Brown v. Greiner

Citation: 409 F.3d 523Docket: Nos. 03-2242(L), 03-2269(XAP), 03-2480 and 03-2833

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; June 3, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Three consolidated appeals challenge whether New York state court rulings affirming extended sentences under the persistent felony offender statute (N.Y. Penal Law 70.10) were contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court. The key precedent referenced is *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, which mandates that any fact increasing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, except for prior convictions.

The court held that it was not unreasonable for state courts to interpret a sentencing judge's opinion regarding what sentence serves the public interest as a non-factual finding under *Apprendi*. Consequently, the judgments granting writs of habeas corpus in the cases of petitioners Brown and Rosen were reversed, while the judgment denying the writ in the case of petitioner Ramos was affirmed.

Under New York's persistent felony offender statute, individuals with multiple felony convictions can receive significantly longer sentences. This statute differentiates between persistent violent felony offenders and persistent felony offenders. For the latter, if the court believes that the defendant's history and criminal conduct warrant extended incarceration, they may impose a sentence equivalent to that for a Class A-I felony, which carries a minimum of fifteen or twenty-five years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

In the case of Nelson Brown, he was convicted of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon, generally punishable by a maximum of seven years. However, he was sentenced as a persistent felony offender under the statute.

Brown was sentenced as a persistent felony offender to an indeterminate term of fifteen years to life imprisonment after conceding two prior felony convictions. The sentencing judge expressed regret over the lack of a lesser sentencing option. Brown appealed, contesting the sufficiency of evidence and the judge's failure to provide specific reasons for his sentence. The Appellate Division ruled that Brown did not preserve his sufficiency claim for appeal but found the evidence sufficient for conviction. However, it vacated the sentence due to the lack of recorded reasons for the persistent felony offender designation and remanded for resentencing. At resentencing, the judge provided the necessary rationale and reaffirmed the fifteen years to life sentence. Brown's subsequent appeal, which invoked the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Apprendi, was dismissed by the Appellate Division as without merit. Brown was denied leave to appeal the dismissal. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which the U.S. District Court granted, determining that his sentence violated Apprendi. The State appealed this decision.

Harry Rosen was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child after abusing a four-year-old on a subway. Despite a maximum sentence of seven years for first-degree sexual abuse, Rosen was sentenced to twenty-five years to life under the persistent felony offender statute after admitting to two prior felony convictions. Evidence presented included his psychiatric history, prior abuse history, and the crime's impact on the victim's family. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction.

Rosen received permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, where he argued for the first time that his enhanced sentence as a persistent felony offender violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Apprendi. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating that the statute governing persistent felony offenders allows for enhanced sentencing based solely on prior felony convictions. The court clarified that the determination of whether to impose an enhanced sentence involves the sentencing judge's assessment of additional factors, which does not constitute fact-finding covered by the Apprendi rule. Furthermore, the court ruled that the 'mode of proceedings' exception, which permits appellate review of fundamental errors despite lack of timely objections, did not apply since Rosen failed to demonstrate a right to a jury trial for the facts necessary for his enhanced sentence. Consequently, his failure to object at sentencing barred him from raising the Apprendi issue on appeal. The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.

Rosen filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which was granted based on reasoning from a previous case, Brown. The State appealed this decision. Concurrently, Betsy Ramos was convicted of second-degree manslaughter, second-degree assault, and obstructing governmental administration, following the death of a police officer during a struggle involving her boyfriend. Despite being acquitted of second-degree murder, Ramos was sentenced as a persistent felony offender to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for manslaughter, with concurrent sentences for the other charges. After her sentencing, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in Apprendi, which Ramos later cited in her appeal. However, the Appellate Division affirmed her conviction, stating she failed to preserve her Apprendi claim for review, and her request for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. Subsequently, Ramos's habeas corpus petition in the Eastern District of New York was denied due to procedural bars stemming from her failure to raise objections in state courts. The appeal followed. The Apprendi case established that any fact increasing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, except for prior convictions, must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, emphasizing the constitutional requirement for jury determination of such facts.

The 'fact of a prior conviction' exception reconciles the principles established in Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres v. United States, allowing for increased sentencing under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) based on prior aggravated felony convictions without needing to allege these convictions in the indictment. Almendarez-Torres, who had three prior aggravated felony convictions, challenged his eighty-five-month sentence as unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court ruled that prior convictions are treated as sentencing factors, not statutory elements.

In the context of New York’s persistent offender statute, petitioners argue it violates Apprendi by allowing a judge, rather than a jury, to find facts that result in a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, without requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. They assert that the judge's evaluations regarding the defendant's history, character, and the nature of the crime constitute factual findings that should be submitted to a jury.

The State counters with three arguments: (1) habeas review is barred in some cases due to independent and adequate state procedural grounds; (2) under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the focus should be on whether the state court's interpretation of Apprendi was reasonable at the time; and (3) prior felony offenses are explicitly excluded from Apprendi's requirements, and the judge's assessment concerning public interest is not a factual finding in the relevant sense.

