Williams v. Board of Regents of the University System
Docket: No. 04-13800
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; March 8, 2006; Federal Appellate Court
The appeal centers on whether Tiffany Williams, a University of Georgia student, provided sufficient facts to support her Title IX claim concerning student-on-student sexual harassment. On January 14, 2002, Williams was invited to the room of UGA basketball player Tony Cole, where they engaged in consensual sex. Unknown to her, football player Brandon Williams was hiding in the closet, having conspired with Cole to ambush her. After Cole left the room, Brandon sexually assaulted and attempted to rape Williams. During this, Cole was on the phone with teammates, boasting about the incident. Steven Thomas later arrived and, with Cole's encouragement, sexually assaulted Williams as well.
After the assault, Williams confided in her friend Jennifer Shaughnessy, who urged her to report the incident to the police. However, Williams hesitated due to fear. Following a phone call from Thomas, who identified himself, Shaughnessy answered and dismissed him. Eventually, Williams called her mother, who reported the assault to UGA Police. They arrived shortly after 1:00 a.m. on January 15, assisted Williams with a sexual assault examination, and began an investigation, which included reviewing Cole's phone records.
The investigation corroborated Williams's claims through testimonies from others, indicating the actions of Cole, Brandon, and Thomas constituted sexual harassment under UGA's policy. However, the applicable policy at the time categorized harassment between students as a disciplinary issue to be reported to the Office of Student Affairs rather than handled under the Sexual Harassment Policy. The assailants were charged with disorderly conduct, and their coaches suspended them from their teams. Williams ultimately withdrew from the university following the incident.
A UGA judiciary panel held hearings nearly a year after a January 2002 incident involving Cole, Brandon Williams, and Thomas, ultimately deciding not to sanction any of them. By the time of the hearing, Cole and Williams had left UGA, and Thomas departed in September 2003. Although the three faced criminal charges, Williams was acquitted, and the charges against Cole and Thomas were dismissed. Williams's complaint alleges that UGA officials, including former head coach James Harrick, Athletic Director Vincent Dooley, and President Michael Adams, were complicit in recruiting Cole despite his known disciplinary and criminal issues, including previous allegations of sexual assault while at other colleges. Specifically, Cole had been dismissed from Wabash Valley College for disciplinary problems and faced sexual assault allegations at the Community College of Rhode Island, to which he pleaded no contest to misdemeanor trespass.
Williams's lawsuit included claims against UGA, the Board of Regents, and UGAA for Title IX violations; against Adams, Harrick, and Dooley under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and state law tort claims against Cole, Williams, and Thomas. She sought injunctive relief for policies to prevent sexual harassment. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, leading Williams to amend her complaint with further factual details. The district court dismissed her Title IX and § 1983 claims, denied her requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, and partially granted her motion to amend. It also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims, ultimately dismissing all claims. Williams appealed, and upon review, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of her Title IX claims against UGA and UGAA and her motion to amend, while affirming all other aspects of the district court's ruling. The review standard applied was de novo, with a focus on whether the plaintiff could prove any facts supporting her claims. Williams raised four specific issues on appeal regarding the dismissal and amendments.
Williams contends that the district court incorrectly denied her motion to amend her complaint to include claims for declaratory judgments against UGA, the Board of Regents, and UGAA. In her first amended complaint, she sought declarations that the application of the sexual harassment policy to her and similarly situated female students was unconstitutional and violated equal protection laws. At the time of filing, the Board of Regents, UGA, Adams, and Dooley had filed a motion to dismiss, while only Thomas had answered. According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may amend their pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served, and a motion to dismiss is not considered a responsive pleading. Since not all defendants had filed responsive pleadings, Williams was entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of course. However, the district court required her to obtain consent from opposing parties or seek leave to amend, ultimately allowing her to add factual allegations but rejecting her claims for declaratory judgments as futile. The court erred by not allowing Williams to amend as a matter of course, as Thomas was the only defendant who had responded.
Additionally, Williams argues that the district court erred in dismissing her Title IX claims against UGA, the Board of Regents, and UGAA. The court concluded that her claims failed due to a lack of meeting the deliberate indifference standard required under Title IX, which prohibits discrimination based on sex in education programs receiving federal funding. While Title IX does not explicitly permit private enforcement suits, the Supreme Court has recognized an implied right of action for individuals to seek enforcement, including the possibility of monetary damages for sexual harassment, which constitutes discrimination in educational settings under certain circumstances.
