Brown v. Parker Drilling Offshore Corp.

Citations: 396 F.3d 619; 2005 A.M.C. 827; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 125; 2005 WL 19532Docket: No. 03-30782

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; January 4, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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A seaman, Rickey Brown, sued his employer, Parker Drilling Offshore Corp., claiming damages for a back injury sustained while working on their vessel. Following a jury trial, Brown was awarded damages, but Parker appealed, arguing that the jury erred in finding that Brown did not willfully conceal his prior back injuries and that Parker unreasonably withheld maintenance and cure benefits. 

The case details Brown’s history of back injuries, beginning with an incident in August 1998. He subsequently failed to disclose this injury when applying for jobs with both LeTourneau, Inc. and Parker, checking 'No' on medical questionnaires regarding previous back trouble. After allegedly injuring his back again while working for Parker in April 2001, Parker investigated the incident and concluded that Brown had concealed his medical history, leading to the withholding of maintenance and cure benefits.

Brown sued Parker for negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, retaliatory discharge, maintenance and cure benefits, and compensatory damages. The jury found in favor of Brown, determining that he was injured due to Parker's negligence and was entitled to maintenance and cure, as well as compensatory damages for the unreasonable withholding of those benefits. The district court upheld the jury's decision, but Parker appealed, asserting that Brown had indeed concealed his medical condition and that their actions were justified.

The appellate court reviews jury findings under a clear error standard, meaning it will only reverse if it is firmly convinced a mistake was made.

The jury erred in concluding that Brown did not willfully conceal his medical condition when completing Parker’s medical questionnaire. Parker argues that the jury's finding was incorrect as Brown had a history of back injuries that he failed to disclose. Under the Jones Act, an employer can investigate a seaman's claims for maintenance and cure benefits and may deny such claims if a seaman willfully conceals prior medical conditions. To prove willful concealment, the employer must demonstrate: (1) intentional misrepresentation of medical facts by the claimant, (2) that the undisclosed facts were material to the hiring decision, and (3) a connection between the withheld information and the injury claimed. 

Parker asserts that all three elements were proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Brown's negative response to a question about past or present back and neck trouble is cited as intentional concealment, particularly because he had received treatment for back injuries prior to completing the questionnaire, was terminated from LeTourneau for dishonesty regarding a workplace injury, and misrepresented his medical history during deposition. Despite this evidence, the jury found no intent to conceal. Brown offers two defenses for this finding: that the questionnaire's question is compound and that he misunderstood the term "trouble." However, the compound question argument was not raised at trial, thus it is waived on appeal. Furthermore, no evidence supports Brown's claim of misunderstanding, and his acknowledgment of being fired for "back trouble" reinforces the conclusion of intentional concealment.

Brown argued that he did not realize his back injuries qualified as 'trouble,' believing the term referred to more serious conditions like broken discs. During trial, Brown stated he had been treated for a 'sore back' and a 'pulled muscle,' and when asked about the Parker application regarding back trouble, he associated 'trouble' with severe injuries rather than minor strains. Despite this, he admitted he was fired from LeTourneau for back trouble, which suggested he recognized his injuries as such. The district court noted Brown's non-confrontational demeanor and the possibility that the jury might view his testimony skeptically due to his intimidation during cross-examination. However, evidence from his termination at LeTourneau indicated he was dismissed for misrepresenting his medical condition on their application, contradicting his claim of misunderstanding the term 'trouble' just two months later. Overall, the circumstances demonstrate that Brown was aware of his back issues and the implications of failing to disclose them.

Materiality and causality in the context of willful concealment were firmly established at trial. The employer's specific medical inquiry, related to the applicant's physical capability for job duties, rendered the information material. Brown's history of back injuries was directly relevant to the employer's hiring criteria. Despite Brown's claim of being able to perform heavy labor initially, this was deemed irrelevant since the employer considered past or present back and neck issues in their hiring decision. The trial demonstrated a clear causal link between Brown's past lumbar injuries and his current claim, as both injuries affected the same lumbar spine region, as confirmed by expert testimony.

Parker successfully established that Brown intended to conceal his medical history, that the undisclosed information was material to the hiring decision, and that there was a connection to the injury claimed in the lawsuit. Consequently, the district court's ruling granting Brown maintenance and cure benefits was deemed incorrect.

Additionally, the jury's finding that Parker acted unreasonably in withholding these benefits was challenged. Parker argued that its refusal to pay was justified based on Brown's willful concealment and the assertion that the injury did not occur on its vessel. The court determined that the jury erred in concluding Parker's reliance on these defenses was unreasonable, given that the concealment constituted a reasonable basis for withholding benefits. Thus, the jury's finding was reversed without needing to consider Parker's second defense.

The jury's finding that Brown did not willfully conceal his back injuries is deemed a clear error, leading to the vacation of the jury's verdict and dismissal of the matter with prejudice. The employer’s argument concerning improper jury instructions on special damages and the seaman's invocation of the Golden Rule during closing arguments is acknowledged, but not addressed as the first two arguments are sufficient for the court’s decision. The jury sided with Parker on claims of unseaworthiness and retaliatory discharge, attributing 75% liability for Brown's injuries to Parker due to Brown's contributory negligence. The district court granted Parker's remittitur motion, reducing the awarded future medical expenses from $150,000 to $100,000. The questionnaire's structure and Brown’s responses contradict his claim that he treated the question as compound; he checked 'N' for both past or present back and neck trouble. Although Parker noted Brown did not seek attorney's fees, which could imply Parker's actions were not arbitrary and capricious, this point is irrelevant to the court's determination. Compensatory damages are based on the employer’s unreasonableness rather than arbitrariness, indicating that punitive damages and attorney's fees apply if the employer is egregiously at fault. Brown's failure to pursue attorney's fees does not impact the assessment of compensatory damages.