a classroom setting is significant. The precedent set in Garcetti v. Ceballos further confirms that speech made pursuant to official duties lacks First Amendment protection. Lee argues that the Removed Items represent speech on public matters, as they relate to political issues and community interests, despite their religious aspects. Examples include articles on presidential candidates, government staff activities, and a local tragedy. While these arguments may generally be persuasive in establishing speech of public concern, they overlook significant legal precedents. Courts have recognized that public schools have the authority to regulate speech in classrooms, a power that exceeds regulation in other governmental settings. The school board's determination of inappropriate classroom speech is upheld by cases such as Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, which asserts that a teacher’s in-class conduct is not protected under the First Amendment. The school has a vested interest in maintaining classroom operations and ensuring that expressed views do not misrepresent the school’s stance. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has clarified that First Amendment rights in schools are not equivalent to those in other contexts and must align with the unique characteristics of the educational environment. Schools are thus empowered to limit classroom speech to further educational objectives, even if such limitations would not be permissible in non-school settings. Special considerations must be taken into account by reviewing courts regarding in-class speech by teacher-employees, particularly in determining if such speech is a matter of public concern. In the case of Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education, it was determined that a teacher's choice of a controversial school play did not constitute speech protected by the First Amendment. Margaret Boring claimed her transfer was retaliatory due to her selection of the play, which was performed by students at a state competition. The court assessed whether her speech was curricular, referencing the Supreme Court's definition from Hazelwood, which describes "curriculum" as school-sponsored activities perceived as having the school’s endorsement. The en banc Boring majority, led by Judge Widener, found that the selection of the play was curricular because it was faculty-supervised, involved interscholastic competition, and aimed to impart skills to students. The court concluded that this curricular nature of speech does not involve matters of public concern, categorizing disputes over curriculum as ordinary employment disputes. Thus, determining if a teacher's in-class speech is curricular is a legal question for the court, necessitating adherence to the Hazelwood criteria. To qualify as curricular, the speech must be school-sponsored and supervised by faculty, aiming to provide specific knowledge or skills. On appeal, Lee argued that his classroom postings did not meet the Hazelwood definition, as they were unrelated to his Spanish curriculum and not intended for instructional purposes. Lee contends that the Removed Items are not part of his Spanish instruction and thus do not qualify as curricular speech, claiming a First Amendment right to display any materials on classroom bulletin boards. However, legal analysis reveals that Lee's postings are indeed curricular speech, as they represent school-sponsored speech with Tabb High School's endorsement and aim to impart knowledge to students. The Hazelwood definition of curriculum extends beyond specific course objectives to include various expressive activities on school property. Prior cases, such as Fleming v. Jefferson County School District and others, affirm that school-sponsored speech encompasses activities supervised by school officials that promote educational objectives. In assessing whether Lee's speech is school-sponsored, it is crucial to determine its connection to the school and the level of school involvement. Lee's postings, although not referenced during class, were accessible in a mandatory classroom setting, leading students and parents to perceive them as endorsed by the school. Materials displayed on school-owned bulletin boards are seen as part of the curriculum and indicative of school approval. Additionally, the School Board, through Principal Zanca, exercised oversight of bulletin board content, including the Removed Items, demonstrating that while teachers have discretion in posting, their choices are subject to administrative supervision. Therefore, Lee's postings are properly characterized as school-sponsored speech bearing the school's imprimatur. Principal Zanca held the responsibility for monitoring classroom bulletin boards and had the authority to remove inappropriate postings. Since the Removed Items were displayed on school-controlled bulletin boards in a compulsory classroom, Lee's actions in posting them could be attributed to Tabb High. The definition of school-sponsored speech, as established in *Hazelwood*, encompasses a broad category of speech but requires that it be supervised by faculty and aimed at imparting specific knowledge. Lee's postings met these criteria as they were overseen by teachers and Principal Zanca, who controlled what could be displayed. Lee argued that "curriculum" should only pertain to traditional classroom instruction; however, the court recognized that classroom speech can convey particular knowledge beyond standard subject matter. For instance, in *Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County*, it was determined that projects allowing artistic expression served educational purposes. Similarly, Lee's postings aimed to communicate social and moral values to his students. He highlighted positive figures like George Washington and presented political figures to instill beneficial values. These actions were intended to contribute to the emotional and moral development of his students. Ultimately, while teachers impart more than academic knowledge, the determination of appropriate social and moral messages rests with the school board, not the courts, in line with the principle that education is primarily the responsibility of parents and local officials, rather than federal judges. Judge Widener's perspective in Boring emphasizes the importance of local school authorities controlling curriculum, rather than teachers being accountable to judicial decisions. The Removed Items, recognized as school-sponsored speech aimed at educating students at Tabb High, are deemed curricular, leading to the conclusion that disputes regarding Lee's postings are typical employment issues rather than matters of public concern protected by the First Amendment. The district court's summary judgment favoring the School Board is affirmed. The appeal facts are considered favorably for Lee, the non-moving party, with sealed identities of complainants as per a protective order. Zanca, the school administrator, had previously only removed inappropriate materials and made judgment calls on sensitive items, such as leaving up pictures related to September 11 due to their significance to the community. The First Amendment's Free Speech and Establishment Clauses are acknowledged, but Lee's Section 1983 claim is pursued solely under the Free Speech Clause. The analysis relevant to this case is based on the Pickering-Connick framework, which assesses public employee speech protections. Lee challenges this standard, advocating for the Tinker analysis instead. The Tinker analysis, established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, applies primarily to student speech rather than teacher speech. Under Tinker, the School Board cannot regulate a student's speech unless it disrupts school discipline. However, since Lee's speech is deemed curricular, the Pickering-Connick standard is applicable, as clarified in Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education. The Supreme Court's ruling in Garcetti indicates that public employees' speech made in the course of their duties is not protected under the First Amendment, though it left open the application of this principle to teaching-related speech. The parties agree that Lee’s postings are in-class speech, which requires reliance on the Hazelwood definition of "curriculum." The Boring case emphasized that the legitimacy of a school's interest in regulating a teacher's speech is a valid consideration, and Lee does not dispute the School Board's legitimate pedagogical interest. While Boring did not explicitly categorize the nature of curricular speech as a legal question, it treated it as such. The determination of whether speech is a matter of public concern is based on its curricular nature in the context of teacher speech. Lee's subjective belief regarding the curriculum's scope is irrelevant, as the Hazelwood definition extends beyond personal perspectives. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit's Fleming decision noted that certain expressive activities may be closely associated with schools without being considered school-sponsored speech. Lee additionally argues that the School Board violated his First Amendment rights by censoring his postings based on viewpoint in a nonpublic forum and failing to provide written guidelines. However, since his speech is classified as curricular and not a matter of public concern, it lacks First Amendment protection. Consequently, if a public employee's speech as a private citizen does not address a matter of public concern, the state can regulate it without infringing on First Amendment rights.