A plaintiff must establish four elements to recover under Title IX for student-on-student harassment:
1. The defendant must be a recipient of Title IX funding.
2. An 'appropriate person' within the institution must have actual knowledge of the alleged harassment or discrimination. This person must have the authority to take corrective action.
3. The funding recipient is liable only if it acted with deliberate indifference to known harassment, focusing on the recipient's conduct rather than the harasser's, ensuring that the recipient's indifference caused the discrimination.
4. The discrimination must be severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, significantly impeding the victim's access to educational opportunities.
In the case involving the Board of Regents, the district court correctly dismissed Williams's Title IX claim because she did not allege that any appropriate person within the Board had actual knowledge of the discrimination. While Williams claimed the Board appointed Adams, he is not a Board member and lacks authority to change Board policies.
Conversely, in claims against UGA and UGAA, the district court erred in dismissing those claims. UGA is acknowledged as a Title IX funding recipient, and even though UGAA disputes its status, Williams provided sufficient facts to treat UGAA as a funding recipient based on its control over UGA's athletic department and funding received. The court emphasized the importance of holding indirect funding recipients liable to avoid evasion of Title IX responsibilities. Furthermore, Williams sufficiently alleged that an appropriate person at both UGA and UGAA, specifically Adams and Dooley, had actual knowledge of the harassment she faced.
Cole was recruited and admitted to UGA despite a history of misconduct at other institutions. A January 14, 2002 incident involving Cole and others is central to the allegations. Williams claims that UGA and UGAA inadequately addressed student-on-student harassment and failed to communicate sexual harassment policies to athletes. Adams and Dooley, who had authority to implement corrective measures, are alleged to have acted with deliberate indifference to Williams's claims of discrimination, which is necessary to establish a Title IX violation.
Case law indicates that a funding recipient is considered deliberately indifferent only if its response to harassment is clearly unreasonable given the circumstances. Williams argues that UGA's response was insufficient: despite a thorough investigation by UGA Police, the university took nearly eleven months to hold a disciplinary hearing. By that time, two of the alleged assailants had left UGA. The delay in disciplinary proceedings is criticized, especially since UGA Police’s report provided substantial evidence supporting Williams's account of the incident.
Moreover, UGA’s justification for the delay, citing ongoing criminal trials, is challenged on several grounds, including that the criminal proceedings did not prevent UGA from initiating its own processes. The failure to establish a grievance procedure, while not in itself constituting Title IX discrimination, is relevant to the overall assessment of UGA’s handling of harassment claims. The document underscores that the lack of proactive measures and communication about harassment policies contributed to the alleged indifference of UGA and UGAA.
UGA and UGAA exhibited minimal control over Cole despite awareness of his prior misconduct and failed to enforce existing harassment policies. Williams alleges that the defendants knowingly admitted Cole, responded inadequately to her allegations, and lacked effective procedures for addressing student-on-student harassment, demonstrating deliberate indifference to her situation. The discrimination Williams faced was found to be 'severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive,' not merely a single instance of peer harassment but involving a conspiracy among multiple individuals committing sexual misconduct. The failure to act on these issues contributed to Williams experiencing discrimination that effectively barred her access to educational opportunities. Although her allegations regarding the impact on her access to education are limited, the circumstances surrounding Cole’s admission and the subsequent incidents suggest her withdrawal from UGA was due to trauma from the events. The district court's dismissal of Williams's § 1983 claims against Adams, Harrick, and Dooley, as well as against the Board of Regents and UGA, was based on her failure to adequately state a claim and the defendants’ qualified immunity.
The district court dismissed all claims against defendants Adams, Harrick, and Dooley based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individuals can sue state actors for violations of federal rights, but the statute itself does not create any rights; plaintiffs must identify specific rights that were violated. Williams claims that the defendants, acting under color of state law, violated her rights under Title IX by failing to implement necessary policies and under the Equal Protection Clause due to gender discrimination. She also alleges that the defendants showed deliberate indifference by admitting Cole despite his troubled history, but she does not clarify which specific rights were violated by this indifference, thus linking these claims to her Title IX and Equal Protection allegations.
