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Guidry v. Dretke
Citations: 397 F.3d 306; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 745; 2005 WL 78304Docket: No. 03-20991
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; January 13, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
Howard Paul Guidry was convicted of murder for remuneration in Harris County, Texas, and sentenced to death. He received conditional federal habeas relief based on two claims: his confession violated the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and hearsay testimony against his interest violated the Sixth Amendment confrontation right. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had previously denied these claims, ruling that while the hearsay testimony was admitted erroneously, the error was harmless. The State argued that the district court erred by conducting an evidentiary hearing on the confession's constitutionality, which had already been addressed by the state trial court, and that the district court improperly rejected key state court findings and conclusions. The State contended that the district court’s conclusions regarding the erroneous admission of the confession and hearsay testimony, and their classification as not harmless error, were incorrect. Ultimately, the district court's decision to grant conditional habeas relief was affirmed, as it was determined that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable application of federal law or unreasonable factual determinations. Guidry had confessed to the murder of Farah Fratta after being arrested for bank robbery, with evidence including his confession and testimony from Prystash’s girlfriend linking him to the crime. After multiple hearings, the trial court denied his motion to suppress the confession, leading to his conviction and death sentence. Conditional federal habeas relief was granted based on two fact-intensive claims regarding Guidry's confession, which is central to his Fifth Amendment violation claim. Key events include Guidry's interrogation and confession on March 7, 1995, and an in-chambers discussion involving Detective Roberts and Guidry’s attorneys on March 15, 1995. The critical questions are whether Guidry requested his robbery-charge attorney during the March 7 interrogation and whether detectives misled him by stating his attorney had authorized his cooperation without being present. Detectives deny that Guidry requested an attorney or that they spoke with his robbery attorney, asserting that his confession was voluntary. The trial court addressed these issues through pre-trial hearings. The first hearing on August 28, 1996, was continued to allow testimony from Guidry's attorneys regarding the in-chambers conversation. A second hearing on February 20, 1997, included testimony from Guidry and his former attorneys. Ultimately, the trial court denied the suppression motion, issuing written findings and conclusions on March 27, 1997. During the 1997 hearing, Guidry recounted his March 7 interrogation, claiming his robbery attorney instructed him not to discuss anything with anyone. He described how Detectives Roberts and Hoffman transported him for questioning, confronted him with graphic evidence, and how he repeatedly requested his attorney. Guidry testified that after being left alone for about an hour, Detective Hoffman presented him with a statement implicating him, suggesting they could negotiate if he cooperated. After a second request for his attorney, Detective Hoffman allegedly told Guidry he would contact his attorney, subsequently returning to say that the attorney had authorized Guidry to answer questions. Relying on this information, Guidry then provided his initial confession. During the 1996 pre-trial hearing, Detective Roberts provided inconsistent testimony regarding his awareness of Howard Guidry's legal representation in the context of a bank robbery charge. Initially, he acknowledged being informed that Guidry had an attorney but later stated uncertainty about whether Guidry had legal counsel, claiming he never confirmed this information. When questioned about contacting Guidry's attorney, Roberts expressed doubt that he had done so and denied that Guidry requested to speak with his attorney. In the subsequent 1997 pre-trial hearing, Roberts contradicted his earlier statements, claiming he had no knowledge of Guidry having an attorney during their March 7, 1995 interrogation. However, he later admitted that Guidry did inform him of having legal representation, although he clarified that Guidry did not express a desire to consult with that attorney. Detective Hoffman, who also testified, confirmed that he read Guidry his Miranda rights multiple times and that Guidry voluntarily waived those rights and confessed, without requesting his attorney's presence during the interrogation. Hoffman was unaware of the specific charges Guidry faced at that time. Sergeant Dan Billingsley, who oversaw the interrogation, stated he believed he knew Guidry had an attorney but was unclear on when he became aware of this fact. Additionally, lawyer Gottlieb, unaffiliated with Guidry's case, recounted a conversation on March 15, 1995, involving Guidry's attorneys and law enforcement, where it was mentioned that a confession from Guidry was obtained in relation to the investigation of Farah Fratta's murder. Scott and Yarborough, newly appointed defense attorneys for Guidry, inquired about the circumstances surrounding Guidry's