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Miller v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center
Citations: 421 F.3d 342; 2005 WL 1950352Docket: Nos. 02-10190, 02-30318 and 02-30369
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; August 15, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
The consolidated appeal examines whether states waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal lawsuits under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by accepting federal funds conditioned on such a waiver. The court reaffirms its previous ruling in Pace v. Bogalusa City School Board, concluding that acceptance of federal funds indeed waives a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, as stipulated in 42 U.S.C. §2000d-7. In this case, Louisiana's Department of Education (LADOE), the Department of Social Services (DSS), and Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center (TTUHSC) contested district court rulings that mandated their amenability to suit after accepting federal funds with explicit waiver conditions. While prior rulings had suggested a lack of waiver due to the belief that states had no immunity to waive at the time of acceptance, the en banc ruling in Pace II established that waiver occurs under the specified conditions. The defendants concede that most of their arguments are foreclosed by Pace II, except for three main points: (1) LADOE and TTUHSC argue there was no valid waiver because state law did not expressly authorize them to waive immunity under §504; (2) TTUHSC questions whether the conditions imposed by §504 and §2000d-7 are reasonably related to the purpose of the federal funds, a requirement from the Supreme Court's South Dakota v. Dole decision; (3) LADOE claims it did not "knowingly waive" its immunity upon accepting federal funds, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education. The court begins by addressing the defendants' argument regarding the lack of express authority to waive immunity, clarifying that their authority to accept federal funds does not imply a lack of ability to waive immunity, and that grant programs should be interpreted under standard contractual principles. Defendants authorized by the State to accept federal funds under the Spending Clause must comply with the conditions attached, specifically the waiver of immunity from federal lawsuits as stipulated in §2000d-7. This acceptance, derived from statutory powers of attorney, inherently includes the obligation to adhere to these conditions. States can either reject the federal funds and the associated waiver or accept both; they cannot selectively accept the funds while simultaneously rejecting the waiver condition by claiming a lack of authority. In response to TTUHSC's argument that §504 and §2000d-7 are unconstitutional for placing unrelated conditions on federal grants, it was noted that TTUHSC failed to raise this issue in prior briefs, resulting in a waiver of the argument. The court emphasized that a party must present its arguments at earlier stages to retain them for en banc consideration. Even if the relatedness argument pertains to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court aligned with other circuits that assert accepting federal funds waives any immunity, regardless of whether the funds are specifically designated for anti-discrimination efforts under §504. A referenced case, Koslow, exemplifies this principle, where the acceptance of federal assistance led to a waiver of immunity despite the funds not being earmarked for the goals of §504. The Koslow court determined that an agency’s acceptance of federal funding constitutes a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, even if those funds are not specifically designated for Rehabilitation Act purposes. The court provided three main reasons for this conclusion: 1. The Rehabilitation Act reflects Congress's clear intent to combat disability-based discrimination within state agencies, indicating that the waiver of immunity for claims by employees aligns with this significant interest. 2. The waiver applies solely to the agency receiving federal funds, in accordance with §2000d-7, which ensures a connection to the "relatedness" requirement established in Dole. 3. Practically, federal funds received by agencies are often untracked, complicating the determination of their specific use, which underscores the need for a waiver. The court rejected TTUHSC's claim that its federal educational funding was unrelated to §504's goals, thus not meeting Dole's requirements. LADOE contested that it did not "knowingly" waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting federal funds, a point already addressed and dismissed by the en banc majority in Pace II. LADOE argued for a reevaluation based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, which discussed notice regarding federal funding and liability. However, the en banc court in Pace II clarified that the relevant knowledge pertains to a state's awareness of the need to waive immunity in order to receive funding, rather than its understanding of its own immunity status. The court found that §504 and §2000d-7 explicitly conditioned federal funding on the waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, thus affirming that LADOE had "knowingly waived" its immunity. LADOE did not contest the clarity of the statutory provisions but argued that Jackson replaced the "clear statement rule" with a "notice" requirement regarding potential liabilities under federal statutes. A State must be aware of the conditions associated with federal funds to demonstrate "knowing acceptance" of those conditions, as reiterated by the Court in relation to its decision in Pennhurst. Although Title IX does not specify whether fund recipients can face retaliation suits, the Court inferred sufficient "notice" for the school board based on precedents interpreting Title IX broadly, particularly following cases like Cannon v. University of Chicago, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., and Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed. LADOE's argument suggesting that Jackson overruled the "clear statement rule" established in College Savings Bank and applied in Pace II was rejected. The Court noted that Title IX's ambiguity regarding retaliation differs from the explicit conditions outlined in the Spending Clause statutes addressed in Pace II, particularly Section 2000d-7, which clearly waives Eleventh Amendment immunity for accepting federal funds. The Court emphasized that Jackson does not undermine the necessity of a clear statement for a valid waiver. Consequently, LADOE's argument regarding Jackson failed, leading to the conclusion that LADOE, DSS, and TTUHSC are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The district courts' denials of the defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' §504 claims based on this immunity were affirmed, and the cases were remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, the factual background of the consolidated appeal involved Johnson, a disabled student from the University of New Orleans, who faced a revocation of financial aid following a medical emergency but successfully appealed the decision. The appeals committee delayed notifying Johnson of its decision until after the fall 2000 semester had commenced and imposed academic requirements for his financial aid eligibility. Consequently, Johnson, who struggled to meet these requirements due to a late start, had his financial aid denied for the spring 2001 semester. He subsequently filed a lawsuit against various state entities and officials, alleging discrimination against disabled students and failure to provide reasonable accommodations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Lynn August, a blind computer instructor, also filed claims against the Louisiana Department of Social Services (DSS) after losing his teaching duties due to the alleged failure to submit required materials, which he claims were submitted concurrently with a sighted instructor's approved materials. August's claims, including those under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, were largely dismissed based on state sovereign immunity, except for those under Section 504. The legal context includes the Eleventh Amendment, which protects states from being sued by citizens of other states or foreign subjects, and Section 2000d-7(a)(1), which allows federal lawsuits against states for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The cases of Johnson and August represent broader issues of discrimination against disabled individuals in educational settings and the applicability of state sovereign immunity in such claims. LADOE is designated as the State Agency for federal funds related to education programs under its jurisdiction, as per La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 17:24C. The State Department of Education is tasked with administering and distributing these funds. Similarly, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 46:51(6) authorizes the Department of Social Services to act as the state's agent in cooperation with the federal government for administering federal funds to support its functions. Additionally, the Texas Education Code allows the board of TTUHSC to accept and manage federal grants and gifts. The excerpt references Supreme Court rulings, particularly the Dole decision, which outlines valid conditions for Spending Clause legislation: they must benefit the general welfare, be unambiguous, reasonably related to the expenditure purpose, and not violate any constitutional provisions. It also notes that failure to raise certain arguments in initial briefs may result in waiver on appeal, supported by various case law precedents. The excerpt emphasizes the importance of thorough briefing by appellants to ensure all issues are considered by the court.