The court rejects the first argument, agrees with the second, and does not address the third. It notes that federal courts typically do not review procedurally defaulted arguments unless the prisoner shows cause and actual prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur.

Presumption exists against an independent and adequate state ground for a state court decision when it appears to rest primarily on federal law or is interwoven with federal law, particularly when the state law basis is unclear from the opinion. The Court of Appeals’ procedural default finding in Rosen did not arise from an adequate state ground but rather hinged on its determination that the Apprendi claim lacked merit. Had the claim been deemed meritorious, the court would have needed to assess whether it fell under the 'mode of proceedings' exception for unpreserved objections, which applies to fundamental errors affecting the validity of the proceedings. The court concluded that the Apprendi claim was not a 'mode of proceedings' error, thus allowing reliance on procedural grounds for dismissal. The Appellate Division’s ruling in Ramos, which cited Rosen, similarly indicated that Ramos failed to preserve her Apprendi claim, leading to disagreement with the district court's procedural bar decision.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) of AEDPA, a federal court must defer to state court interpretations of federal law when the state court has adjudicated claims 'on the merits.' The Appellate Division's ruling in Brown that the Apprendi claim was 'without merit' constituted a decision on the merits. In Rosen, the Court of Appeals' merit-based rejection of the Apprendi claim supported its procedural bar conclusion. Thus, both Rosen's and Brown's cases were adjudicated 'on the merits.' Ramos’s claim, similarly supported by a citation to Rosen, is also viewed as an adjudication on the merits. Consequently, all three rulings are subject to the deferential standard of 2254(d), which prohibits federal court intervention unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. This standard assesses whether the state court's interpretation was unreasonable in light of Supreme Court holdings at the time, with later decisions being irrelevant to this assessment.

State court interpretations of Apprendi are not subject to influence from subsequent Supreme Court cases like Blakely and Booker. The state courts did not unreasonably apply Apprendi, and as a result, the Petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief. New York's persistent felony offender statute allows for enhanced sentencing if a defendant has two prior felony convictions and if the court believes that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision serve the public interest. The first requirement aligns with Apprendi’s exception for the fact of a prior conviction, which all three Petitioners acknowledged. The state courts’ determination of the existence of these convictions was reasonable under Apprendi.

The second requirement involves a subjective judicial assessment of public interest, which differs significantly from the specific fact-finding in Apprendi and earlier cases. The New York Court of Appeals distinguished this assessment from the precise factual determinations necessary for increased sentences in earlier cases like Castillo and Jones, emphasizing that the traditional role of the court includes consideration of various factors in sentencing. Thus, the court deemed the second determination to be a broader evaluative process, not confined to the specific factual findings that Apprendi addressed.

The New York Court of Appeals reasonably differentiated its decision from the Apprendi ruling, asserting that determining a sentence that serves the public interest involves considerations of the defendant's history, character, and the specifics of their criminal conduct. Under N.Y. Penal Law 70.10(2), the court has discretion in sentencing without a requirement to identify specific facts prior to concluding that an extended sentence is in the public's best interest. The court found that the factors considered in this determination are distinct from the essential elements of heightened sentencing discussed in Apprendi. Consequently, the state court's decisions to uphold the sentences of the Petitioners were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of established federal law as defined by the Supreme Court. The conclusion affirmed the district court's judgment in the case of Ramos, while reversing the judgments in Brown and Rosen, directing the dismissal of those petitions. N.Y. Penal Law 70.10 defines a persistent felony offender and outlines the criteria and conditions under which extended sentences may be imposed, emphasizing the necessity for the court to document its reasoning for such decisions in the record.

Brown cross-appealed, arguing that his sentencing was based on materially false information, violating his due process rights. He claimed the State failed to prove his constructive possession of firearms, drugs, and a bulletproof vest found in his apartment. However, the court found this argument unpersuasive, citing evidence including videotaped statements from Brown's co-defendants, Brown’s admission regarding the disposal of firearms, and his pre-search statements, which supported the sentencing court’s factual findings.

The excerpt references the Supreme Court's inconsistent guidance on determining what constitutes 'clearly established Federal law' as of the time of a state-court conviction's finality. In *Williams v. Taylor*, the Court established that the threshold question under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) is whether the petitioner seeks to apply a rule established at the time of their conviction's finality. Justice O'Connor clarified that 'clearly established Federal law' refers to the holdings, not dicta, of the Court’s decisions at the relevant time. 

For the cases in question, the applicable law did not materially change from the state court decisions denying the petitioners' claims under *Apprendi* until their convictions became final. All cases were decided between the *Apprendi* ruling and subsequent interpretations. Additionally, a clerical error in the district court's opinion regarding the New York Court of Appeals’ denial date was noted, clarifying that the denial occurred on August 2, 2001, not 2002, and that the period for seeking a writ of certiorari expired in the fall of 2001. Consequently, the relevant 'clearly established Federal law' for this appeal is limited to *Apprendi* and its precedents.