confession to detectives. Gottlieb testified that the detectives claimed to have obtained permission from Guidry's robbery attorney to speak with him, which shocked those present. Duer, the robbery attorney, later testified that he never permitted any discussion with Guidry and had not been contacted by detectives. Following contradictions between Gottlieb’s and the detectives' accounts during the 1996 hearing, Scott and Yarborough recognized the necessity to withdraw as counsel and requested a continuance to appoint new representation for Guidry, which was granted. At the subsequent 1997 hearing, both Scott and Yarborough recounted the in-chambers conversation where Detective Roberts asserted he had permission from Guidry's attorney to interrogate him, a statement that shocked Yarborough. Scott noted that Roberts acknowledged knowledge of Guidry's attorney and claimed permission was granted. Scott also mentioned that he initially thought Roberts was joking about the permission, but changed his view when Roberts later denied the in-chambers conversation altogether. This realization prompted Scott and Yarborough to withdraw and contact Duer, who reaffirmed that he had not had any communication with the detectives regarding Guidry. Duer testified in both 1996 and 1997 that he was never contacted regarding Mr. Guidry. During the 1997 hearing, Detective Roberts denied recollection of a 15 March in-chambers conversation. The state court orally denied a pre-trial suppression motion on 20 February 1997, deeming the in-chambers discussion irrelevant to the admissibility of Guidry’s confession, except regarding credibility. At the 1996 hearing, the trial judge waived the swearing-in of attorney Gottlieb, acknowledging her experience. However, subsequent hearings involved sworn testimony from lawyers regarding the 15 March conversation, emphasizing its importance for credibility. The state court, in admitting Guidry’s confession on 20 March 1997, summarized critical testimony from Gottlieb, Scott, and Yarborough but did not address their credibility. Following the verdict, the trial court issued findings that Guidry understood his rights and did not request an attorney, concluding that his confession was voluntary and not coerced. These findings did not address discrepancies between detective testimonies and those of the defense lawyers. The court's evaluation of Guidry emphasized his cooperation with law enforcement across various offenses, including prior confessions. Guidry acknowledged multiple confessions to police throughout his arrest history. Guidry argued that his culpability was diminished as he was merely the driver and not the shooter, which the trial court considered in evaluating his credibility and motive. In his direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Guidry raised 23 issues, including claims regarding the voluntariness of his confession, a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights when he invoked his right to counsel, and the improper admission of hearsay testimony by Gipp which infringed on his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The Court found that while Texas law requires specific findings of fact regarding the voluntariness of confessions, the trial court's findings were adequately detailed and did not need to address every piece of conflicting testimony. It upheld the trial court's determination that Guidry did not request an attorney, thereby rejecting his Fifth Amendment claim. Regarding Gipp’s testimony implicating Guidry based on Prystash’s statements, the court ruled that some of Gipp’s hearsay testimony was admissible, but her statements against Guidry's interest were inadmissible. However, this was deemed a harmless error since the strength of Guidry's confession and other evidence would likely have led to the same conviction. Later, in May 2000, Guidry filed a habeas petition asserting Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims, which the state habeas court denied without an evidentiary hearing, adopting the State’s findings verbatim. The state habeas court referenced testimony from a 1996 hearing but ignored the 1997 pre-trial hearing and did not reconcile conflicting testimony among various witnesses. The court concluded that Guidry's claims about the voluntariness of his statements were previously addressed and thus did not warrant further consideration in the habeas proceedings, additionally stating that he failed to prove a violation of his right against self-incrimination. In November 2000, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the habeas trial court's findings, denying habeas relief to Guidry. Guidry subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in November 2001, raising four claims, including Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations, and requested an evidentiary hearing. The State's response did not directly address this request but summarized relevant AEDPA standards, including the presumption of correctness for state court factual determinations under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) and conditions under which an evidentiary hearing may be barred under § 2254(e)(2). The district court issued a detailed opinion denying the State's summary judgment motion, ordering an evidentiary hearing focused on the voluntariness of Guidry’s confession. The court emphasized the necessity of further factual development to assess whether Guidry could rebut the presumption of correctness regarding