Superior Construction Co. v. Brock

Citations: 445 F.3d 1334; 2006 A.M.C. 1038; 66 A.L.R. 6th 717; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9498; 2006 WL 964105Docket: No. 05-10110

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; April 14, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

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On December 29, 2001, a pleasure boat collided with a stationary barge owned by Superior Construction Co. (Superior), resulting in significant injuries to 12 passengers. Following a bench trial, the district court found Superior liable and awarded damages totaling $19,214,689.63. Superior was the general contractor for a Florida Department of Transportation project involving the Blanding Boulevard Bridge and had chartered a barge and tugboat from Mobro Marine, which lacked permanent navigational lights. Superior implemented its own inadequate lighting plan, with only three out of ten lights on the barge and one out of two on the tug functioning. These lights were described as old and in poor condition, providing minimal visibility.

The bridge spans a wide passageway that recreational boaters typically navigate, particularly through a channel marked unofficially with spray-painted arrows. Superior had previously observed boats traveling through this channel at high speeds. However, on the night of the incident, Superior moored the barge parallel to the bridge, blocking most of the channel, and positioned the tug to form a 'T' shape with the barge. Despite being able to remove the vessels quickly, Superior opted to leave them in place and did not assess the visibility from the water after dark. As a result, the barge became nearly invisible due to its black color and insufficient lighting, leading to the allision.

Brock, along with several attendees, consumed alcohol before inviting eleven guests for a ride on his 25-foot pleasure boat. As they approached a bridge at 6:52 p.m., Brock reduced the boat's speed but failed to see a barge that was unexpectedly positioned, resulting in a collision that caused serious injuries to the passengers. A blood sample taken from Brock later revealed a blood alcohol level exceeding legal limits. Superior, the owner pro hac vice of the barge and tug involved, initiated an admiralty action seeking exoneration from liability. Appellees challenged this, claiming damages under maritime law. The district court ruled against Superior, finding it liable for the injuries incurred by the Appellees and awarding them $19,214,689.63 in damages, while determining that none of the Appellees were at fault. Superior appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its findings regarding navigation obstruction, the presumption of fault under the Pennsylvania Rule, and in its assessment of Brock's intoxication as a non-contributory factor. The appeal included a challenge to the damage award. The standards of review for the appeal dictate that findings of fact by the district court are upheld unless clearly erroneous, while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

The analysis outlines the legal framework involving the Oregon and Pennsylvania Rules in cases of allision between moving and stationary vessels. The Oregon Rule establishes a rebuttable presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object, which can be countered by evidence demonstrating that the allision was due to the stationary vessel's fault, that the moving vessel acted with reasonable care, or that the incident was unavoidable. Conversely, the Pennsylvania Rule applies when a vessel violates a statutory rule intended to prevent allisions, shifting the burden to that vessel to prove its statutory violation did not contribute to the accident. 

In this case, Appellees argue for the application of the Pennsylvania Rule against Superior, citing its obstruction of navigation as a violation of 33 U.S.C. 409, while Superior claims the Oregon Rule applies because its vessel was compliant with the stationary barge. The interplay between these rules indicates that the moving vessel initially bears the burden of proof; however, if it proves the stationary vessel's statutory violation, the burden shifts to the stationary vessel. Additionally, if both vessels are found to have violated regulations intended to prevent allisions, the Pennsylvania Rule dictates that the court must determine whether the statutory faults of both contributed to the incident, unless one vessel’s fault can be ruled out as a cause.

If each vessel successfully invokes the Pennsylvania Rule against its opponent, they must overcome a presumption of fault by proving their violation did not cause the allision. If neither vessel meets this burden, the district court will assess comparative fault and allocate liability for damages. In the case of Superior’s appeal, the district court initially presumed fault on the Appellees due to their moving vessel colliding with Superior’s stationary barge. However, it later determined that Superior violated 33 U.S.C. § 409, thus shifting the presumption of fault to Superior, which failed to prove that its violation did not contribute to the allision.