Regarding Title IX, the district court dismissed Williams's § 1983 claim against the individual defendants, stating that Title IX does not permit lawsuits against individuals; only funding recipients can be held liable. The court determined that allowing a § 1983 claim against individuals would circumvent Title IX’s limitations.
For the Equal Protection Clause claims, the district court dismissed Williams's second § 1983 claim against the individuals, citing qualified immunity and Williams's failure to state a claim. The court affirmed that qualified immunity protects government officials from liability unless they violate clearly established rights. The burden initially lies with the defendants to demonstrate that they acted within their discretionary authority, after which the plaintiff must show that the law was sufficiently clear at the time of the alleged misconduct to alert the defendants that their actions were unconstitutional. The court indicated that the defendants successfully met their burden, and thus the inquiry focused on whether the plaintiff could demonstrate that the defendants had fair warning of the alleged constitutional violation. The law does not require the precise conduct to have been previously deemed unlawful, but it must be clear enough that a reasonable official would recognize the violation.
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees a federal constitutional right against sex discrimination. Williams has alleged a significant incident reflecting a troubling trend on university campuses, claiming that defendants Adams, Harrick, and Dooley prioritized the basketball talents of Cole, despite being aware of his prior criminal and disciplinary issues. Williams argues that their actions, in conjunction with others, may constitute discrimination under Title IX. Although the defendants displayed reckless disregard for potential harm due to their "win at all costs" mentality, Williams did not provide cases demonstrating a violation of her established equal protection rights in recruiting Cole. Consequently, Adams, Harrick, and Dooley are granted qualified immunity.
Additionally, Williams filed Section 1983 claims against these defendants in their official capacities, which the district court dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. This ruling is upheld, as the claims against the individual capacities were also dismissed for similar reasons. Regarding claims against UGA and the Board of Regents, the Eleventh Amendment prevents suits against these state entities, and while Congress has abrogated state immunity for Title IX cases, it has not done so for Section 1983 claims. Therefore, Williams's 1983 claims against UGA and the Board of Regents are barred.
Lastly, Williams contests the dismissal of her request for injunctive relief aimed at implementing protective policies against student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX. Her initial complaint sought to compel the defendants, including UGA and the Board of Regents, to adopt specific policies, which were further detailed in her amended complaint. These policies included notification procedures, comprehensive investigations, defined timelines, outcomes communication, and measures to prevent recurrence of harassment.
Williams’s claims were dismissed by the district court due to lack of standing under Article III, which requires three elements: (1) an injury-in-fact that is concrete and particularized; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's action; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury. The court found that Williams's claims for injunctive relief were conjectural, as the alleged assailants no longer attended UGA, and Williams herself was no longer a student there. While she argued that a new sexual harassment policy could prevent future harm, the court deemed this argument insufficiently concrete.
Additionally, the district court dismissed Williams's state law claims against Cole, Brandon Williams, and Thomas, stating it would not exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claims. Although Williams indicated an intention to appeal these state law claims, she did not address them in her appeal briefs, leading the court to conclude she waived the argument. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Williams’s Title IX claims against UGA and UGAA, allowing her to file an amended complaint, while affirming all other district court rulings.
The district court dismissed Williams's claims based on a motion to dismiss, necessitating the acceptance of her allegations as true. The term "running a train" refers to gang rape. Under Rule 15(a), a party may amend pleadings with court permission or written consent from the opposing party, and courts should liberally allow amendments unless deemed futile. While the district court found the complaint insufficient in alleging UGAA's involvement in the discrimination stemming from the January 14 incident, it left the determination of UGAA's role to the district court. Williams's reliance on Seamons v. Snow was noted, but the court clarified that it supported the opposite conclusion. Although Williams did not explicitly allege a § 1983 claim against UGAA, she argued that her complaint should encompass any recoverable theory. However, the court maintained that the Eleventh Amendment precludes such a claim against UGAA. Additionally, any claim for injunctive relief in her first amended complaint was properly dismissed, as the district court's ruling was a legal determination, distinct from denying an amendment due to futility.