the state court's finding that he did not request counsel, and to evaluate the reasonableness of the state court's decision. The evidentiary hearing was deemed appropriate to determine if the state court made an unreasonable determination per 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The State did not contest the decision to hold the hearing or oppose Guidry’s request to postpone it. During the hearing, Guidry and the attorneys provided testimony consistent with previous state pre-trial hearings, while Detective Hoffman and Sergeant Billingsley reaffirmed their earlier statements. Detective Roberts' testimony revealed critical discrepancies from his earlier statements. Notably, during Guidry's interrogation on March 7, 1995, Roberts was unaware that Guidry had legal representation. He acknowledged a conversation on March 15, 1995, which contradicted his previous 1997 pre-trial claims and confirmed he did not inform Scott about contacting Guidry's attorney, Duer. For the first time, he disclosed that he had consulted Assistant District Attorney Wilson prior to questioning Guidry regarding potential conflicts due to Guidry's incarceration. Roberts expressed concern that, given Guidry's jail time, he might have been assigned an attorney. During cross-examination, Roberts suggested that Guidry might have indicated he had legal counsel during the interrogation. In September 2003, the district court granted Guidry conditional habeas relief based on claims of an involuntary confession and improper hearsay testimony under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, respectively, while staying its judgment pending appeal. The appeal examined whether the district court erred in conducting an evidentiary hearing about the confession, challenging the state court's credibility determinations, ruling that Guidry successfully rebutted the presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and determining that the admission of the confession and hearsay testimony constituted harmful error. The court upheld that the district court properly applied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in both the hearing and the decision to grant habeas relief. The AEDPA aims to strengthen comity, finality, and federalism principles, and the state did not argue that AEDPA explicitly prohibited the district court's hearing, instead claiming it was an abuse of discretion. The State argues that the district court improperly replaced state court credibility determinations with its own during a federal habeas review, violating the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) principles. The State references case law indicating that federal courts cannot re-evaluate credibility simply because they disagree with state court findings. It claims that conducting an evidentiary hearing is an abuse of discretion when no new evidence is presented and only existing evidence is re-evaluated. While the State contends that AEDPA restricts federal evidentiary hearings to instances where state court facts were not fully developed, there is no direct authority supporting this limitation. The State's ability to raise this narrow issue is questionable, as it did not explicitly object to the evidentiary hearing in district court, despite having the opportunity to do so. The district court granted an evidentiary hearing in conjunction with its denial of the State's motion for summary judgment, yet the State did not adequately present its objections at that time. Consequently, the issue should have been more thoroughly articulated in district court to facilitate a complete record for review, promoting judicial efficiency. The State's argument regarding deference to state court decisions under AEDPA and the circumstances under which an evidentiary hearing is barred does not adequately address whether the district court abused its discretion in conducting such a hearing. The summary judgment motion does not raise this issue either. It can be argued that the narrow issue of alleged abuse of discretion was only fully articulated after the evidentiary hearing when the district court ruled. The State's contention that the district court's decision to hold the hearing was sua sponte is noted, as the court did not reference Guidry’s request for a hearing, nor did Guidry mention it in his opposition to the summary judgment. The State was not required to seek reconsideration of the hearing order to preserve the narrow issue for review. The challenge to the evidentiary hearing primarily relies on the argument that the same evidence presented in the federal hearing was also presented in prior state hearings regarding the suppression of Guidry’s confession. However, the district court could not ascertain whether the testimony would be identical, and significant differences were noted, particularly in Detective Roberts' testimony regarding his knowledge of Guidry's legal representation. Thus, the evidence was not the same, leading to the conclusion that the State's narrow issue lacks merit. The State argues that the district court improperly held an evidentiary hearing, claiming it was required to accept the state trial court’s credibility rulings based on the prior testimony of the same witnesses. However, the district court contended that it could not assess the reasonableness of the state court's decision under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) without conducting a hearing to further investigate the matter. In examining the State's