Superior contends that the district court erred in finding it violated § 409 and misapplied the Pennsylvania Rule, leading to an unjust conclusion of total fault. Section 409 prohibits obstructing navigable channels, and the court assesses compliance with this statute based on relevant facts. Prior cases, such as Orange Beach, upheld findings of obstruction when vessels blocked significant portions of waterways. The district court identified four key findings supporting its conclusion that Superior obstructed navigation: 

1. Superior’s barge blocked about 24% of the waterway's width.
2. It was tied in a location obstructing approximately 68% of a preferred navigational channel.
3. Witnesses expressed shock at the barge’s positioning before the allision.
4. A U.S. Coast Guard officer indicated that he would have issued a navigational warning had he known of the barge's location.

These factors contributed to the court’s determination that Superior's actions constituted a violation of § 409, justifying the application of the Pennsylvania Rule and the resulting allocation of fault.

Superior left the Barge and Tug inadequately lit and in an unexpected location after nautical twilight, with only four of the twelve required lights functioning. Witnesses described the operational lights as old and in poor condition, leading the district court to conclude that the vessels were virtually invisible from the water, creating a navigational hazard and violating statutory provisions under 409. The court found sufficient evidence to support its findings and determined that Superior’s violation was a direct cause of the allision, shifting the presumption of fault under the Pennsylvania Rule. 

In evaluating comparative fault, the district court considered whether Appellees, specifically Brock, violated boating under the influence statutes. Although the court assumed such a violation occurred, it found that Appellees demonstrated Brock's intoxication did not contribute to the allision. This conclusion nullified any presumption of fault against Appellees stemming from Brock's blood alcohol level. Superior challenged this finding, arguing that Brock’s intoxication legally precluded a finding of no causation, and contended that the court erred in its conclusion regarding the cause of the allision. These challenges will be addressed in subsequent analysis.

The Pennsylvania Rule shifts the burden of proof regarding causation in maritime law, establishing a stringent but not insurmountable presumption of fault for vessels violating statutes designed to prevent allisions. Over time, courts have clarified that this rule does not require vessels found at fault to demonstrate that their violations did not causally relate to a collision, even when speculative. The argument that a legally intoxicated operator necessitates an insurmountable presumption of fault has been rejected; no circuit has established such a requirement. While violations like boating under the influence (BUI) generally suggest some contribution to an allision, there may be exceptional cases where a court finds that intoxication could not have caused the incident.

In the present case, the district court determined, based on sufficient evidence, that Brock’s legal intoxication did not contribute to the allision. This conclusion rests on four key findings, including expert testimony indicating that Brock's operation of the boat demonstrated unimpaired skills and control, thereby supporting the assertion that his intoxication was not a factor in the allision.

Brock reduced the Boat's speed from 34 mph to 22 mph while approaching the Bridge, a decision supported by expert witness testimony. He accurately aimed the Boat to pass safely under the Bridge, but the unexpected position of the Barge obstructed this path. Testimony from passengers, including Appellee White, indicated that the Barge was nearly invisible until it was too late to avoid a collision. White recounted a near-instantaneous response to the sighting of the Barge, highlighting the lack of time to react. The district court concluded that Brock’s legal intoxication did not contribute to the allision, attributing the incident solely to Superior's negligent placement and inadequate lighting of the Barge, which posed a nighttime hazard without any warnings to boaters. 

Regarding the damages awarded to Appellees Tammy Bowers and Jimmie White, Superior contended that the amounts were excessively high. The court noted that findings of damages in admiralty cases are factual and should be upheld unless clearly erroneous. The district court did not provide specific findings for the damages awarded but, based on the complete record, the appellate court found sufficient information to evaluate the merits of the award without remanding for additional findings. Ultimately, the court will assess whether the total damages of $1,249,911.23 for Bowers and $3,317,277 for White constituted clear error.

Tammy Bowers suffered multiple injuries from an allision, including a ligament tear in her right hip, facial scars, cervical spine herniations, musculoskeletal injuries, and a concussion leading to migraines. Expert witness Professor Paul Mark Mason estimated her future medical expenses at $423,834.28. The district court awarded her $249,911.23 in economic damages, which was deemed reasonable despite being lower than the expert estimate. For non-economic damages, Bowers testified about the hardships of supporting her family during her husband's recovery, her ongoing pain, and permanent disfigurement. The court awarded her $1,000,000 for non-economic damages, which was supported by her testimony.