summary judgment motion and the suppression hearings, the district court noted several key observations regarding the testimony surrounding an in-chambers statement. Despite the police's denial of making this statement, contradictory testimony from three attorneys raised doubts about the police's credibility. The unclear motive behind the in-chambers statement further indicated inadequacies in the state review process, which the district court found significant enough to warrant further factual development. Although the in-chambers statement did not explicitly indicate that Guidry invoked his right to counsel, it implied such a request, suggesting potential police disregard for that right. This context reinforced the district court's rationale for holding the hearing, emphasizing that it could provide substantial insights beyond the dissent's claim of limited utility in evaluating the state trial court's factual determinations. The State did not contest the district court's authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing under AEDPA but argued that the court abused its discretion regarding the state court's credibility determination. Given the narrow focus of the State's argument, detailed discussion of prior AEDPA jurisprudence was deemed unnecessary to clarify the constraints on a federal habeas court's ability to conduct such hearings. Before the enactment of AEDPA in 1996, the Supreme Court in Townsend v. Sain established the conditions under which federal habeas courts are required or permitted to conduct evidentiary hearings. A hearing is mandated if: (1) the factual dispute was not resolved in state court; (2) the state’s factual determination lacks support from the overall record; (3) the state court's fact-finding process was inadequate; (4) there are substantial allegations of newly discovered evidence; (5) material facts were inadequately developed in state proceedings; or (6) it appears the state did not provide a full and fair hearing. The Court also noted that a federal court has discretionary authority to hold a hearing even without these conditions. In contrast, AEDPA significantly restricted this discretion, particularly through 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which limits evidentiary hearings if a petitioner failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court. An evidentiary hearing can only occur if the petitioner demonstrates: (A) reliance on a new constitutional rule or previously undiscoverable factual predicate, and (B) that the facts would convincingly show that, absent a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner guilty. This standard mirrors the criteria for filing a second or successive habeas application. Subsection (e)(2) imposes a "dramatic restriction" on evidentiary hearings and applies only when there is a lack of diligence or fault on the part of the petitioner or their counsel. If a petitioner has adequately developed a factual basis in state court, subsection (e)(2) does not prevent an evidentiary hearing in federal court. Guidry obtained an evidentiary hearing in state court, presenting substantial evidence for his Fifth Amendment claim, including testimony from himself and four attorneys. The district court's decision to hold an evidentiary hearing was not restricted by subpart (e)(2), a fact acknowledged by the State during oral arguments. The dissent argued that the district court abused its discretion by holding the hearing, claiming there was no justification for considering new evidence. However, Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides district courts the discretion to conduct evidentiary hearings unless barred by subpart (e)(2). The version of Rule 8 in effect at the time required judges to review state court proceedings and determine if an evidentiary hearing was necessary. The amended Rule, effective December 1, 2004, did not change this substantive aspect. Cases such as Murphy v. Johnson and Clark v. Johnson support the interpretation that federal courts have discretion to hold hearings when not prohibited by subpart (e)(2). Furthermore, courts have previously remanded cases for evidentiary hearings despite state courts having conducted their own hearings, highlighting the federal court's discretion in these matters. The Director of the case acknowledged this discretion, noting that while subpart (e)(2) was intended to limit unnecessary hearings, it does not prevent federal courts from exercising their discretion to hold them when appropriate. The State acknowledges that certain procedural bars do not apply to Guidry's claim, which necessitated an evidentiary hearing as determined by the district court. Key reasons for this decision include: 1) Guidry's testimony, supported by four attorneys (three of whom were former assistant district attorneys), presented a potential constitutional claim that could justify relief if substantiated; 2) the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law did not address identified gaps, inconsistencies, and conflicting testimonies; and 3) the trial court failed to make essential credibility determinations, raising legitimate concerns about the evidence's contradictions. The district court, operating within the confines of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), was justified in probing these discrepancies to properly adjudicate the habeas petition. The analysis also involves implicit credibility determinations made by the state court. Notably, the conclusion that four lawyers provided false testimony is considered extraordinary and warrants further exploration through an evidentiary hearing. Alternatively, the trial court's implicit finding could suggest that while some lawyers were truthful, Detective Roberts was not, or vice versa regarding other testimonies. The lack of explicit findings on these critical issues underscores the necessity for thorough examination. In terms of AEDPA, relief for a claim previously adjudicated in state court is limited to instances where the state court's decision was either contradictory to or an unreasonable application of established federal law, or based on an unreasonable factual determination. The presumption of correctness regarding state court factual determinations can only be rebutted by the petitioner with clear and convincing evidence. The State contends that the district court improperly applied this presumption by not accepting certain factual findings from the trial court, which could undermine the required deference to the state court under AEDPA. The district court found, based on clear and convincing evidence, that it did not accept the trial court's determinations regarding Guidry's request for an attorney and whether he was informed of his attorney's permission to discuss the case. These findings hinge on credibility assessments, with the trial court deeming Guidry not credible while accepting the detectives' credibility. The trial court did not address the testimony of four lawyers who supported Guidry, leading the State to interpret this silence as an "implied" credibility determination against the lawyers. The State argues that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) restricts the district court's ability to reject these determinations, claiming that the district court erred by not presuming the correctness of the trial court's findings. The State contends that the evidence accepted by the district court is essentially the same as that presented unsuccessfully in state court, suggesting the district court improperly substituted its own credibility assessments for those of the state trial court. The dissent is criticized for not adhering to this principle. Additionally, the state habeas court made alternative findings regarding the confession's admissibility but did not analyze or mention these findings in the context of the trial court’s conclusions. The state habeas court's inability to consider the confession issue due to previous adjudication is noted, along with the general doctrine that prohibits habeas corpus applications post-direct appeal, except for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Ultimately, the state habeas court’s findings did not conflict with the trial court's and did not assess credibility, indicating that the trial court’s findings prevail. The case law supports the idea that findings from a state habeas court may be disregarded if not adopted by the appellate court. The district court appropriately concentrated on the state trial court's factual determinations. When reviewing a state court's factual findings, including credibility assessments, a district court must show respect for state courts within the federal system, as established in Miller-El v. Cockrell. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), state court factual determinations are generally presumed correct unless clearly rebutted by substantial evidence. A federal court may only overturn a state court's decision on factual grounds if it is deemed "objectively unreasonable" based on the evidence from the state proceedings. The dissent's view that the district court must defer to the state court's factual findings, even when lacking explanation regarding critical conflicting evidence, is challenged. The district court found that the state trial court failed to make necessary factual findings on critical evidence in Guidry's case and thus deemed the state court's decision as based on an unreasonable factual determination. Guidry contended that the state court did not adequately resolve significant evidentiary conflicts relevant to his claim. While the dissent argues that merely pointing out the absence of explicit credibility findings is insufficient for a habeas petitioner to discredit the state court's factual determinations, the record indicates that the trial court neglected to consider key testimony from four lawyers that supported Guidry's position, undermining its credibility assessments. Lawyers' testimony is pivotal in assessing whether Guidry requested legal counsel and if detectives falsely claimed to have consulted his attorney, Duer, who supposedly permitted Guidry to speak with them. The district court did not err in its application of subpart (e)(1). However, the state trial court's lack of findings on critical evidence for Guidry's habeas claim raised doubts about the reasonableness of its factual determinations under subpart (d)(2). The district court, having observed the demeanor of Detectives Roberts and Hoffman during a 2002 hearing and finding them not credible, preferred the credible testimonies of the lawyers and Guidry. Findings of fact from the district court are reviewed for clear error, with conclusions of law assessed de novo. The district court upheld two of Guidry’s claims: that his confession violated his Fifth Amendment rights and that hearsay testimony from Gipp breached his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The court determined that Guidry invoked his right to