Jimmie White sustained a broken rib, cervical neck injury, and a forehead laceration due to the allision, alongside permanent neurological injuries causing chronic pain. Professor Mason estimated his future pain management costs at $1,939,781. The court awarded him $1,317,277 in economic damages, also found reasonable. White described the trauma of the incident, loss of independence, and lifelong pain, leading to a non-economic damages award of $2,000,000, which was well-supported by the evidence.

In conclusion, the district court's total damages awards of $1,249,911.23 to Bowers and $3,317,277 to White were substantial but not erroneous. The court also found that Superior violated legal standards and was solely liable for the allision and the resulting injuries, with sufficient evidence to support these conclusions.

The district court's award of damages totaling $1,249,911.23 to Bowers and $3,317,277 to White is affirmed. The incident on December 29, 2001, is classified as an allision due to the impact of a moving vessel with a stationary one. The distinction between allision and collision is noted but deemed irrelevant for the appeal. Superior, as the charterer under a bareboat charter, assumed the rights and obligations of the vessel's owner. Expert witnesses agreed that the Inland Navigation Rules do not address the lighting of a barge tied to a bridge. Jim Tipton, who did not participate in the incident, received damages for loss of consortium due to his wife's injuries from the allision. Testimony indicated the barge was inadequately lit on the night of the incident, despite being illuminated on previous occasions. Brock’s blood alcohol level (BAL) was 0.112 three and a half hours post-allision; however, the district court concluded that his potential intoxication did not cause the allision. Mobro Marine sought exoneration from liability but settled all claims through mediation, thus not part of this appeal. The district court attributed liability to the Tug, determining it was the controlling vessel that contributed to the incident, a conclusion not contested by Superior on appeal. Total damages awarded included substantial amounts to multiple claimants, with the district court explicitly distinguishing between the Oregon Rule and the Louisiana Rule.

The Oregon Rule and the Louisiana Rule both presume fault for a moving vessel that collides with a stationary object, but they differ in application: the Oregon Rule applies to vessels under their own power, while the Louisiana Rule applies to drifting vessels. The district court found that Superior violated 33 U.S.C. § 409, and the appellate court declined to address alternative findings regarding violations of 33 C.F.R. § 84.15, § 88.13, and 33 U.S.C. § 2002. Superior argues that a violation of § 409 cannot invoke the Pennsylvania Rule because it lacks a clear standard regarding what constitutes an obstruction. However, the cases cited by Superior do not support this claim, as they do not mention § 409 or establish that it precludes the application of the Pennsylvania Rule. Furthermore, the appellate court highlighted that their circuit has consistently upheld the use of § 409 violations to invoke the Pennsylvania Rule. Superior's assertion that a safe passage for vessels negates a § 409 violation mischaracterizes prior rulings, which emphasize that the analysis must consider all relevant facts and circumstances. The appellate court cited a specific case where the presence of a moored vessel did not exempt it from violating § 409, despite the possibility of navigating around it. Additionally, Superior's failure to preserve the lights on its Barge and Tug on December 29, 2001, limited the district court's ability to inspect them. Superior contended that the district court erred in finding it disposed of the lights in bad faith.

Adverse inferences regarding the condition of the lights used during the accident involving Superior were not justified, as the district court's findings stemmed from witness testimony rather than assumptions of bad faith spoliation. Although there was evidence suggesting bad faith by Superior, the court did not explicitly state that Superior acted in bad faith or draw adverse inferences about the lights' quality. The relevant statutes, 33 C.F.R. 95.020 and Florida Statutes 327.35, are designed to prevent allisions, and the expert testimony on whether Brock's blood alcohol level exceeded legal limits was conflicting. The district court did not resolve this dispute but assumed Brock violated the statutes while concluding that this violation did not cause the allision under the Pennsylvania Rule. Superior's claim that the court misapplied the Pennsylvania Rule by stating Brock’s intoxication "was not a cause" instead of "could not have been a cause" was rejected; the court provided sufficient factual support for its conclusions. Additionally, Superior's arguments regarding the comparative negligence of Brock and other Appellees for their safety practices were found to lack merit, as the district court did not err in determining that none contributed to the accident or their injuries.