counsel during interrogation and that the detectives falsely induced his confession by misrepresenting their communication with his attorney. The State argues these findings are erroneous, citing ambiguous identification testimony regarding the detectives involved in a critical in-chambers conversation. Discrepancies existed among the lawyers' testimonies about the detectives' identities at prior hearings, affecting their credibility. Despite these prior hearings informing Guidry's claim, the district court's credibility determinations were based on 2002 testimony, where inconsistencies in Detective Roberts' statements were noted, highlighting conflicts across various testimonies. Detective Roberts provided inconsistent testimony regarding his presence during a critical in-chambers conversation and his knowledge of Guidry's legal representation. Initially, Roberts claimed he was not present, but later admitted to being there, albeit with no recollection of the discussion. He also contradicted himself about when he became aware of Guidry's attorney. The district court determined that Roberts and another detective lacked credibility while believing the testimonies of Guidry and his lawyers. The court found that Guidry had invoked his right to counsel and that the detectives falsely claimed they had contacted his attorney regarding his cooperation. The court noted inconsistencies in the lawyers' accounts but resolved these when Roberts confirmed his presence during the in-chambers discussion. The court ruled these findings were not clearly erroneous. The court referenced Edwards v. Arizona, establishing that an accused who requests counsel cannot be interrogated until a lawyer is available, unless the accused initiates contact. The court assessed whether Guidry's waiver of rights was knowing and voluntary, considering if it was made under coercion or deception and with full awareness of his rights. Guidry's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right was evidenced by his repeated requests to consult his attorney. Although he later signed a waiver and was informed of his Miranda rights, these actions occurred after his invocation and were based on a misunderstanding induced by police deception. The district court concluded that Guidry's confession was involuntary and the state trial court erred in not suppressing it. Consequently, the district court found that the state court's factual determinations were unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The State argued that any error in admitting the confession was harmless, a claim the district court rejected. Additionally, on direct appeal, the State acknowledged that Gipp's testimony contained hearsay, but contended it was nonetheless admissible. Gipp's hearsay testimony included statements from Prystash that implicated Guidry in the murder of Farah Fratta, detailing plans for the murder, Guidry's actions during the crime, and a financial arrangement for the killing. The district court granted habeas relief, ruling that Gipp's repetition of Prystash's statements violated Guidry's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, as the statements were hearsay and Prystash was unavailable for cross-examination. The Court of Criminal Appeals previously determined these statements were inadmissible due to lack of a hearsay exception and insufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. The district court concurred, noting Prystash had motives to deflect blame onto Guidry, and highlighted the absence of a basis to assess Prystash's credibility. Furthermore, the district court found the admission of Gipp's hearsay testimony was not a harmless error. With Guidry's confession excluded, the court identified Prystash's statements as the primary evidence supporting Guidry's conviction for capital murder. The court concluded that the hearsay testimony significantly impacted the jury's verdict. The State countered that other evidence, including witness sightings and physical evidence, sufficed to establish Guidry's involvement in the murder, but the district court maintained that the hearsay testimony was essential to the conviction. Gipp testified that she lived next to Guidry, who frequently communicated with her boyfriend, Prystash, who allegedly planned the murder, aiming for an alibi for Robert Fratta. On the day of the murder, Gipp returned home between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m., encountered Guidry on the staircase waiting for Prystash, and observed both of them dressed in black. Prystash arrived 30 minutes later, changed clothes, and left, later returning around 8:30 p.m., during which he unloaded a gun he claimed was from Fratta, stating he needed to meet Fratta for $1,000. Gipp later found bullet casings and noted details about the gun. The district court highlighted a lack of evidence linking Guidry to the murder without Prystash's confession or statements. Neighbors could not identify Guidry and some believed the assailant might be white. Although Guidry was found with the murder weapon months later, it was associated with a robbery. Under Texas law, to establish murder for remuneration, proof of the actor's intent is necessary, which must be beyond a reasonable doubt. The presence of $1,050 in Fratta's vehicle did not connect Guidry to it. The district court concluded that without the contested evidence, there was insufficient basis for a conviction, leading to the granting of conditional habeas relief, which was affirmed.